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5750 Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60637

DISSENT issued May 1, 1970, is published bimonthly, January-February, March-April, May-June, July-August, September-October, November-December, by DISSENT Publishing Corporation, 509 Fifth Avenue, New York N.Y. 10017. Subscriptions: $7.00 for one year; $12.00 for two years; $4.50 for students for one year; foreign subscriptions, including Canada, add $1.00 for mailing costs per year. All payments from foreign countries must be made by United States money orders or checks payable in United States currency. Single copy, $1.25. For special rates on bulk orders from organizations, teachers, etc., write directly to DISSENT. For information on newsstand and bookstore distribution write to: Eastern News Co., 155 West Fifteenth Street, New York, N.Y. 10001.

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SOCIALISM IN AMERICA



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WHY WE NEED SOCIALISM IN AMERICA —*by Michael Harrington* 240

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Frank Wallick

Creeping Repression in Washington

THERE IS AN AIR OF CREEPING REPRESSION in Washington. You can detect it in many ways. Civil rights enforcement at Health, Education and Welfare is at low ebb. A voting bill is beaten in the House of Representatives, albeit narrowly. A Carswell nomination for the Supreme Court goes to the Senate, and only because of tough reporting does the public discover a chain of racist comments that make the rejected Clement Haynsworth a moderate by comparison. Then Daniel Moynihan, with great apologies after his memo surfaces, talks of an era of "benign neglect" on racial matters. The judicial clubbing of the Chicago Seven may well be followed by other trials.

How do liberals and progressives fight back? They look for leadership, and sometimes it is there. Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, normally an easy-going moderate who had restricted himself to safe issues, took on the unpleasant task of marshalling the votes against Haynsworth. When Abe Ribicoff, who was last heard from when he denounced Mayor Daley's cops from the Democratic Convention podium, joined with the Southerners to mock the North for its sins of resegregation—an opposing voice was found, this time in Senator Walter F. Mondale, a liberal's liberal with guts.

• *There are shifting coalitions* in Washington these days. While the Agnew sallies are hardening the political lineup, a group of about 15 and perhaps as many as 20 Republican moderates join with Northern liberals in the Senate to make a majority on issue after issue. Nixon and Agnew popularity ratings may rise and fall a little, then rise again—but on the anti-ballistic issue, new priorities, and school bussing, Republican moderates join with liberal Democrats.

The story of the near-win or near-miss on ABM is not generally understood. Cynics are inclined to write it off as meaningless. But there is a growing skepticism in the Senate about things military. Vietnam contributes to it. And the sickness of the cities makes a growing group of senators question lop-sided federal budgets that pour billions into defense spending. A quiet and informal lobbying effort during 1969 by scientists and military budget experts enabled many senators for the first time to hack away at the ABM and other vulnerable parts of the defense budget. "A lot of senators just never understood military-weapons jargon and they were easily intimidated by the hawks on the Armed Services Committee," is how a key member of Senator Mike Mansfield's staff explained the new Senate backbone on defense spending.

• *House liberals* are in a different set of circumstances. They are better organized, with the ten-year old Democratic Study Group, a well-financed and well-staffed caucus within the Democratic power structure. But they are hampered by House rules that give committee chairmen greater powers and more elbow room in shaping the flow and kind of legislation. House liberals have a caucus within a caucus, which includes such rough-and-tumble types as Bob Eckardt of Houston, Bob Kastenmeier of Madison, Ab Mikva of Chicago, Phil Burton of San Francisco, Don Ewards of San Jose, and Ben Rosenthal of Queens.

The Democratic Study Group, and the DSG's peppery offspring, are constantly frustrated. It is a long climb to committee or subcommittee chairmanship, and rarely does a bona fide liberal make it to the House Appropriations Committee, where the real action is and where the money is counted. Charles Joelson of New Jersey finally made it to the money committee, but was relegated to a lesser subcommittee; he then left the whole bag for a judgeship, rather than fight the system.

(*continued on page* 237)

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Lewis Coser

Indeed, They Did Grow Up Absurd

THE THEATER OF THE ABSURD is now being enacted on the public scene. Letters recently sent to a number of corporations which were subsequently bombed stated that the bomb throwers were full of loving care for mankind and therefore felt justified in destroying the offices of death-dealing corporations. They seem to think of themselves as angels of death whose innocence is vouchsaved by their loving intentions. These Jesuits of the bomb seem untouched by reflection on the relations between means and ends. Since they are convinced of the purity of their motives, they apparently feel that everything they do should be judged in the light of these motives rather than in terms of the consequences for others. Theirs is in effect a kind of magical politics. As John Dewey wrote long ago, "The principle of magic is found whenever it is hoped to get results without intelligent control of means; and also when it is supposed that means can exist and yet remain inert and inoperative."

In their desperate assaults against "the system" in general, these loving avengers seem to have the utmost contempt for human beings in particular. Like all executioners, they care not for their victims. While protesting against a "dehumanized system" they eagerly refer to its representatives as "pigs" and "vermin," thus dehumanizing them in their turn. Pigs are to be slaughtered and vermin must be exterminated, and so these modern terrorists can apparently bomb and maim with a perfectly good conscience. Imprisoned in a moral universe of total negation, these young men attempt with bombs and revolvers to evoke values they do not really possess.

They are desperate, and it would be foolish to deny that much of their desperation must be laid at the doors of a political situation that has been created by at least two administrations. Washington has shown its contempt for the young, and generally for all those who do not belong to the mindless middle of the electorate. In a very real sense, these terrorist acts are symptoms of the devolution of the democratic process in recent years. Similarly, the mass media and other purveyors of the pornography of violence have surely had a part in creating an atmosphere that is conducive to benign tolerance for the most outrageous acts of terror. *In Cold Blood* as well as *Bonnie and Clyde* helped define the latest twist of the *Zeitgeist*. But it would be wrong to exonerate the terrorists for what they do by pointing to the failings of the system which has engendered them. We must treat them as accountable and responsible for their actions. Granted that much of what is currently happening on the American scene is ultimately rooted in the failings of a society that led many of its young to grow up absurd, we owe it to them to treat them as responsible actors.

One may well be aware of the depth of despair that lies at the roots of their actions and yet castigate their conduct with the utmost vigor. Only when all standards of valuation are toppled do men react to terror without moral revulsion. (That moral rot has indeed set in is painfully evident when one reads that society ladies at Leonard Bernstein's swoon over Panthers accused of murder or that Los Angeles underground newspapers make a hero of Charles Manson, the leader of a band of young people accused of killing Sharon Tate. And one wonders how the editors of the *New York Review of Books* now feel about having printed that unclean Andrew Kopkind essay about morality growing from the barrel of a gun or for having reproduced on its front page a drawing giving instructions for the making of Molotov cocktails.)

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Men are likely to engage in a politics of terror only when they feel totally cut off from their fellows, when they do no longer trust anybody, when they feel surrounded by hostile forces over which they seem to have no control whatever. It may very well be that such conditions are at least approximated at certain times and under certain historical conditions, as in Czarist Russia or Nazi Germany. But to believe that such times and conditions do obtain in comtemporary America can only be the result of a delusionary system of thought.

THE YOUNG TERRORISTS ACT on the basis of the proposition that if you don't get what you desire, the system that denies your wants is out "to get you." The revolution of rising expectations that pervades all society has now created in some Americans the delusion of immediate gratification. What you cannot get, you destroy—like the child that smashes the toy that doesn't do its bidding.

Men who are actuated by such sentiments are not likely to respond to rational argument. When the rage for disorder takes over, the voice of reason is silenced. That is why those of us who are committed to a politics of rationality must see in these young terrorists not only the enemies of the "system" but our enemies as well. By their mindless acts they foreclose the chances of reasonable transformations. Terror on the Left is likely to generate terror on the Right, and unless we stand guard, the democratic polity will degenerate into an arena where rival gangsters will fight it out for control over the turf.

Recent terroristic acts, bomb scares and the like have proved again how extremely fragile are the structures that hold a highly technological society together. It would hence be mistaken to counter the politics of terror with the traditional Marxist arguments on the futility and ineffectiveness of individual terroristic acts. It is plain that such acts can now be much more effective than they were under less intricate societal arrangements. Even as a few grains of sand can bring a delicate machine to a stop, so a relatively few terrorists might indeed be able to bring a modern city to a standstill. The arguments against such acts can no longer be conducted in terms of efficacy but rather in terms of political and moral consequences. It is these that are disastrous and need to be countered with the utmost vigor. There can be no tolerance for this "socialism with an inhuman face."

Let us no longer be taken in by those who beg our indulgence for men whom they call well-intentioned though misguided in the means they use. When men resort to bomb and revolver in a democratic society in order to coerce their fellows, they do not merit indulgence. By all means let us see to it that they are treated with all the legal and judiciary safeguards to which they have the same right as any American citizen. But let us not ask that they remain unpunished for the crimes they have committed, if it is proved that they have indeed committed them. Anything else only reveals a failure of nerve. Those of us who oppose terror in Vietnam can do this with clean hands only if we oppose it at home too.

Jean Bloch-Michel

Dissident Voices from Paris

WE HAVE RECENTLY had some interesting new political books in France. *La Nouvelle Société*, by Jacques Chaban-Delmas, the Premier of France; *Le Grand Tournant du Socialisme*, by Roger Garaudy, a leading Communits intellectual; and *Le Manifeste du Parti Radical*, by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, the editor of *L'Express*—all three demonstrate, each in its own way, a wish to cope with a new situation, yet each also testifies to its author's inability to deal effectively with that situation—a dilemma that is shared by the people these men are addressing.

Chaban-Delmas promises France "a Swedish, albeit sunnier, socialism." But it is not he who governs France, and George Pompidou, who

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has never wanted to hear talk of so-called Gaullist Participation, is anything but a socialist, Swedish or otherwise, either in his way of thinking or acting. To achieve "socialism's big shift," Garaudy addresses a Communist party that is, as he knows perfectly well, conservative and sclerotic to the point of being incapable of the slightest political reflex. Cocooned within a sacrosanct theoretical ritual, the party is concerned solely with daily tactics and not at all with "socialism." As for Servan-Schreiber, the vehicle he has chosen for setting in motion basic structural reforms is a party that one might term nonexistent. The least to be said of the Radical party is that for the past 50 years it has been a sturdy bulwark of political and social conservatism. Furthermore, it is the party that rejected the opportunity offered it by Mendès-France.

One must see these snares for what they are. It is not true that thanks to Garaudy "something in the Communist party has changed." His recent humiliation at the Nanterre conference of the CP should be sufficient evidence of how wrong his book is. The French CP has never made a move toward de-Stalinization, much less toward any overall reevaluation of Communism in national or worldwide terms, such as the Italian Communist party attempted and only the Czech party achieved. Nor is anything changing in Gaullism or in the Radical party—and if the latter were to take seriously its new "Manifesto," it would have become something different from what it has always been. While one may feel that these men are simply going on record for a purpose —to be able some day to try their luck in political life, as is the case with Servan-Schreiber; or to be able to round up a few electors in Presidential campaigns by playing the Gaullist tune, as is the case with Chaban-Delmas; or simply to be able to say "I told you so," as is the case with Garaudy—nonetheless, the fact of putting the doctrines of the Left on trial is interesting and, particularly in the case of Garaudy and Servan-Schreiber, deserves attention.

As to Garaudy, let us pass over the fact that this political philosopher was among the most strictly and blindly obedient of Stalinists, and professes to have seen the light thanks to the "Khrushchev report" and the Twentieth Congress. If his discovery of what all the world knew has been at the root of his present reflections, his second thoughts are more interesting than his tardy enlightenment. Garaudy's point of departure is, in fact, the same as Servan-Schreiber's. To put it perhaps oversimply, one can say that both take off from the computer. That is, both affirm that a technological revolution is taking place which no one has undertaken to analyze in terms of a politico-economic theory, and the realities of which no political party is attempting to transpose into a political context. Whatever differences in language the two men exhibit, they are essentially in agreement, and which of their two formulations one chooses does not matter. The point is this: confronted by the technological revolution, capitalist and socialist governments have assumed parallel and equally fallacious positions. Capitalism holds that the problem can be resolved solely by developing the productive potential; socialism claims it will be resolved solely by a change in production relations. That is to say, both camps deem it sufficient to persevere as they have in the past for everything to work out right in the end.

The conclusions at which both men arrive can be formulated in one and the same word—"democratization." Garaudy declares that the new "historic bloc" formed by the working class and the ensemble of technicians of all kinds is henceforth to be the "productive force" in the new society—"productive force" being understood in the Marxist sense of the term. Under the present conditions, the role of this historic bloc must be broadened beyond that of the classic Communist party acting as spokesman and guide for the working class. Hence, Garaudy rejects the Soviet model.

Servan-Schreiber acknowledges the fact of the technological revolution, but asserts that the traditional structures of the capitalist world must be revised for the sake of both justice and efficiency. Both men insist that the hereditary handing down of control over the means of production must be abolished, as must any illusions that social progress is brought about by economic progress. The "Manifesto" is therefore a kind of rehabilitation of "politics" at the expense of economics. But whereas Garaudy remains faithful to the Marxist critique of capitalist society and places the responsibility for this revolution on a renewal of socialism, Servan-Schreiber contends that capitalism is more efficient in the development

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of production and intends to make his revolution "in the context of a market economy."

FOR AN AMERICAN READER, these two books must sound a familiar note. By way of analysis of the two kinds of society, Galbraith said all this long ago. Garaudy's excellent critique of American society and his conclusion that it is childish to try to make a socialist revolution in the United States but that it is appropriate to create there what he calls a "finalized capitalism"—all of it comes straight out of *The Affluent Society*. In the Galbraith book, one finds the situation already diagnosed (Keynesian production solves none of the basic social and political problems) and the solution spelled out (discard Keynesian theories and, above all, achieve the same goals through so-called nonproductive expenditures—which is to say, public services). It would therefore seem that in responding to the dual Soviet and American challenge, the two authors are, regrettably, a good ten years behind American politico-economic thinking. There's nothing surprising in this, for these problems are only now beginning to arise in France.

Whatever one may think about the effectiveness of these books, one thing is certain: at the very least, both are concerned with what has long been recognized as the basic wrong in industrial and post-industrial societies—the sense that everything happens without our being able to do anything about it. In France, as in the United States, some of our young people are beginning to feel a disgust and a hopelessness that lead them either to some form of extremism—whence the growth of the Maoists and other far-out groups that lack any roots in reality—or to pure and simple escape. There are few middle-class families who do not see a child leave home to join one of the more or less hippie-type communes that are beginning to spring up in France, or simply to go live "somewhere else" and in "some other way," driven by their repugnance for a society that can provide everything and satisfy no one. The two young *lycée* students, obviously inspired by the example of Jan Palach, who immolated themselves after the collapse of Biafra signify a grave phenomenon that must not be underestimated. It was a profound feeling of frustration, isolation, and impotence that gave birth to the revolt of May 1968. It must be said to the credit of Garaudy and Servan-Schreiber that they have understood the importance of that rebellion and, to the best of their abilities, have tried to find an answer to it. Both men attempt to do so against the opposition of a government and a party which find themselves again in agreement, in that each is prepared to respond to the revolt of the young with repression.

—*Translated by* ADRIENNE FOULKE

Harlan Hahn

Dove Sentiments Among Blue-Collar Workers

WHAT ARE THE MAJOR SOURCES of opposition to the Vietnam war? Who are the hawks? What does the "silent majority" really think?

Among political commentators, public officials, and even antiwar leaders, there has been a general—and unexamined—agreement that working-class citizens are not critical of the war. From scattered displays of working-class patriotism, many observers have drawn the sweeping and erroneous conclusion that blue-collar Americans favor a more aggressive policy in Vietnam. But the evidence does not support this conclusion.

On the contrary. Several studies of public attitudes have demonstrated that persons with meager incomes or limited education are more likely than those of higher status to oppose the escalation of the war and to support a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. A na-

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tional survey in 1964,[1] for example, found that 53 percent of college graduates favored to bring more American soldiers to Vietnam, even if that would mean risking war with Communist China—but only one-third of persons with only a grade-school education endorsed this policy. Opposition to the total withdrawal of U.S. forces was expressed by three-fourths of the survey's respondents with a college degree, compared to 38 percent of those who had not entered high school.

Another national survey, conducted shortly after the 1964 elections, disclosed similar results.[2] Here major support for the escalation of the war was found among the college-educated, professional or managerial occupations, and among persons earning more than $10,000 annually; the strongest approval of a complete withdrawal from Vietnam, however, was registered among Americans who had not finished high school, those with annual incomes below $5,000, and among blue-collar employees. Even during the initial stages of the conflict, military intervention in Vietnam was viewed less favorably by working-class than by middle- or upper-middle-class voters.

As American involvement in the war increased, this pattern seemed to continue, and even to intensify. Public opinion polls in 1968 and 1969 revealed that low-income and poorly educated citizens tended to call themselves "doves," while higher-status persons preferred the designation of "hawks."[3] Manual workers expressed stronger support for both an immediate and/or gradual withdrawal from Vietnam than persons in white-collar or professional and business occupations.[4] Whether social status was measured by income, education, or occupation, the results were similar: high-status adults endorsed a "hawkish" attitude, and Americans with low social and economic status expressed increasing resistance to U.S. participation in the war.

HOW, THEN, DID THE MISUNDERSTANDING about lower-class attitudes toward the Vietnam war develop? Mainly, because few people bothered to study or inquire into their opinions. The difficulties of recognizing working-class opposition to the war has also resulted from the different styles of registering political beliefs. While blue-collar workers have not been staunch defenders of the present Vietnam policy, their ways of expressing themselves do resemble many of the characteristics President Nixon ascribes to the "silent majority."

Low-income segments of the population are, in general, less articulate and more reticent about divulging their opinions than high-income voters, particularly when those attitudes may be considered unconventional or unpatriotic. Although a report prepared for the President's Commission on Violence found that public opposition to the war has grown as the number of antiwar demonstrators increased,[5] blue-collar workers seldom play an active role in mass protests or marches. Except for labor-union picketing, American workers tend to feel uncomfortable about participating in public demonstrations, and they are not effectively represented in the antiwar protest movement. As a result, working-class sentiments about the Vietnam war are less visible than those of other groups.

The effects of blue-collar reticence are highlighted by a generally accepted measure of "social position,"[6] which combines social and economic characteristics with other indications of low participation and articulation. When "social position" was related to opinions regarding a gradual withdrawal of U.S. soldiers in a 1968 national survey, the results disclosed that relatively low social status or social involvement was closely associated with opposition to

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[1] Martin Patchen, "Social Class and Foreign Policy Attitudes," unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in San Francisco, September 1969.

[2] Richard F. Hamilton, "A Research Note on the Mass Support for 'Tough' Military Initiatives," *American Sociological Review,* June 1969, pp. 439–445.

[3] *Gallup Opinion Index,* "Report No. 40," October 1969, p. 25.

[4] *Gallup Opinion Index,* "Report No. 49," July 1969, pp. 10–11; see also "Americans on the War: Divided, Glum, Unwilling to Wait," *Time,* October 31, 1969, pp. 13–15.

[5] Jerome Skolnick, *The Politics of Protest,* Ballantine Books, 1969, pp. 31–32.

[6] Johan Galtung, "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position," *Journal of Peace Research,* 1964, pp. 206–231; see also Johan Galtung, "Social Position, Party Identification, and Foreign Policy Orientation: A Norwegian Case Study," in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy,* James Rosenau, ed., Free Press, 1967, pp. 161–193.

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the Vietnam war. Where 59 percent of those of low social positions favored a withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, only 40 percent at an intermediate level and 31 percent at high social levels shared this attitude.

This pattern was confirmed by a 1966 survey of Detroit residents,[7] in which support for an escalation of the war ranged from 29 percent among persons at low social positions to 42 percent among those at relatively high positions. The Detroit survey also revealed that lower-class citizens were more anxious to participate in public decisions concerning Vietnam policy than high-status residents. While only 52 percent of the persons with low social status were willing to delegate major foreign-policy issues to government officials, 63 percent of those in the middle and 74 percent of those on top were content to leave Vietnam to the diplomats.

The "abstract" nature of international issues such as the Vietnam conflict is probably another major barrier to demonstrative blue-collar opposition to the war. Unlike most domestic matters, foreign-policy decisions are somewhat insulated from popular sentiments or pressure. The average voter may, for example, have more chance of promoting a major change in farm-price supports or educational aid than in the conduct of the war. In addition, public discussions of the issue devote relatively little attention to the immediate or personal effects of military intervention in Vietnam. Even opinion polls rarely ask people about Vietnam in concrete or personal terms and usually phrase their questions in relation to global problems or Southeast Asian policy. Largely, the failure of working-class voters to demonstrate strong disapproval of the war seems to be shaped by a feeling that there is little they can do about it.

DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS, at least seven communities held local referendums on the Vietnam war. In the first five referendums, held between November 1966 and early April 1968, opposition to U.S. participation in the Vietnam war ranged from 39 to 43 percent in such widely diverse localities as Dearborn, Michigan; Cambridge, Massachusetts; San Francisco, California; Lincoln, Massachusetts; and Madison, Wisconsin. While the results of the elections were similar, the vote against the war in each of the referendums was almost 25 percent higher than the criticism disclosed by public opinion surveys conducted at the same time! Shortly after President Johnson's decision to retire and to limit the bombing of North Vietnam, in April 1968, Beverly Hills and Mill Valley, both in California, became the first American communities to pass antiwar resolutions. Another referendum on a proposal to withdraw U.S. troops was approved by 57 percent of the voters in Dearborn in November 1968. These referendum votes seemed to parallel and even outpace the growth of antiwar sentiment in opinion polls.

Perhaps most striking, however, was *the fact that vote against the war in nearly all referendums was concentrated in working-class rather than in upper-middle-class segments of the communities.* As the social status of voters increased, opposition to the Vietnam war declined, and vice-versa. Even in Cambridge, perhaps the only exception to this pattern, two observers noted that "support for the referendum was lower than anticipated in the predominantly upper-income university sections but substantially higher than anticipated in working-class districts." [8] In Madison, the antiwar vote ranged from an average of 59 percent in lower-income areas to 37 percent in upper-income sections of the city. In San Francisco the average vote against the war in low-income neighborhoods was 43 percent, but in high-status districts only 29 percent. Even in affluent suburbs, such as Dearborn and Beverly Hills, antiwar voting was more prevalent among segments of the electorate that earned less than $15,000 annually or did not have a college degree than among higher-status areas.

Whenever blue-collar voters were granted an opportunity to record their preferences on the Vietnam war issue directly, they have expressed strong disapproval of the war. The evidence, therefore, suggests that antiwar feelings have not "trickled down" from upper-middle-class sources as much as they have "percolated up" from working-class citizens.

Blue-collar voters, however, were some-

[7] Harlan Hahn, "Political Efficacy and Foreign Policy Attitudes," *Social Problems,* forthcoming.

[8] Victoria Bonnell and Chester Hartman, "Cambridge Votes on the Vietnam War," *Dissent,* March–April 1968, pp. 105–106.

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what more reserved about publicizing their views than other groups, but their attitudes provided a firm base for the expansion of the antiwar movement.

Although most definitions of the "silent majority" have not been sufficiently explicit to identify this group precisely, available information suggests that the least articulate or forceful sectors of the population tend to oppose the Vietnam war. The "silent majority," it therefore seems, eventually may fail to support policies for continuing the war.

DESPITE THE FAILURE of most commentators to identify it, the explanation for widespread working-class opposition to the war is easily understood. In general, the sons of blue-collar families face a greater probability of being inducted into military service, sent into combat, and suffer more casualties than middle- or upper-middle-class boys. Though it is difficult to obtain information about the social and economic backgrounds of draftees and veterans, some evidence has revealed that black citizens, Mexican-Americans, and other minority groups are exposed to a greater risk of service or death in Vietnam than young men from the white middle-class. Moreover, civil rights leaders have been among the leading critics of the war. Yet, a careful examination of public-opinion and voting data reveals that even in communities such as Dearborn or Beverly Hills, which have few black residents, and even when white attitudes are investigated separately elsewhere, opposition to the war still is centered primarily in blue-collar segments of the population.[9] The death of thousands of young men has had a profound impact upon many working-class homes in white as well as black areas throughout the country.

Working-class families often are bound together by close ties of kinship and economic dependence. In many blue-collar households, the actual or potential loss of a son, a brother, or a grandson—not to speak of a husband and father—may mean financial adversity as well as deep grief. The reactions of persons at various social levels, it seems, imply different attitudes toward war. While high-status persons might view the Vietnam conflict in abstract terms, either as a necessary defense against Communist aggression or as an unwarranted intervention, working-class citizens tend to adopt a more personal orientation that focuses primarily upon the suffering, hardship, and tragedy of war. The perspectives of lower-class Americans, therefore, may ultimately emerge as a potent political force for ending the war.

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[9] Harlan Hahn and Albert Sugarman, "A Referendum on Vietnam," *War/Peace Report,* May 1967, pp. 14–15.

Jerry De Muth

In the South, Murder Continues

THE SOUTH may be changing, but the old South has not disappeared. In May 1969, for example, an all-white federal court jury in Meridian, Mississippi, acquitted three Ku Klux Klansmen accused of murdering a black civil rights leader and could not agree on verdicts for seven other Klansmen also implicated in the crime. The ten were being tried for the first time on federal charges in connection with the January 1966 slaying of Vernon Dahmer whose store and home in Hattiesburg was fire-bombed.

Three times 16 persons had been indicted on federal charges of conspiring to "intimidate, coerce and threaten" Dahmer, but the first two times the indictments were dismissed and it was not until early last May, 40 months after the crime and 16 months after the third set of indictments, that any of the 16 were tried. And then none were convicted.

One of those indicted, Klan Imperial Wizard Sam Holloway Bowers, Jr., thus won the second mistrial that year. The first, which Bowers had won in January, was the second

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mistrial in less than one year in the county court where he was being tried for the murder of Dahmer.

Another of the seven who won a mistrial in federal court was Charles Clifford Wilson. Wilson also had been indicted by the county grand jury on a murder charge but has not yet been brought to trial. Two days before the county grand jury indicted him, Wilson received the distinguished service award from the Junior Chamber of Commerce in Laurel, a Klan stronghold located about 30 miles northeast of Hattiesburg.

Five of the thirteen indicted were ever tried in county court. Two won mistrials, one was found guilty of arson and sentenced to ten years in prison, and the other two received life sentences on murder charges. Yet law-enforcement officers, local officials, and civic leaders all pushed for convictions.

Since early 1963, at least 33 persons have been killed in the South, 19 of them in Mississippi, because they were black or because they were involved in civil rights. At least 74 persons were involved in those killings, but only 46 persons were indicted on federal charges and only 37 on state charges.

In federal courts only 52 percent of those indicted, 38 men, were ever brought to trial, and only 12 of those 38 were convicted. In county courts, only 23 of the 37 persons indicted on state charges were ever brought to trial and a mere eight convicted. (These figures do not include repeat indictments.)

The state was able to obtain the eight convictions because in all but two cases the killings were not related to civil rights. Of those two cases, one was the slaying of Martin Luther King, Jr., for which James Earl Ray pleaded guilty; the other was the Dahmer case.

An examination of the other convictions reveals that the crimes were especially reprehensible and did not involve persons active in civil rights. Sentences were generally light.

In Birmingham on September 15, 1963, one of two white youths on a motor scooter fired twice at two black youths on a bicycle and 13-year-old Virgil Ware fell dead. The white youths were caught and signed confessions. They were brought to trial on charges of first-degree murder but were convicted on reduced charges of second-degree manslaughter and sentenced to seven months in prison. The youth who had fired the fatal shots was then placed on two years' probation and sent home.

In Anniston, one of Alabama's more moderate towns, Willie Brewster, a factory worker and father of four, who was not involved in civil rights, was shot on July 15, 1965. Three persons were indicted, two persons tried, one of them acquitted and the other found guilty. Herbert Damon Strange, after the jury deliberated a day and a half, was convicted on a reduced charge of second-degree murder, sentenced to ten years in prison, and then freed on bond.

More recently, in Natchez, Mississippi, in June 1966, three white men lured 65-year-old Ben Chester White from his home by asking him to help search for a lost dog. Once they

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Information about the program is available from The Office of the President, 1730 Grove Street, Berkeley, California, 94709; WWWC-Midwest, Room 1506, 116 South Michigan, Chicago, Illinois, 60603; WWWC-Northwest, 4235 Roosevelt Way NE, Seattle, Washington, 98105.
Berkeley, California

Anne Stadler
Executive Secretary,
World Without War Council
of the United States

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got White to a secluded area, they shot him 17 times with a rifle, blew the top of his head off with a shotgun, and then dumped his body in a creek. Although a jury indicted the three Klansmen, one was acquitted, one won a mistrial in 1967, and the third has never been brought to trial.

BUT THE PROBLEM does not rest solely with juries. State officials never took any action against those who killed 16 persons.

In the triple slayings in Philadelphia, Mississippi, for example, a county grand jury refused to issue any indictments. Instead, it issued praise for the conduct of law enforcement officers (including Deputy Sheriff Cecil Price, later convicted in federal court) for their behavior in the face of "drastic provocation by outside agitators." And when on December 4, 1964, the FBI arrested 21 men in connection with the killings, the state said it would not file any charges of its own.

After the Birmingham church bombing in which four young girls were killed, Al Lingo, head of the state police, arrested three men with Klan backgrounds, charging them only with illegal possession of explosives. The three were convicted in Recorder's Court, sentenced to 90 days and fined $100 each. They appealed and the state circuit court overturned the convictions, ending the state's role in the case.

The FBI, conducting a fruitless investigation, commented, "This investigation was prejudiced by premature arrests made by the Alabama Highway Patrol. Consequently it has not yet been possible to obtain evidence or confessions to assure successful prosecution."

BUT NOT ONLY SOUTHERN STATES have been guilty of inaction, so has the federal government. No federal action was taken in such killings as those of:

· William Moore, the postman who was walking from Chattanooga, Tennessee, to Jackson, Mississippi, to appeal to the governor to grant blacks their constitutional rights.

· Medgar Evers, Mississippi NAACP leader who was working to enable blacks to gain their voting and other rights.

· Jonathan Daniels, who went to Alabama to aid a voter registration drive.

· Willie B. Tucker, who was in interstate travel when slain.

· Ben Chester White, who was murdered by Klansmen because of his race.

Federal action could have been taken in all of these cases. For example, the killers of Lemuel Penn, who was in the midst of interstate travel when shot, were brought to trial by the Justice Department but not the alleged killers of Moore and Tucker.

In the case of Rev. James Reeb, who was murdered while aiding a voter registration drive in Selma, Alabama, federal charges were lodged against four persons, but the government never carried the case any further. (Three were tried, and freed, on state charges of murder.)

This poor record concerning these 33 slayings has not only encouraged lawlessness on the part of others, but it has also permitted some persons to become involved in further crimes.

Sam Holloway Bowers, Jr., under federal indictment for the June 1964 Philadelphia slayings, was later indicted for the January 1966 fire-bombing that took the life of Dahmer.

Also indicted by the federal government for the Dahmer slaying was Mordaunt Hamilton, Sr., a Hattiesburg hardware dealer. Before the Dahmer slaying, Hamilton had been freed five times on charges of beating civil rights workers. After one of these acquittals, he even attacked the civil rights worker a second time on his way out of the court house.

Cecil Meyers and Joseph Sims, after being acquitted by a county jury for the slaying of Lemuel Penn, attacked a Southern Christian Leadership Conference photographer in Crawfordville, Georgia, and then were arrested for attempting to beat a black farmer.

Herbert Damon Strange, while free on bond for the July 1965 slaying of Willie Brewster, was arrested again in May 1966. He was charged with beating and kidnapping a white man who was riding in a car with a black man, and again he was freed on bond. But on November 5, 1966, Strange got into a fight in an Anniston honky-tonk and was killed by a spray of bullets in the back.

Such an outcome is also part of the old South. It may be "poetic justice," but it's not yet justice.

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From the Prisons of Cuba—A Cry for Help!

The following document, here published in English for the first time, comes from a group of 47 prisoners being held in the political prison, La Cabaña, in Cuba. The document is dated December 1969. It was submitted by the prisoners through the League for the Rights of Man and addressed to the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations. If and when this latter body considers this appeal, we shall be glad to report its action.—ED.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

WE TAKE this unique opportunity, the only one we have had in all these years, to bring before you and denounce before the world the cruelty and crimes to which we political prisoners of Cuba have been subjected.

On the Isle of Pines, a forsaken place of terror and barbarism, more than 7,000 of us lived, crowded in four compounds with a capacity of 870 men each. The guards made frequent rounds during which they mistreated us physically and verbally. What few possessions we had, they threw out. For the slightest reason we were taken to the punishment wards, small bare cells in which beatings and miserable conditions (water-covered floors, mosquitos, etc.) ruled; there we would stay for an indefinite time, sometimes eight or nine months. Our correspondence was limited to one letter per month and one telegram. On numerous occasions we saw them burn the bundles of letters our families would send us. Visits were once or twice a year, and only three relatives were allowed in for two hours; that is four hours of visits a year!

Food was scanty and of the poorest quality. Meat, eggs, fish were rare; we never saw milk. We were so weak that men would fall if they remained standing too long. We were all anemic and starving. Medical assistance was scarce and poor. The penal hospital saw only 40 to 50 men per month, and they never had the necessary medication. They prescribed only aspirin and simple medications made at the hospital. We were admitted only to serve as guinea pigs for the recently graduated military doctors who were transferred out as soon as they had acquired some experience. The dentist was there only to perform extractions; rarely did he take care of cavities. Because of the poor nutrition, cavities were numerous. When they became painful, the solution was to extract. Today, there is not a single prisoner who has not lost part or all of his teeth.

Beatings and Bayonet Jabs

WE REMAINED in this situation until 1964, when the most cruel, brutal, and inhuman plan of forced labor known in the history of the Americas began. Never has any group of men suffered so much. We left the compounds at five in the morning and usually returned at 6 or 6:30 P.M. Sometimes we returned as late as 10 or 11 at night. We ate our lunch in the field. It consisted of cooked corn-meal or bean broth, yams or bread. We carried our lunches to the fields and left them out under the hot sun until 12 or 12:30. Many times the food was spoiled by the time we ate it.

During the "Plan," the rounds were even worse. The "Corporals" came into the compounds with their machetes, hitting and wounding prisoners left and right. On one of such occasions, Mario Jimenez Figueredo lost an eye; on another, an old man, Erasmo Gomez, was almost blinded from a blow across his eyes; we were all beaten mercilessly.

In the field, the "Corporals" watched us

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constantly and anything was considered reason enough for a beating—even leaving the line for a drink of water was cause for a beating. There were times when totally naked men were forced to pull up grass with their mouths. They would both hit and jab us, leaving wounds at times 20 to 25 cm. deep. The number of men who have been crippled in the different prisons of Cuba is countless.

Murders

BUT THAT was not all. When they realized that they could not subdue us with these abuses, the shootings began. For any reason, they would begin to fire indiscriminately, increasing considerably the list of our martyrs. During the plan of forced labor, the following men, among other victims of such murders, died: Ernesto Dìaz Madraga, Aug. 9, 1964; Luis Nieves Cruz, Sept. 21, 1964; Josè Guerra Pascual, Sept. 21, 1964: Josè Alfonso Solarana, Sept. 21, 1964; Jerònimo Candine, Jan. 8, 1966; Julio Tang Texier, Sept. 3, 1966; Eddy Alvarez Molina, Dec. 9, 1966; Diosdado Aquit Manrique, Dec. 16, 1966; Dany Crespo, Dec. 24, 1966; Francisco Nogales, Feb. 28, 1967. On Nov. 12, 1966, in the punishment wards, Roberto Lòpez Chàvez died in acute pain as a result of a prolonged hunger strike.

Another mass murder committed in prison was that of 21 of our comrades, members of the so-called Escambray Cause. They had been on the Isle of Pines for three years. One morning they were called in to be transferred. Later, we learned they had been taken to Santa Clara to be "tried." There, all were sentenced to death. They were taken by truck near the Escambray to be shot. The shooting was by machine guns, as they came off the truck—a true massacre!

More Abuses and Vexations

IN THE BEGINNING of 1967, the transfers to Cuba began. Again they put us to the test. This time they wanted to place us on the same level as the ordinary "rehabilitated" prisoners, trying to force us to wear their blue uniforms. Many men refused to put on the blue uniforms and were placed into the punishment dungeons and cells of provincial jails. For over a year and a half we remained there, dressed only in our underwear, half naked, suffering from hunger and cold, incommunicado, lacking the bare essentials of human life. On our arrival from the Isle of Pines, we were put into La Cabaña, 250 men per cell block. Food was so scanty that three spoonfuls emptied the plate. There were some incidents in the dining hall. In one case, the men of a certain cell block found when they came to the dining hall that their meal was just some bean water. They refused to eat and were attacked by a group of soldiers armed with clubs and sticks. They wounded several of the men.

At muster time, they usually made us run so they could mock and demoralize us. At one afternoon muster we refused to do it, and more than 200 soldiers armed with bayonets and clubs entered the yard. Our group was attacked and many of our comrades wounded. Some were taken to the Hospital Nacional de Reclusos del Príncipe (National Hospital for the Inmates of the Castillo del Príncipe) due to the seriousness of their wounds.

On July 29, 1967, they offered us the blue uniforms, which we refused to accept. We were then transferred to cell blocks seven and eight without any belongings and dressed only in our underwear. They jammed 350 of us in each cell block. We were so crowded that we had to sleep in two-hour shifts, for all of us could not lie down at once. In the provincial jails the situation was the same or worse. Months passed, and when winter came they dispersed us among seven cell blocks, "So the cold will get to you and force you to dress." We had nothing, not even a piece of paper to put under our backs. Barefoot, extremely thin, almost nude, we were brought before our families. Before seeing us, they were told they had to advise us to wear the blue uniforms. Their love and long absence from us made them accept.

Thus bribing our relatives, they tried to make us give in. Those were hard moments: mothers on their knees begging their sons to dress, others dissolving into nervous collapse and we, with tears in our eyes, trying to make them understand our principles and the bribery to which they were being subjected. Another method they used was to place ordinary prisoners in the same cells with us. Many hunger strikes broke out in the different jails

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in Cuba to force the authorities to separate us from the ordinary prisoners. During one strike, in September of 1967, Luis Alvarez Rios died.

At "La Cabaña" and other prisons, they used poisons to give us diarrhea, destroying us physically.

The Slots

IN MARCH, 1968, a group of prisoners was taken from the jail of Boniato, Oriente, to the "Slots" of Tres Maceo and San Ramón, prison farms for ordinary prisoners. The "slots" are in the middle of a prairie and consist of cells two feet wide, six feet long, and seven feet high, mud-walled with one small window to let in air. Three prisoners would be put in each cell. There was no room to move. They had to take care of their necessities right where they were seated. The purpose of this punishment was to make them wear the blue uniforms. A hunger and thirst strike began. When prisoners fainted, they would be given a shot and put back in the cells. This continued for almost two months when they were finally taken out. Their condition was deplorable, and they were psychologically destroyed. One of the men in this group, Francisco Balbuena Calzadilla, died on August 14, 1968, when, during a spell of insanity, he jumped from the roof of "El Príncipe."

Mental Torture

THE COMBINATION OF COLD, hunger, and filth, facilitated the spreading of diseases among us: tuberculosis, anemia, pneumonia, grippe, and fungi constantly afflicted us. But medical attention was nil; they took advantage of our condition, telling us that all we had to do to receive medical care was to wear the blue uniform. Because of all the diseases and the torture, many of the men were driven to insanity. The only treatment they received was sleeping pills or electric shocks. The latter were administered haphazardly: four, five, ten, twelve shocks would be given until the patient was completely stupefied.

Because of poor care and the cruel use of shock treatments, on February 14, 1968, Rafel Dominguez Socorro, totally insane, hanged himself. At present, a great many prisoners are psychically destroyed. At that stage of our imprisonment, Eddy Molina died for lack of medical attention at La Cabaña, and Alfredo Carrión Obeso expired in a labor camp.

Human Experiments

AT PRESENT, the situation remains unchanged. Food continues to be of the worst kind, without spices or dressings. Treatment by the prison wardens is deplorable. With the slightest excuse they impose an unacceptable, humiliating discipline that is contrary to our principles and rights. Our belongings are often damaged or destroyed. We are allowed only three books, and they must be edited by the government. Our scarce correspondence is rigorously censored and any suspicious word is enough to suspend it. Our families are orally abused during their visits. Members of the Mint-Int (Ministry of the Interior) go around our homes terrorizing and haunting our relatives. Medical assistance has not become any better, and in the infirmaries and hospitals they do not give us any kind of medicine, their entry to the prison being forbidden.

At the Hospital Nacional de Reclusos del Príncipe, operations for hemorrhoids, nose and throat problems, etc., are performed by recent surgery graduates with no experience. Prisoners who face surgery are forced to witness operations. In this hospital, which is also a jail for ordinary prisoners, room number seven is for the mental patients. They are placed together with the ordinary prisoners, and as a result there have been murders and fights where political prisoners have been injured. The care there is so deficient that none of the men who have entered the hospital have been cured.

Hunger Strikes

THOSE MISERABLE CONDITIONS led to two great hunger strikes, one in October, 1968, for 19 days and another last August and September, for 35 days. The latter was as inhuman an event as the world has ever seen. The number of prisoners who fell ill or went insane prove the cruelty of our jailers. They denied medical assistance to prisoners suffering from heart attacks, stomach upsets, diarrhea, and even total paralysis unless they changed their attitude. It was horrible to see 800 men in a state of total malnutrition, thrown to the mercy of cruel, unpredictable jailers.

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Since these strikes, we still have not received any type of medical care. Instead, we have been guinea pigs in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior and Public Health. Doctors and students have studied us to measure the reactions of the human body after such a prolonged fast and the results of a convalescence without nutrients or medication. They wish, they say, to write a book!

We should mention the case of Carmelo Cuadra, the third political prisoner to die during a hunger strike. For eight months he suffered the abuses and tortures of the red assassins, and in April, 1969 he died suffering severe hepatic pains. Another case we cannot forget is that of Wilfredo Martinez, 30. He was completely blinded as a result of wounds he received when taken prisoner and has remained in that condition for seven years in prison, suffering the cruelty of this harsh confinement.

The Vampires

THE MARTYRS THAT have died and still die facing the firing squads are the victims of a most ironic policy. They are forced to give blood which the government donates "humanitarily" to Vietnam and Laos.

We cannot overlook the selflessness and heroism of the women political prisoners. They, just as we, have undergone the same abuses. They have been stripped, thrown in with the ordinary prisoners, beaten and wounded. They have been kept incommunicado for interminable periods. But these worthy Cuban women have been able to rise above these tortures and vexations and have upheld the tradition of courage and strength of the Cuban woman.

•

PLEASE receive our highest esteem for you and for the distinguished members of the Commission.

Please take this letter to its destination, copy and give it to the press.

It is a faithful copy of the original.

SIGNED, stating the number of the cause [in the Cuban legal code] for which they were condemned and the number of years of sentence:

Jose Piloto Mora, 99–61, 30 years, Pinar del Rio. Jose E. Gomez Guerra, 1160–61, 15 years, Matanzas. Rolando Morejon Guirado, 50–62, 15 years, Oriente. Joaquin Lassus Martinez, 320–60, 10 years, Oriente. Maximo Cora Abraham, 1151–61, 10 years, Matanzas. Guillermo Rodriguez Alvarez, 187–61, 10 years, Pinar del Rio. Justo Regalado Borges, 122–62, 30 years, Pinar del Rio. Roberto A. Ramos Alfonso, 439–60, 12 years, Havana. Alberto Mojena Ortega, 600–60, 12 years, Havana. Juan Rodriguez Esquia, 248–63, 30 years, Santa Clara. Benito Hernandez Gonzalez, 354–64, 6 years, Havana. Tomas Gonzalez Camejo, 568–60, 20 years, Havana. Rovaldo Calero Sosa, 437–65, 9 years, Havana. Angel L. Arguelles Garrido, 97–63, 30 years, Havana. Arturo S. Canet Oulego, 320–60, 10 years, Oriente. Fernando Gomez Fonseca, 33–63, 12 years, Havana. Feliciano Mohamed Esperon, 543–63, 12 years, Havana. Domingo Sanchez Costa, 460–61, 20 years, Las Villas. Manuel Mosquera Rodriguez, 460–61, 20 years, Las Villas. Servando Infante Jimenez, 86–65, 12 years, Havana. Mateo Rodriguez Rodriguez, 740–63, 30 years, Havana. Antonio Dominguez Hernandez, 31–62, 20 years, Havana. Justo Guerra Remedio, 565–60, 30 years, Havana. Rigoberto Perez Roque, 356–63, 20 years, Havana. Carlos Betancourt Rodriguez, 600–60, 20 years, Havana. Armando Yong Martinez, 21–62, 20 years, Havana. Angel Mendoza Mendoza, 1151–61, 10 years, Matanzas. Ricardo Fernandez Vichot, 24–67, 5 years, Havana. Luis Hernandez Garcia, 192–61, 10 years, Pinar del Rio. Herminio Gutierrez Martinez, 122–62, 15 years, Pinar del Rio. Roberto Cosculluela Valvarcel, 556–61, 20 years, Havana. Orlando Almanza Sanchez, 10 years, Oriente. Jose O. Rodriguez Terrero, 81–63, 20 years, Oriente. Mario C. Simon Suarez, 477–61, 20 years, Havana. Laureano Pequeno Velo, 484–62, 20 years, Havana. Enrique Garcia Cuevas, 829–60, 30 years, Las Villas. Jose R. Varona Primelles, 127–61, 10 years, Oriente. Gregorio Ariosa Rubio, 462–64, 9 years, Havana. Aurelio Vazquez Neceda, 60–61, 15 years, Matanzas. Angel Calzado Mesa, 480–61, 20 years, Las Villas. Pedro Sierra Vega, 981–61, 15 years, Matanzas. Jose Carreno Perez, 10–64, 18 years, Havana. Rene Ramos Ganzalez, mayo 63, 20 years, Pinar del Rio. Hipolito L. Diaz Montero, 17–64, 9 years, Havana. Mario Pedraza Marti, 360–63, 20 years, Havana. Roberto Alonso Gonzalez, 617–60, 30 years, Havana. Dagoberto Acosta Chirino, 71–63, 12 years, Pinar del Rio. Roberto Iglesias Martin, 144–63, 8 years, Pinar del Rio.

Political Prison, La Cabana, December 1969.

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Alex Page

Another Modest Proposal

I DO NOT UNDERSTAND what the fuss is about. These complaining editorials, these worried, pained people—when the solution stares us in the face.

Yes, there *is* that huge stockpile of deadly nerve gas that nobody knows what to do with. *Of course* you can't bury it, sink it in the ocean, blast it to outer space, or burn it. Try, and you'll have *everyone* dead. An industrial use will hardly make a dent in the mountains of barreled gas. *Of course* sober citizens are nervous to see it carted about the country.

The generals and arms-makers have shown themselves (not for the first time) muscle-bound in their follow-through. It's up to us, they tell us, to find a solution because that is what democracy is all about. Very well.

I merely wish to point out that no one has given another element a close, hard look. I am referring, naturally, to the human element. That I am the first to do so does make me wonder about integrity in high places.

Both science and experience have proved that the human organism has unusually high absorbent qualities. It can sustain heat, poverty, government, education, lies, taxes, religion, and more such tribulations—why, a good case has been made that they are what human beings are meant for. That basic and convenient feature becomes the keystone to my proposal.

Now *which* human beings?

From a practical point of view, science instructs that the young, those between 17 and 25, make far and away the best absorbents, that is to say, *per capita* more quantities of gas can be absorbed by them—being in their prime—than people younger or older. Yet there are other equally practical considerations. I am thinking of our country's fiber, of the encroaching moral rot, of traditional home life.

I ask, which sector has been least productive? most arrogant? a thorn in the side of the law? an acute embarrassment to the government? a pain to the C.I.A.? an ill-wind to the army? of concern to manufacturers? a comfort to the enemy? a threat to educational institutions? the source of a bad press abroad?

I need not go on. The answer is clear: the young.

In short, I propose to kill two birds with one stone.

Lest I be taken for an extremist, I want to make it absolutely clear that I do not advocate my scheme for *all* the young. There can of course be no argument about the leaders of the dissatisfied, the troublemakers, and their more active followers to serve as absorbents. They come first. After that, only every seventh youth would serve, and by the fairest means devised by man: a lottery. The remainder will come to their senses very shortly and be models of gratitude. I see no reason why the process should not continue to be called Selective Service.

•

THE ADVANTAGES of my proposal are evident. In the *first* place, am I putting forward anything very unusual? Have I not followed widespread practice? Do we older citizens not expect the young to go to wars and give their lives cheerfully? For improbable reasons? Do we not assign them a twilight existence in ghettos? Do we not find it en-

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tirely proper, if now and then *individually* regrettable, that thousands die on highways? Do we not kill something in the young as we ready them for life? Are we not reassured when they become cynical?

Second, my proposal will meet head-on the danger arising from lowering the voting age to 18, an ill-advised move now afoot. Just consider the emotional manner in which the young, had *they* the power, would deal with the surplus of nerve gas!

Third, there are specific precedents. Tear gas and mace are used against the young as a matter of course, and spraying dissident students from the air has been tried and found entirely satisfactory.

Fourth, the poison would not have to be shipped about the country with danger to life and property. The chosen youths would be transported instead to where the gas is stored. Thanks to previous experiments of this nature, we would not come to the actual absorption process in entire ignorance.

Fifth, since the gas is so powerful, the absorptive process will be of short duration—an unexpected dividend for the selectees.

Sixth, we have heard much of the notion of overkill. Once an individual has served as absorbent, he will not object to being so used to his maximum capacity.

Seventh, in a modest though not insignificant way my proposal will contribute its mite to soften the population explosion.

Eighth and finally, there is no doubt this will drastically lessen the ugly frictions prevailing between parents and children.

Since those selected will eventually be turned into useful, acquiescent citizens, I would make no protest to a grateful nation acknowledging that fact by a suitable plaque in some distant, pleasant, disinfected spot.

It will have become apparent that I could never make claim to originality; to logical thinking, yes. After all, I merely urge the fulfillment of the purposes for which the gas was created.

Now there are those who will raise their voices in consternation that I am not attending to the surplus problem quickly enough. I answer that in a democracy we proceed with deliberate speed. Besides, I daresay we are a flexible enough people to revise, if occasion demands, the proportion of those selected for their Service upward.

Others may object that we shall be inundated with a youth all too patriotic, all too grateful. An unworthy quibble. As though there could ever be enough of those virtues.

And if there are some who cry that my solution smacks of cruelty and inhumanity, why, I fail to understand them. I say to them: look around you. I remind them, moreover, that we have become sufficiently adept at redefining such antiquated abstractions. I can foresee the day when it may be cruel and inhuman *not* to select someone for his or her Service.

Unlike my great predecessor, whose proposal was also eventually put into effect, I do not disavow a *personal* interest in the matter. My children are but seven and three, and if my proposal will be put in effect over a ten-year period, which I calculate will suffice for the disposal of the gas, my older one will no longer be eligible under the Selective Service outlined above but can look forward like all of us to enjoy the fruits of democracy. We will of course continue to take care of *all* the young in the usual, time-honored ways.

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Pedro Lopez

Spain: Cracks in the Column

IT IS AMAZING. Thirty years have gone by, yet books about the Spanish Civil War still sell. Every year, a dozen or so new volumes appear and almost always there is a best-seller among them. At least half their readers must have been born after the Civil War, yet the subject continues to fascinate them. Why? A guilty conscience among older people? Identification on the part of the young? A romanticism compensating the middle-aged for an uninvolved existence? No one really knows.

The world press, however, pays less and less attention to Spain. Strikes, repressive police action, student demonstrations, divisions among the clergy, the proclamation of an eventual new king, a consular treaty with Poland—none of these items seem to interest either journalists or readers. Why not? Because the situation in Spain is far from romantic? Because, despite some public unrest, nothing warrants prophecies of radical changes in the near future? Or because what is happening in Spain does not seem to differ greatly from what is happening under other dictatorships, and because readers are fed up with news of persecutions, demonstrations, strikes, and proclamations?

IN 1812 A LIBERAL CONSTITUTION for Spain was ratified in the hope that political freedom would lead to social stability and economic modernization. In the 158 years since then, Spain has known exactly 35 years of either liberal or revolutionary government; the rest of the time, the country has been ruled by conservative or reactionary regimes. It has endured four civil wars, two republics, four periods of avowed dictatorship, one experiment with fascism, and now, for nearly 25 years, a regime born out of fascism that has become a potpourri of authoritarianism, religious intransigence, capitalistic planning, church-inspired technocracy, and even "liberalization."

Spain always seems to have been out of step with history. In the Middle Ages, Spain did not share in the typical feudal experience; but in the Modern Age the country has taken on feudal characteristics. When the Reformation was transforming Europe, the Counter-Reformation was powerful in Spain. In the nineteenth century, every revolutionary thrust in Spain was flanked by conservative power in Europe. The 1931 Republic came into existence just when elsewhere the world economic crisis brought power to the rightists. The Civil War and its revolution took place while fascism came to the fore in Europe. After the Second World War, when slow changes began to occur throughout the world, Spain remained static. Now that the country is beginning to be "liberalized," the world again is shifting to the Right.

None of this would suffice to make Spain a subject for best-sellers. Such popularity required a three-year-long civil war, with almost a million dead out of a population of 25 million.

The causes of the Civil War were many. Masses of restive Catholics thought they were being persecuted because the Republic (elected in April 1931) had separated church and state—and taken a series of related measures, as flamboyant as they were unessential, such as forbidding crucifixes in schools and cemeteries, expelling the Jesuits, etc. A by no means negligible number of traditionalists believed in the monarchy and

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feared all change. The timid Spanish bourgeoisie possessed neither the vigor to dominate the Republic nor the imagination to adapt to the growing potential of the working-class movement. The titled proprietors of the *latifundios* saw their privileges threatened by moderate but effective agrarian reforms. The church had lost its accustomed ascendancy over the government and thereby considered itself a victim of persecution. The army continued, in the main, to be ideologically and emotionally bound to the old political structures and let itself be manipulated by church and nobility. And there was the impact that Hitler's electoral victory in 1933 and Mussolini's military triumph in Ethiopia left on middle-class Spanish youth.

Over the last 30 years, Spain has escaped from its post-Civil War isolation into a qualified international "respectability." The economic situation has improved, thanks to a number of factors, among them the growing influence of technocratically-minded younger men in government, an increase in foreign-capital investments, an invasion of tourists, and certain development programs revived from the Republican era. Socially and politically, the country is no longer quite so immobilized by the extreme repression that characterized the Franco regime in its early years. Now Spain has arrived at a stage of "liberalization." Yet the term must be employed with much caution, for the country is still in a gray condition.

Let us try to see what is happening.

In the last three decades, the world has undergone tremendous industrial development and intensive mechanization, and the nations of Western Europe have enjoyed a considerable rise in their living standards. Since the late fifties some small part of all this has filtered into Spain. There such new developments have been osmotic; the changes that have occurred are not so much the work of the regime as the result of international events.

For example, the Republican government had prepared irrigation projects which the Civil War brought to a halt; in recent years, these plans have been carried out by the Franco regime, with considerable social consequences in rural areas. The peasants have abandoned arid regions and moved onto newly irrigated lands—and the owners of the *latifundios,* thus deserted, have been unable to recruit other farm labor. Simultaneously, new industries have been created in the cities—before 1955 by the government (in particular, by the Instituto Nacional de Industrias, the chief organ of the partisans of economic self-sufficiency), and since then either by foreign concerns or by domestic firms that can obtain the kind of bank financing traditionally hard to come by in Spain. All this has encouraged a population shift from the countryside to the cities. Finally, since 1962 more than a million Spanish workers have emigrated to West Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Holland, and in lesser numbers to Switzerland, England, and France.

For all these reasons, the Spanish countryside has been gradually depopulated. The big landholders, not knowing how to cope with the new labor shortage, have sold their holdings to the state, to newly formed agricultural enterprises, or to the peasants. While the *latifundio* system is still powerful, it is gradually disappearing, and everyone is convinced that within a decade the entire Spanish agrarian structure will have changed.

WHILE THE PEASANTRY is changing, in some measure, into a class of small landowners and, in larger measure, into groups of emigrant laborers living in the cities or abroad, the urban working class also has not remained as it was at the end of the Civil War.

At that time, the workers found themselves exactly where they had been before the Republic was proclaimed: wages low, jobs uncertain, and their predicament exacerbated by the absence of unions. The Spanish working class had such a strong tradition of belligerency that the new re-

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gime realized workers would have to be both controlled and appeased. Vertical "syndicates" (Confederación Nacional Sindicalista, or C.N.S.) were organized, with both employers and workers included in their membership. These "syndicates" sufficed to control but not to appease the working class, so that for years the old workers' parties, especially the Anarchists, preserved all their prestige and clandestinely organized local committees.

So long as the opposition labor groups had some hope that the Franco regime would disappear at the end of the Second World War, they thought in terms of a simple reestablishment of their old organizations—the Socialist *Unión General de Trabajo* (UGT) and the Anarcho-syndicalist *Confederación Nacional de Trabajo* (CNT). But meanwhile the vertical "syndicates" were amassing great capital resources through obligatory dues from their members; they erected office buildings as their headquarters, created splendidly equipped "workers' universities" (actually, professional schools) and *mutualidades* (pension and retirement funds), as well as a vast bureaucracy, appointed by the one legal political party and the government.

As Franco advanced in years, people began to think of the future. There was no organized power in the country except for the church and the army, both completely dominated by Franco, and for the "syndicates." Falangist elements disappointed by Franco's policies chose the "syndicates" as their field of operations. Little by little, in fact but not in law, the "syndicates" lost their nonclass character and endeavored, without disturbing the life of the regime, to win benefits for the workers. Now the labor opposition within Spain came to see that it was necessary to work against the regime and for the workers *within* the syndicate structure; but the exiled leftist groups were opposed and managed to block every effort in this direction. This left the field wide open, both to the Catholics, who organized the Worker Brotherhoods (*Hermandades*), and to the Communists, who proved to be less rigid than the Socialists and Anarchists in exile. Catholics and Communists succeeded in occupying lower-echelon positions in the vertical "syndicates," and thus they were able to develop their contacts with the workers and to exercise some influence on the only labor pressure group in the country.

Around 1960 the Catholics managed to create the Workers' Commissions, through which they were able to exert a kind of aggressive pressure the official syndicates did not dare attempt. The Communists succeeded in capturing control of some of these units, and since then Catholics and Communists have maintained not a collaboration but an amicable coexistence—which is, of course, not free of rivalries—both in the syndicates and the Workers' Commissions.

At the same time, the workers' economic condition was changing, for several factors were bringing about a measure of prosperity in Spain: the contagion of Europe's prosperity, American aid, massive tourism, and the emergence of a new generation of businessmen and technicians. Although for political reasons Spain had not been accepted into the Common Market, any more than the country had benefited from the Marshall Plan, these factors helped create a consumer society. The consumption was primarily for the rich, of course, but the masses have benefited also. For the family of a workingman whose grandfather had been imprisoned under the Republic as an Anarchist, whose father had been imprisoned at the end of the Civil War as a Republican, and who himself had for years held down two jobs in order to eat badly and run into debt—for such a workingman's family suddenly to find itself in a position to buy a television set, a washing machine, a car, and perhaps even an apartment represented comfort. True, in the rest of Western Europe or in the U.S., a man had all those things and paid for them with only eight hours' work a day, five days a week, while in Spain they cost a man 12–14 hours' work

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a day, six days a week, not counting what his children and wife could earn. But even at this price, having these things represented well-being to the Spanish worker, who knew nothing about the rest of Europe or about the U.S. He did not identify his well-being with the regime. He had had enough experience with the vertical "syndicates" to know that the regime had not voluntarily given him this "well-being." But he also did not want to risk losing it in any antigovernment adventures.

The old people still talk revolution, without much believeing in it. And the young people care nothing about revolution; they want changes, but for themselves as individuals. Only when unemployment threatens or some injustice arises in connection with work do the workers mobilize for action, and even then only in large enterprises and for limited demands. This attitude is due not merely to a shift from proletarian to semi-middle-class status, as has occurred among American and European workers, but also to peculiarly Spanish conditions—such as no political guarantees, no freedom of organization, no genuine security. In Spain a worker who is arrested or fired loses not only his freedom or his job but also his apartment, TV, washing machine, car. As the Spanish worker sees it, he is a *nouveau riche* constantly menaced by his former poverty. He neither dares nor wants to muddy the waters.

This state of affairs is temporary, but for the moment it exercises a decisive influence. The opposition sees this in practice but refuses to accept it in theory, while the exiles quite simply refuse to recognize it at all.

THE OPPOSITION long ago gave up any expectation of overthrowing Franco and became resigned to waiting for his death. Franco's opponents had really never expected to dislodge him on their own. At the end of the Second World War, the Alianza di Fuerzas Democráticas hoped that an Allied victory would topple Franco. Old-line Communists then believed that, because the regime had sent the Blue Division to fight with the Nazis on the Russian front, the U.S.S.R. would declare war on Franco and thus prod the Allies to intervene. None of these things happened. And Franco displayed sufficient political aplomb to frustrate whatever vague diplomatic attempts the Allies did make to replace him.

IN SPAIN, TODAY, one finds three kinds of opposition to the regime:

(1) *Opposition within the system,* tolerated but held in check, and occasionally put down for form's sake. It is composed of elements within the Opus Dei which are associated with the daily *Madrid*; the Demo-Christian group allied with the former Franco Minister Ruiz Jiménez and his monthly *Cuadernos para el Dialogo;* disabused Falangist groups who want no part of a monarchy but do want a syndicalist movement that would be more independent though still essentially controlled by them. This opposition aspires to pressure the regime into greater "liberalization," hoping

Trotsky—Zionist!

LEON TROTSKY, the first Soviet foreign minister, is faring badly in Soviet literature now that Russia has put all its marbles on the Arabs. In a new Russian noved by Shevtsov, Trotsky is called a "typical Zionist agent" planted for subversive purposes in the Communist movement by International Zionism. In the new book, Josef Stalin, who was once downgraded by the Krushchev regime, is praised for purging Trotsky. Ironically, Trotsky, a Soviet Jew, had been bitterly anti-Zionist in his lifetime and today's Trotskyites in Europe and America are anti-Israel.

Newsday, March 23, 1970

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thereby to wield a certain influence in the post-Franco period.

(2) *Opposition on the fringes of the system.* This includes leftist Demo-Christians; Catholic syndicalists; Socialists living in the country as well as those who follow the exiles' political line; Anarchists who are similarly divided (the exiles are extremely intransigeant in principle, whereas those in Spain tend to be syndicalists who have abandoned pure Anarchist principles); last, the Communists, who are divided into a pro-Russian group, the best-organized and -financed, a pro-Italian or polycentric faction (the Claudin group), and a pro-Chinese group. Within the pro-Soviet group there is a "purifying" splinter element opposed to the Pasionaria-Carrillo leadership.

All these assorted opposition groups have no contact with the people and no real power, except for the pro-Russian Communists, who exercise some influence in the Workers' Commissions and have some militant supporters; the pro-Chinese group, which enjoys some (passing) prestige among students; the Anarchists, who retain a sentimental appeal for the Catalan working class and who, three years ago, undertook a "dialogue" with elements of the confederación Nacional Sindicalista which, however, did not lead to any concrete results.

All these groups calculated that the Pretender, Don Juan, would be Franco's successor. They accepted help from his supporters and were caught short when Franco named Juan Carlos instead—all of which leaves this conglomerate of opponents without much influence. The opposition appears to rely on certain army personnel (young officers and others from the General Staff) and hopes that, when the moment comes, these military men will dismiss Juan Carlos and seize power. The opposition maintains these military men are democratic and liberal in their thinking and wish to establish a constitutional government; it seems to have no fear that, *à la grecque,* they may become military dictators.

(3) *The impatient opposition.* These groups include the students and the young priests, who demand immediate changes. The students do not say what changes they want, for they have assumed the abstract position of French and American campus revolutionaries. The priests know what they want—modernization of the ecclesiastical structure and, in Catalonia, church support for local nationalist demands. At the moment, the students comprise a wide political spectrum — Maoists, Castroites, neo-Marxists, Marcuseites—and they view the pro-Russian Communists as rightists. But the Communists get along well enough with the progressive Catholics, and they control, or at least influence, a number of publishing houses and the one Catalan periodical, which can be published only because it is brought out by a religious congregation. The fact that the Ministry of Information does not permit the other partisan groups within the opposition to publish helps create the impression that the entire opposition is under the control or influence of the Communists; this in turn contributes to keeping the middle class simultaneously fearful and sympathetic. Their dread of Communism (which the facts do not justify) makes middle-class people hope that the Communist party will be defeated but also leads them to aid the Communists with money on the chance that their defeat is not absolutely certain.

There is one other group among the "impatient opposition"—a minority among the workers who want their living standard raised, precisely because it has already somewhat improved. Previously, these workers were organized in the Alianza Sindicales Obreras (A.S.O.), and with the support of some foreign unions—notably, the German metallurgical union—they were a force to be reckoned with. The A.S.O. was eventually disbanded by the police, whereupon, with the assistance of the Catholics, this working-class minority formed the Workers' Commissions.

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ALL THESE OPPOSITION GROUPS, diverse as they are, have some things in common. Although to oppose the regime no longer requires the heroism it did immediately after the Civil War, opponents of the government know they must face veiled harassment, the loss of their job, or even imprisonment, and they know also that they are renouncing the material advantages the regime provides even for those who are neutral. The students know that the police will be tough with them, and the workers consider police brutality inevitable.

Another point of similarity is that, ideologically, the opposition groups all live from hand to mouth. They all import some ideas from France, especially from the New Left, but they make little attempt to study the Spanish situation in depth or to formulate concrete solutions to Spanish problems. The literature of the opposition, now "legal," consists mainly of denunciations or generalities. Therefore, in the eyes of most Spaniards, the opposition does not constitute a real alternative to the Franco regime; one might even say that the majority of Spaniards outside the big cities and some working-class areas do not know it exists.

Finally, as a pressure group the opposition is powerless since it does not command the allegiance of the majority of Spaniards, being unable to count on the active support of the middle class or the militancy of the working class. It is reduced to proclaiming opinions it is incapable of defending, not to speak of imposing them on the country. With the disintegration of the student movement into small dogmatic factions (aping the French), the opposition has lost the one real if uncertain shock-troop potential it had; and it places its hopes not in any action of its own but in a possible anti-monarchical coup once Franco will have left the scene.

What I have written here is not intended as a criticism. Probably, the opposition cannot be otherwise, given the political situation in Spain and in the world at large. It is no small thing that an opposition exists at all and that it has persisted for 30 years—hard, asphyxiating years. Had the opposition not existed and made the regime feel uneasy, there would have been no liberalization.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? Franco seems to have an answer: create conditions that will allow the system to continue after his death, while making some concessions—termed "liberalization." Even within the system, opinions about this policy vary. Older people are for a strong-arm policy and against "liberalization," not only because they lived through the Civil War and deem themselves the victors but also because they will not have to live in the Spain of the future. Men under fifty favor "liberalizing" in one way or another: some want to give the throne to Don Juan, a possibility now excluded by Franco's having designated Prince Juan Carlos as his successor; others, particularly among the Falangist, want to make the syndicates more independent and worker-oriented so that they may become a major center of power in the future; still others favor a government, with or without a king, that would be controlled by the army; and finally there are those who hope to move slowly toward a democratic system, taking advantage of the "liberalization."

My personal impression is that both these elements and the opposition will be displaced and outdistanced in the long run by forces that will spring up spontaneously. In a short while, the regime itself will have to decide about its future and very possibly will absorb some elements from the opposition —the younger churchmen, militant students, philo-Communist bourgeois, and intellectuals from the pseudo-New Left.* Historically, such a move will have no importance, for these groups are politically powerless. There is, however, one segment of the opposition that is more realistic, has ties with

* With the late 1969 reorganization of the Franco cabinet eliminating the old Franquiata elements, this has in part taken place. For the moment, the predominant group in Spain consists of the pseudo-liberal technocrats and business milieu grouped in the *Opus Dei*.

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the past, has learned a few lessons, and will be able to play a political role.

But what role?

It is my impression that there are individuals and even groups among the opposition who are beginning to think more or less in these terms: The system is strong and probably will survive for one or two generations more. But not forever. It can be pressured into accelerating its "liberalization" which will permit us to speed up modernization—that is, hasten the transformation of an oligarchic feudal-capitalist society into a more open capitalist society that requires a political democracy.

For the moment, this is the utmost we can hope for, which is not to say that we relinquish our ultimate objective, in a still distant Spain, of a socialist society. However, if we have no strength we can exert no pressure. The elitists are all with and for the system. Accordingly, what strength we can have lies at the base of society. That strength has to be created. We must go to the people, work with the masses—the laborers, the peasants, the uprooted. We must begin at the beginning. Today we are in the same situation in which the working-class movement was a hundred years ago. People must be won over one by one.

Now, what organizational forms this effort will assume is for the moment unforeseeable. But, I repeat, it is my impression that a small sector of the opposition, even of the young people, is ready for this silent labor that will proceed without fanfare or immediate apparent results. For some years, it will be work that produces small victories and big failures. Later . . . well, later one will see what it is that Spaniards want, and one will fight so that they may fight to force the system to grant or to accept what Spaniards want.

This is a strategy. What tactics can be used to implement it?

One can already point to a growing interest in an objective study of the country's problems. This is a genuine advance over the old reliance on clichés about agrarian reform, civilian control of the army, separation of church and state, etc. However, it is disturbing that the people who appear to have moved farthest in this direction, albeit not yet very far, are of elitist persuasions—as, for example, the Communists and progressive Catholics. Democratic elements so far have not found a language for communicating with the submerged masses.

In my view, the Spanish democratic opposition would find it profitable to learn from the spirit and the techniques of the struggle for civil rights and political participation, not from the theorizing of the French New Left or instructions from Moscow, Peking, or Havana, but from the experience in the United States. In Spain there is fertile political ground for campaigns (obviously, they would entail some risk) through which certain sectors of the submerged masses would begin to participate in organizations that must deal with their problems. To undermine the system's paternalism is to weaken it and, simultaneously, to foster among the people an awareness of their own interests and the will to defend them.

This analysis of the current Spanish situation may seem to derive from discouragement and to be itself discouraging; but quite the contrary. For 30 years, by police action, censorship, and economic pressures, the regime has succeeded in reducing the political life of the nation to a game for elitists. Involuntarily, the opposition, being also an elite, has played the regime's game. It is only by going to the people, mingling with the people, and awakening the people that the opposition can ever become not the critic of, but the successor to, the regime. Francoism must be replaced not by a group or party or ideology but only by the Spanish people. Whoever wants that to come to pass must be integrated with the people. Today in Spain we are living through the first steps of this slow and difficult process of integration. To affirm this is to leave pessimism behind.

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Paradoxes of European Communism

1. Irving Howe

Old Categories and New Realities

I SHOULD LIKE TO OPEN a political discussion about a problem that seems unprecedented, especially in France and Italy. In both countries there are mass Communist parties, allied with the Moscow wing of Communism. These are perhaps the largest, certainly the best organized parties in their countries. They win between a fifth and a third of the vote in national elections. They maintain the allegiance of a major segment, perhaps the majority, of the working class, as well as large elements of the intelligentsia and youth. Their leadership is experienced and often resourceful.

Yet no one seems quite to know what kind of parties they are, what their ultimate ends may be, or how the Democratic Left in these countries should respond to them.

It is many years since these Communist parties were revolutionary parties of the Leninist type. It is many years, even, since they have been "revolutionary" parties of the Stalinist type. After the Second World War a decision was made—perhaps by Moscow alone, perhaps by the French and Italian CP's alone, or more likely, by all in consultation—that neither in France nor Italy would these parties try to take power through extra-legal methods. Whether they could in fact have done so in the years directly after World War II is a matter for debate and historical investigation; that there was a genuine possibility tempting them at the time seems beyond doubt. The decision not to try to seize power was due primarily to the belief that such an effort would precipitate a third world war; the U.S., it was calculated in Moscow, would not allow Western Europe to be taken over by the CP's without offering armed resistance. And the Soviet Union did not want war at that point.

What may have been a momentary tactical decision in 1947 has since become a strategic perspective. The breathing spell given to Western democratic capitalism by the Communist decision not to attempt a revolutionary coup, together with the aid provided by the Marshall plan, enabled the spectacular economic and social recovery of Western Europe. In consequence, the CP's of France and Italy have been—in one sense—immobilized: they are frozen out of the mechanism of parliamentary politics (coalition governments, electoral blocs, etc.) while at the same time they no longer have any sort of serious revolutionary perspective. The idea of a mass revolutionary action the present CP leaderships have never held; the idea of a coup *à la* Prague in their own countries can only strike them as, at most, a distant possibility.

Yet the French and Italian CP's dominate enormous institutions. They have a great deal of secondary social power and large amounts of money at their disposal. They staff unions, front groups, municipal governments; they provide an ideal nesting place for aspiring bureaucrats. As the ultra-left students in Paris and Rome charged with some

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accuracy, the thought of "revolution"—indeed, the prospect of large-scale social disruption—fills the CP leaders with repugnance, even fear. They do, it would seem, have a perspective of power, but it is by no means clear that they have a clear sense of how it is to be obtained.

In Italy that perspective seems, right now, somewhat realistic: the creation of a new center-left bloc which will either include the Communists directly or engage in quiet deals with them. (The latter, apparently, have already taken place.) For the Italian CP, entering a left-center cabinet, or having a close relationship with one, is a meaningful goal; what they would do beyond that, we can hardly say and it isn't at all certain that they themselves have any notions about it either. But if the Italian CP entertains any expectation of reigning exclusively, let alone establishing a one-party dictatorship of the Communist type, it surely cannot suppose this to be an expectation realizable in the next several decades.

THE QUESTION THEN ARISES: what kind of party is the French or Italian CP? Neither in a serious Marxist nor a popular journalistic sense can it still be considered a revolutionary party. Yet, I think, neither is it a traditional reformist party. Why so? Because:

- *it does not proclaim, or work within a tradition of, principled commitment to parliamentary democracy, multi-party politics, free elections as a necessary condition for socialism; nor has it trained its followers to feel loyalty toward this belief;*
- *it keeps its hold on the workers and youth, at least in part through clinging to the mystique of "revolution," even if the social content of that mystique is enfeebled and the moral value eroded; to abandon this would mean to forgo its distinctive reason for existence;*
- *it neither practices nor expresses commitment to the tradition of intra-party democracy, which means the freedom to organize opposition groupings, factions, etc;*
- *it declares itself the ally of a state and, more important, a social system, which is* inextricably *bound up with the one-party dictatorship;*
- *and so long as it maintains its ties with the Russian regime, it cannot fundamentally change in the above respects, despite various equivocal formulas calculated to reassure would-be political partners in Italy and France that they have no reason to fear it.*

The Italian and French CP's also must face the complex problem of sensing the nature, depth, and intensity of the support they win. It is one thing for a worker in Milan to vote CP; another to suppose him ready for "militant" action. It is one thing for a worker in Paris to participate actively in the CP-led trade unions; even in a moment of crisis, to join a sit-in strike which employs revolutionary slogans in behalf of substantial immediate reforms; but quite another to suppose that this signifies a willingness to go further. A recent poll in France indicates that a majority of the population favors some sort of "socialism," but only 5 percent favor a "Soviet" type of "socialism." The leaders of the French CP are shrewd enough to recognize how sharply this response limits them: approximately three-fourths of those who vote for them don't want a reenactment at home of the blessings of the Russian dictatorship. Why should they?

Analogies are sometimes made between the condition of the French and Italian CP's today and the Social Democratic parties in the pre-World War I years. There is some point in such analogies, but not much. The Social Democratic parties kept using revolutionary rhetoric while in fact adapting themselves to reformist politics; the Communist parties, it is said, do the same. But with the Social Democratic parties there was, to an extent both significant and difficult to determine, a genuine and sincere tension between competing outlooks. Can this be attributed to the CP leaders and bureaucrats? Hardly. To the CP workers? Not, I think, very

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much. To some CP youth and intellectuals? More so.

The Social Democrats were caught in a difficulty that must afflict all socialist parties; but the CP's today are caught in a new *kind* of dilemma. They are the allies, and they have been the agents, as to *some* extent they remain the agents, of a totalitarian, or authoritarian, dictatorship; a portion of their local power depends on that relationship; yet they also have independent, national interests of their own, which can bring them into conflict with the Soviet Union. They are not the free, if confused, movements the Social Democrats were in the years before World War I.

WHEN WE CONFRONT a new political phenomenon, our first impulse is to find an old label for it. But it is better to insist upon the "newness," even if we have no label.

The CP's of France and Italy are neither revolutionary nor reformist parties; they are intellectually and materially dependent on the system of bureaucratic collectivism which dominates Russia and Eastern Europe; they rest on working-class support and advance proposals for immediate and "structural" reforms which are sometimes of genuine merit; and as for their strategic ends, those extending beyond the immediate desire to break out of isolation, they seem not to know. Perhaps they do not even care.

To put it this way is to put it statically. But these parties are also in varying degrees of internal uncertainty, ferment, doubt, and confusion. Perhaps even crisis.

For democrats of the Left, whether or not they are socialist, all this presents of course very difficult problems. The effort to "isolate" the CP's has succeeded in some ways: they no longer threaten the survival of democratic regimes. But this effort has not succeeded in reducing significantly the support the CP has within the working class. So long as the CP in France and Italy remains a mass party, the consequences for both democratic values and socialist transformation remain damaging. Excluded from parliamentary arrangements and both unable and unwilling to act decisively outside of them, the CP's tend to immobilize politically the French and Italian working class and to give the political Right far more power on the top of French and Italian society than they have at the bottom. Meanwhile, the left-liberal parties, including the social democrats, seem doomed to internal division, powerlessness, and drift.

Can anything be done about this situation? One possible course is to continue the present policy of "isolation," the argument for it being that slowly the CP's are eroding, gradually their membership is declining and the intensity of its commitment weakening, and with time they will be mere fossils, even if large fossils, with which a reinvigorated and reformed democratic society will be able to cope. This argument would be more persuasive if one were able to believe fully in the idea of . . . "reinvigorated and reformed democratic society." In Italy especially, if one goes by recent accounts, that doesn't seem a likely immediate future.

A second possible course would be for liberal-left parties to enter political and electoral blocs with the CP. In such an arrangement, it is argued, the CP could/would throw its weight behind progressive governments, thereby enabling the passage of urgent reforms. Gradually, the CP might be absorbed into the parliamentary system, as the Social Democrats were; and then there might even open up the perspective of a reunification of the old parties of the Left

TO CONTRIBUTORS

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on a new and democratic basis, so that, in effect, the poison of Stalinism would be flushed out and a new beginning made possible for European socialism. Meanwhile, the various ultra-left sects could happily cannibalize one another on the side.

It is a perspective as dangerous as it is tempting. For the crucial variable is this: what do we estimate the political and moral strength of the anti-Communist or non-Communist Left to be in these countries? If there were in France and Italy today parties of the Left that (a) were firmly rooted in large plebeian constituencies (b) were free of the authoritarian disease; (c) were boldly committed to a radical-democratic reconstruction of society, then this perspective would be decidedly attractive. For then, perhaps, the inner transformation and fracturing of the CP's could be accelerated. Small portions of them might veer to Maoism: good riddance. Others might enter a close alliance with the Democratic Left and be influenced by it. But can one honestly say that contemporary Social Democracy, or other left-liberal groups, in France and Italy have the strength and self-confidence successfully to undertake such a course? Perhaps, as with many problems, there is no immediate answer.

2. Federico Mancini

The Inner World of Italian Communism

ROSSANA ROSSANDA is one of the keenest and most turbulent minds womanhood has contributed to international Communism since the death of Rosa Luxemburg. A long-time militant of the Italian party (PCI), she was appointed in 1963 head of the Cultural Division: not a slight achievement in a political organization that has never suffered from want of able and ambitious male intellectuals. In 1965, however, Rossanda dared to attack in *Rinascita,* the official weekly of the party, the policy in cultural affairs imposed for twenty years by the late Togliatti.[1] As a consequence of this outburst, she lost her job. For a few years, Rossanda disappeared from the limelight. Then, in February 1969, she staged a comeback that could not have been more resounding.

The Twelfth Congress of the PCI was drawing to an end in the huge and crowded stadium at Bologna. The motion of the Political Committee, a long document epitomizing the middle-of-the-road line charted by old Luigi Longo, had just been read and everybody expected the chairman Giorgio Napolitano to put it to the vote. Instead, he announced that an amendment had been proposed by comrade Rossanda. "Does comrade Rossanda"—asked Napolitano, a soft-spoken right-winger, in his suavest tone—"insist on her amendment?" The hint was clear enough and for a moment all the delegates and guests held their breath. Then we saw golden locks move down the aisle toward the tribune: and there, grasping the microphone, her face strained, Rossanda started in a little, broken voice: "Not out of stubbornness, dear comrades, but out of

[1] Rossana Rossanda, "Unità politica e dibattito culturale," *Rinascita (Il Contemporaneo),* August 28, 1965. For a summary and appraisal of this fine piece, see Federico Mancini and Giorgio Galli, "Gramsci's Presence," *Government and Opposition,* Summer 1968, p. 329.

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a deep-seated conviction, I've come here. . . ." For the first time in 40 years the voice of an internal opposition that dared to so define itself had been heard at a meeting of Italian Communists.

In the following months the situation grew more and more exciting. Rossana Rossanda had spoken for a group of Communists that the newspapermen immediately christened "New Left." Indeed, some traits commonly associated with new-leftist sentiment seemed to characterize these men: a bias, though not uncritical, toward the anti-bureaucratic mood of the "cultural revolution" in China, an open dislike for the policies of the Soviet Union, a deep anxiety over the fate of the Czechoslovak experiment and, above all, an obvious sympathy for the spontaneous mass movements agitating Italian life. But the group also had a Spartacist soul, as its rejection of Lenin's organizational model clearly showed. The party—its members suggested—should cease to be an "external vanguard," guiding the working class in a pedagogic relationship; very much along Luxemburgian lines, it should come to view itself as an "internal vanguard," whose task it is to translate into a political strategy the revolutionary initiative of the masses.

At first, these views did not excessively disturb the PCI leadership. The latter affected indifference and probably thought that the existence of an inner New Left might soothe the outer New Left, the obstreperous *groupuscules* whose favorite pastime indeed seemed to be accusing the party of having sold out to the establishment. Rossanda and her friends were even allotted three seats (out of 170) in the Central Committee. But, when the first issues of their new monthly, *Il Manifesto,* began to circulate, the lull came to an end.

Il Manifesto is a much better journal than the official publications of the party, the drab *Rinascita* and the heavy *Critica Marxista.* It is sprightly and well-written and alternates with taste political and cultural topics; it counts among its contributors Jean-Paul Sartre, Jorge Semprun, Edgar Snow, K. S. Karol, Régis Debray. Disagreeable as this was, however, the party leaders might have put up with it. What they must have found unbearable was the editors' obvious tendency to shed the few vestiges of circumspection and respect for the Communist rules of decorum they had shown at the outset. The September 1969 issue smacked of deliberate irreverence, as if the *Manifesto* group sought an open confrontation. Its main feature was a sharp attack on Giorgio Amendola, the powerful leader of the PCI Right, who in August had urged Communist participation in government.[2] The Popular Front strategy, it was argued, was dictated in the 1930s by the necessity of warding off the Fascist assault on the working class. In the present situation, characterized as it is by a great revival of revolutionary forces in the West, launching again that old formula merely testifies to the depth and scope of capitalist integration. The Communist party in government would play the role of a fire department. It would sacrifice the revolution to a politics of reform thoroughly compatible with the system.[3]

THE LEADERSHIP decided to counterattack. At the Central Committee meeting of October 14–17, the awesome word was often uttered: factionalism. Dissent—the *Manifesto* group was reminded—can be vented in the PCI, but not organized. Organization of dissent ends by crystallizing and drying up the debate inside the party. More, it is in contrast with the party's revolutionary nature. If the monolithism of old has to be shunned, unity and centralism—which indeed presuppose a plurality of opinions and a rich democratic life—must be upheld.

Still, the discussion was civilized; and

[2] Giorgio Amendola, "Partito di governo," L'Unità, August 21, 1969, and "Richiamo alla realtà," *ibid.*, August 29, 1969.

[3] Aldo Natoli, "Come, con chi, per che cosa," *Il Manifesto*, September 1969, p. 5.

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civilized beyond all expectation was its outcome. It had been surmised that Rossanda and her friends would be ousted from the Central Committee or ordered to discontinue their venture. In fact, what the Central Committee did was to rally the party against the dissidents politically. "We shall not anathematize them," said Vice-Secretary Enrico Berlinguer in his final speech, "we shall challenge them to a stand-up fight." During the following months the 10,000 territorial sections of the party would resound with accusations against the *Manifesto* group; but they would have a chance to hit back and not be subject to "administrative measures."

Both within and without the party, liberals were exultant. After all, a few days before the Central Committee meeting, Roger Garaudy had been given hell by the French CP and Ernst Fischer, the distinguished Marxist philosopher, had been expelled from the Austrian CP. Both were charged with a crime that in Italian Communist circles is a common parlor-game: having gone somewhat far in condemning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Neither Fischer nor Garaudy were spokesmen for any faction: they were isolated intellectuals, expressing at most the discontent (or agony) of their fellow intellectuals. But the Italian party—already regarded as the most independent and worldly-wise in the West—had been confronted by a group to which the Red Guards seemed to have passed on Mao's exhilarating order: bombard your headquarters. Yet, its members had not been ostracized. The party could be said to have been administered, and passed, a severe test; the road now seemed open for a full acceptance of internal democracy.

But these are hard times for the liberals. On November 12, in the thick of the debate in the party sections, a dry communiqué of the Directive Office announced that the Central Committee would convene at the end of the month to pass a final judgment on the dissidents, whose obduracy was beyond cure. On November 25 the meeting took place, this time a mere formality. The decision had obviously been made in advance: it amounted to the ejection of Rossanda and her friends for "political incompatibility" (a ground that, unlike "moral indignity," leaves the door ajar for re-entry if the ousted member repents). Said Rossanda half sadly, half ironically, but surely without acrimony, to a non-Communist interviewer:

> Yesterday, as I watched the comrades compunctiously voting in favor of our condemnation, I felt there was something paradoxical in the whole story. They seemed to be celebrating the rites of a faith in which, in their heart of hearts, they believed no more. I don't mean the faith in Communism, or, if you prefer, the confidence that our objects are attainable. I mean the faith in the party as a church, as the Primal Mother—protecting, seducing, avenging herself.[4]

WHAT HAPPENED between October 17 and November 12? Rumor has it that the shift in the leadership's attitude toward the *Manifesto* group was caused by the fear that a Stalinist faction might be organized with Soviet help and claim the privileges bestowed on Rossanda and her friends.[5] To be sure, the Stalinists did threaten to issue a journal of their own if Rossanda were not made an example of; but I don't think this group is strong enough to blackmail the leadership into recanting a momentous decision in less than a month. Its members are discredited, half-forgotten; and the sponsorship of the Soviet Union, though still fairly weighty in the eyes of the Communist rank and file, has no longer the power to make an old jade look like a thoroughbred.

The real reason is far more serious. Since the beginning, the fate of the *Manifesto* group has been contingent on the vicissitudes of a debate in the leadership as to the question of Communist participation in a

[4] See *Il Giorno*, November 28, 1969.
[5] See "*Manifesto*: dura sentenza," *L'Espresso*, November 23, 1969.

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grosse Koalition with the Christian Democrats and the Socialists. As pointed out above, Amendola's right wing views participation as a short-term prospect: the industrial chaos, the political paralysis, the widespread feeling that the center-left parties are no longer able to bridle the tensions produced by the impetuous growth of Italian society, all these are factors affording the PCI an excellent chance to enter the area of primary political power. On the other side, Berlinguer's center is not opposed in principle to a Communist presence in government. It believes, however, that in a period of social turmoil the PCI should remain in opposition and take care not to lose its sway over the masses, which have never been so restive and susceptible to the violent slogans of extremist groups. Clearly, for the latter strategy—a PCI giving priority to its ties with the working class, including the latter's outermost fringes—the existence of a left-wing faction is tolerable and even useful. In Amendola's perspective, which calls for a number of decisions apt to discomfit the masses, it is not; it is, in fact, inconceivable. As already occurred in the Socialist party when it went into the government (1962–64), such a faction would attract all those baffled by the new line; it would gain strength and eventually split, depriving the party of valuable cadres. Hence, the need to drive it out *now*.

If the foregoing is correct, Berlinguer had the edge on Amendola in October and lost it in November. This reversal of positions was due to a number of factors. First, the debate promoted by the Central Committee in the party's sections showed that in some cities (Rome, Naples, Cagliari, Bergamo, etc.) the *Manifesto* group had a larger following than had been anticipated, alarming the more lukewarm supporters of Berlinguer's line. Second, the industrial unrest grew considerably worse: which was bound to strengthen the view that the only non-authoritarian way of restoring order is to let the Communists come closer to the center of power. (On the Communist side, this point was unblushingly made by Senator Bufalini at the last Central Committee meeting: "are there regions," he asked, "more orderly than the red ones, where the workers' movement is at its strongest?")[6] Third and last, the Christian Democrats of Emilia showed an all but avid interest in an offer made by the local Communists to set up a common government in that reddest of all Italian regions. Obviously, a *grosse Koalition* in Bologna, Emilia's capital, would be a way-station toward Amendola's ultimate goal: a *grosse Koalition* in Rome. In short, the events following October 17 seemed to validate Amendola's hypothesis; by the same token, they spelled ruin for Rossanda and her friends.

I HAVE DWELT at length on the *Manifesto* affair, its ups and downs and its gloomy ending because it reveals, in my opinion, far more poignantly than a conventional analysis could do, what the PCI is today. The PCI of 1970 has little, if anything, in common with the 20th-century Prince dreamt of by Gramsci, slender, ravenous, possessed by the inflexible will to impose his "hegemony" on society. It is a corpulent, slow-moving, and rather perplexed party, more and more frustrated at being frozen out of the system, more and more eager to join the center-left parties in government and help carry out the far-reaching reforms Italy needs. Lip service is still paid by its leaders to their former revolutionary aspirations; but even lip service is increasingly rare and faint. The authentic thinking of many *apparatchiks* was disclosed by Amendola, in an uncommon outburst of sincerity, as early as in 1964. "Neither the Social Democratic nor the Communist solution," said the leader of the Right, "has so far revealed itself to be competent to achieve a socialist transformation of society. . . . A political party that does not attain its objectives in fifty years, with three generations of militants, must

[6] See *L'Unità*, November 28, 1969.

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search out the reasons for this failure, must know how to transform itself."And from this premise he proposed the establishment of a new unified movement, neither Communist (i.e., revolutionary) nor Social Democratic (i.e., in the words of Léon Blum, available for a loyal management of the capitalist system.) [7]

Though dedicated to a strategy of reforms, the PCI sticks to the doctrine of democratic centralism; in other words, it tends to act as if, instead of organizing 1.5 million people who represent different interest groups and have different ideas as to how socialism should be realized, it still were the tightly-knit army of professional revolutionaries (the "two thousand iron men") envisaged by Lenin in 1902. Of course, time and, above all, the great earthquake of 1956 have eaten into the original purism. The atmosphere in the party is no longer as stifling as it was during the grisly postwar years. Today, the historian Paolo Spriano can expose the wretched role Togliatti played in the Comintern since its Sixth Congress and get away with it; [8] Vittorio Strada, the critic and student of Soviet literature, can write that his work sometimes calls to mind that of a toilet-cleaner and have the editor of *L'Unità* countenance him; [9] Deputy Maria Antonietta Macciocchi may bring out a book that is a devastating attack on the party bureaucracy and suffer no greater harm than a few nasty reviews.[10]

In short, all civil liberties have come to be recognized and guaranteed in the PCI, except one: that of associating with a view to carrying out dissident political actions. Leninism is no doubt at a low ebb, but, as things are at present, its essence is still there.

What to do? I am far from believing that the remnants of authoritarianism still clinging to the organizational philosophy of the PCI should be condoned as a minor foible. Still, I'm persuaded that Italy's left-democrats should do nothing to oppose, that they should actually support, the PCI's bid for participation in government.[11]

In Italy, it seems to me, the problem posed by Irving Howe has one more dimension than in France. Here, helping the Communists out of the refrigerator in which they have immured themselves, is not only a possibly *advantageous* operation, one suggested by the convenience of strengthening the Left and restoring the political balance, or, simply, by the impossibility of keeping in a political ghetto one-fourth of the electorate. Here, putting the CP back into cir-

[7] Giorgio Amendola, "Ipotesi sulla riunificazione," *Rinascita*, November 28, 1964, pp. 8–9.

[8] Spriano analyzes Togliatti's role in the second volume of his monumental *Storia del Partito comunista italiano*, (Turin: Einaudi, 1969), pp. 201 *ff.*

[9] Strada has engaged Vsevolod Kochetov, the notorious editor of *Oktjabr*, in one of the most vitriolic literary-political controversies ever to take place in the Communist world. In Kochetov's last novel, Benito Spada (a transparent allusion to Strada) is the typical Italian Communist intellectual as a Muscovite Zhdanovist must see him: decadent, enthralled by Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn, filled with hate for the Soviet Union, teetering on the verge of open treason.

Strada calls Kochetov a "liar" and an "expert slanderer." Here is his strongest and politically most significant statement: "Kochetov may not know that the Italian working class doesn't aspire in the least to be saddled with a dictatorship of bureaucrats like himself, so ponderous that could not be removed even by great winches." See *La Stampa*, October 3, 16, 17, 1969, and *Rinascita*, October 10, 1969.

[10] *Lettere dall'interno del PCI a Louis Althusser* (Milan: Feltrinelli; 1969). In 1968, Signora Macciocchi stood as a Communist candidate for Parliament in a plebeian constituency of Naples. The book is made up of the letters she wrote to her famous French friend during the campaign and of the latter's replies.

[11] This is the opinion of about two-thirds of the Socialists and 30 percent of the Christian Democrats, though, of course, none of their leaders would at this stage dream of venting it openly. In the Catholic party, former Prime Minister Aldo Moro has spoken of a "strategy of attention" to the Communists; others urge the need of a "constitutional covenant" with the PCI or of a "shift to the left of the political axis." More concretely, the Socialists have been quietly forming coalitions with the Communists in the councils of many cities, including Bologna and Ravenna.

The first stage of the graduated process leading to a Communist entry into the area of power would be the establishment of a government composed of Christian Democrats and Socialists (i.e., without the Republicans and the Social Democrats) under the leadership of Moro.

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culation is a *necessary* operation. We need the PCI in order to effect what has not been, and can no more be, effected by our traditional center and center-left coalitions: a drastic reallocation of resources from private to public ends, a more equitable distribution of the benefits accruing from our "economic miracle," a less authoritarian society. In practice, this means the enactment of 10 or 15 powerful laws: as experience has shown, Communist support in Parliament is indispensable to pass them. It also means the creation of several agencies: if they are to be efficient, we must have Communist officials to staff them. Our inept administrative class needs an injection of Communist know-how, Communist public-spiritedness, Communist singleness of purpose, even Communist toughness.

Besides, let's be realistic. Unpalatable as it is, the fact that the Communists keep denying rights we hold to be basic does not necessarily make them a menace to the governments with which they associate. The Prague coup of 1948 was a turning point in postwar history and in the life of many of us; but the memory of those days should not dim our vision today. In 1970, obviously more relevant though often overlooked is the Finnish experience. A country in a delicate international position, Finland is proving that two democratic parties at variance on many issues may form a coalition with a large Communist party, not especially imbued with liberal traditions, and may not be crushed. In fact, if a danger exists, it is that the Communists may be unable to bear the strain of collaboration and, as happened in Finland, split, thereby losing part of their value as allies.[12]

In any event, to draw from the *Manifesto* story only somber conclusions would, I believe, be a major error. The Rossanda group is merely the upper part of an iceberg, which emerged because the times and the circumstances (the explosion of the student movement, the unexpected combativeness of the working class) were favorable to the open organization of New Left-oriented dissent. Below the surface, other dissident groups, not necessarily New Left- or Spartacist-oriented, are champing at the bit in the factories, the universities, the editorial boards of still obscure monthlies, or simply in the offices of some local leader. At the moment they are kept under control or they feel the time is not suitable for action; but sooner or later they are bound to come out into the open. The PCI has its feet in two worlds: international Communism, which is torn by powerful centrifugal forces, and Italian society which, in essence, is open and pluralistic. The party simply cannot protect its sections from the tensions that rend these worlds and forever shield the chastity of its flock: all the more so as Doubt, as Rossana Rossanda has suggested, is worming its way into the hierarchy of the Church and infecting its priests.

The secularization of the PCI is advancing though painfully and with frequent relapses. "Co-opting" the party into the machinery of decision-making, pulling it closer to the point where the tensions are at their strongest, may be, among other things, a way of stepping up this process.

[12] An excellent essay on the plight of the Finnish party (SKP) has been published in the October–November issue of *Il Manifesto* (Pertti Hynynen, "L'esperienza finlandese," pp. 38 *ff*). Clearly, the intention of the editors was to warn the PCI leadership of the danger it would incur if it adopted the "collaborationist" line of the Finnish right-wingers, Aarne Saarinen and Erkki Salomaa.

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Ben B. Seligman

Labor, Lovestone, and the CIA

AMERICAN LABOR AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, by Ronald Radosh. New York: Random House. 463 pp. $10.00.

RELUCTANTLY, one must deal harshly with this book. I say reluctantly because the topic —union involvement in overseas affairs— is an important one. The book, however, is inept. Its author, who teaches history at Queensborough Community College and is an advocate of the New Left, had a brilliant opportunity to write a significant work. He has bobbled his chance. The book has no life, no style, and generates about as much interest as a Mary Worth cartoon. When little care is given to the craft of writing, the result will be soporific.

The book lacks balance. Some 300 pages are devoted to a snail-paced description— actually a chronicle—of labor's foreign policy in World War I. Then comes a sudden leap to 1945 and the rise of Jay Lovestone and all that follows, a lugubrious tale that Radosh dispatches in about 150 pages. Yet it should be obvious to anyone who has tried to follow the wanderings of the AFL–CIO on other continents that the space allotment ought to have been reversed. Some scholars may want to learn about the tricky involvement of Samuel Gompers with the Wilson administration; but the urgent questions now concern George Meany, Jay Lovestone, Irving Brown, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The unions' present-day participation in Cold War machinations is infinitely more sinister than Gompers's support of the Allied cause in 1918.

Radosh's chief complaint—a supportable one—stems from American labor's continuous nosiness about the political complexion of foreign unions. The AFL, and later the AFL–CIO, wanted to have in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere unions that would be carbon copies of the American business union. Such unions, in their view, were essential to democracy. That some organizations might have preferred reform to five-cents-an-hour suggested to Gompers and his successors anarchism, or worse, bolshevism. Thus a native xenophobia became an item of export and, as Radosh does demonstrate, fitted very well into the long-range outlook visible on the banks of the Potomac. The unions came to do the government's bidding.

According to Radosh, the marriage (or seduction?) was consummated during World War I when Gompers recanted his early pacificism to become, like so many other liberal-labor devotees, an unqualified supporter of the Allied Powers. There was a *quid pro quo*—a shorter work day (at least on government projects); the "right" to organize; and labor's admission through the side door of the White House. Radosh presents this part of the story in great detail, following the gyrations of the right-wing socialists—John Spargo, William English Walling, A. M. Simons, Phelps Stokes —as they panted for government approval and sponsorship of junkets to Europe. He tells how the Stockholm Conference, called by the moderate Soviets in 1917, was torpedoed; how the Social Democratic League was established to offset the socialist militants; how the Root Commission tried to tell the Russians what to do; how Algie Simons, an active socialist and author of a standard work on social conflict, managed to generate praise for Benito Mussolini; how Gompers tangled with Arthur Henderson, head of the British Labour party; how Gompers failed to impress the French socialists; how a Gompers meeting in Italy was inadvertently cancelled only to be filled at the last moment by soldiers (this episode is so hila-

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rious that even Radosh's deadly prose can't diminish its comedy); and on and on for 300 pages.

ALL THIS may be useful history, but there are some strange things in this book that reveal its origin in dissertation drafts, article scraps, and New Left ideology. In the introduction, Radosh suggests that FDR helped the CIO because he knew that industrial unions would assist "the corporations [in maintaining] their hegemonic control over American society. . . . The new industrial union federation served as a government created instrument that enabled sophisticated corporate leaders to overcome the resistance to change of both old-style laissez-faire capitalists and the old-line craft unions that refused to accept a statist structure." Balderdash! The nonsense telescoped in this sentence makes the history of the CIO a weird jumble in which fact and fantasy coalesce, making FDR infinitely more prescient than he ever was. It turns the workers' bitter struggle of the 1930s to organize and claim a place in society into nothing but a capitalist plot. To the New Left anything that a union does —be it striking, sitting down, or bargaining —is "class collaboration." When, oh when, will the New Left display a sense of balance (I almost said of reality) when it comes to labor unions? Sharp criticisms should be applied to unions today, yet there is no better instrument for workers to improve their immediate conditions than the trade unions. If they did not exist they'd have to be created. The New Left might ask itself what this country would be like had there been no union movement.

Some New Left writers—not Radosh—have even suggested that workers would do better by striking without unions. This only reveals that they know little of the strategy of industrial conflict. The electrical workers, for example, would have gotten nowhere against General Electric in the recent 14-week strike had they followed such stupid advice. The New Left evidently prefers a ragged army to a coordinated disciplined struggle. Such notions simply reveal the deficiencies of their political ideas.

What causes the reader really to blink is Radosh's belief that union leaders would not have operated as they did in the foreign field had rank-and-file members been informed. Really? Does he actually believe that union members are so far apart from their leaders on "anticommunism"? Does he think that the leadership would find it so difficult to "sell" the membership on this issue? Does he *know* how unions function? The fact, like it or not, is that in the area of foreign affairs members and leaders happen largely to agree. One trouble with the book is its unstated premise that the American worker replicates Marx's heroic proletarian. It's high time the author awakened to the facts of life: the American worker is often as xenophobic as any know-nothing fundamentalist. That may be sad, but it is true.

Of course, all this does not diminish the incredible *chutzpah* of the AFL–CIO's operation today. Such unbelievable amorality—interfering with unions in other nations, splitting legitimate organizations because they had Communist leaders (though often the membership was not Communist), breaking strikes (the Marseilles dock strike of 1947 being a case in point) and bragging about it, helping the CIA overturn legitimate governments in Latin America, and more—all this could only have had its roots in a virulent animosity to any kind of leftist politics and thinking. But here too Radosh's recital leaves much untold. Perhaps he could not find more to say, for a goodly part of the history remains buried in the archives of the CIA, the State Department, and the International Affairs Department of the AFL–CIO.

Yet there are some choice morsels he might have put on the table, particularly those well-known to Washington cognoscenti before *Ramparts* magazine blew the whistle. Arnold Zander, who was avidly interested in trips around the world, wasn't the only union president to establish an international affairs department subsidized by CIA foundations. At least half a dozen other unions in Washington copied Zander's performance. Suddenly, young men with crew cuts and mysterious backgrounds appeared to set up seminars in Latin America or Africa or Asia to teach workers how to bargain collectively, American style. Often they might just as well have taught negotiating techniques to the Eskimo, for all the interest that their pupils had in these subjects. Frequently, the seminars provided effective covers for CIA maneuvering. And as it turned out in many instances, for foreign

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workers, the seminars were one way of getting a trip to the big city or even a junket through the United States.

More serious problems stemmed from the way American union representatives—an Irving Brown or a Richard Deverall—went about pitting groups of foreign unionists against one another in an effort to isolate Communists. Actually, for all their mischief, the Browns and the Deveralls were not always successful. Leftist unions are still powerful in France, Italy, and Japan. Throughout, the CIA footed the bill. Small wonder that American labor visitors to foreign countries are frequently suspect.

Those facts Radosh has discovered are interpreted from the view of the New Left. He seems accurate enough in describing the Guatemalan and Dominican interventions: in these deplorable episodes there appears little doubt but that American union "foreign affairs" men lent a hand. Nor, I may add, does he give absolution to Walter Reuther: despite the UAW president's continual bickering with George Meany over foreign issues, the two men were not that far apart, says Radosh. Whenever a showdown threatened at AFL–CIO Executive Board meetings, Reuther managed to have other business to attend to.

The definitive study of labor, Lovestone, and the CIA is yet to be written. Only a small part of the tale is currently visible. The key records are buried and it may take years to unearth them. Of course, the events Radosh does relate (and most of these are not unknown) are interesting but, sad to say, he relates them poorly.

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Arthur Mitzman

Communism and Jacobinism

THE NEW JACOBINS, THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY, AND THE POPULAR FRONT, *by* Daniel R. Brower. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 265 pp. $7.95.

THERE ARE TWO THEMES in this book: (1) the way Stalin used the French Communist party and its political capital as pawns in his international *Realpolitik* of the thirties, and (2) the way the French CP (PCF) identified itself with and profited from the patriotic tradition of Jacobin nationalism. Within the relatively narrow confines of the first problem, Brower's control of historical evidence enables him to do an excellent job; the second, however, is far more complex than it appears in Brower's account.

By now it should surprise no one that Stalin viewed with extreme skepticism the Comintern's pretensions to being an agency of international revolution (he is said to have called it a gyp joint), and that he used it exclusively as an arm of Soviet foreign policy. During his consolidation of power in the mid-twenties, he cultivated ties with Germany in order to break out of the *cordon sanitaire,* and pushed a United Front line among Western Communists. In 1929, coinciding with the Russian turn from NEP to collectivization and five-year plans for industry, came the new ultra-left tactic of the Comintern's "third period": class against class. According to Brower, this tactic had two functions:

> within the capitalist regimes, internal dissension . . . might weaken the potential for anti-Soviet action. Besides, while fighting for a social and economic revolution in their own country, the Soviet leaders may have felt that the entire world Communist movement had to mobilize as well.

As is now known, the unique historical accomplishment of this revolutionary equivalent of couvade was to permit Hitler to climb into power against fratricidally divided resistance (*Nach Hitler uns,* was the KPD slogan), while Communists excoriated Social Democrats as "social fascists."

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Stalin, overwhelmingly preoccupied with suppressing internal resistance to his policies, was probably unaware of the danger posed to the Soviet Union by Nazism until some time after Hitler took power. According to Bower, for about a year after January 1933, the General Secretary still hoped to maintain the alliance with Germany. Only in 1934, after German hostility and unresponsiveness to Stalin's overtures had become unmistakable, did the Soviet leadership move clearly toward an alternate strategy of collective security: a military alliance with France and other Western powers against Germany. The *Front Populaire* was to serve the CP as a tactical device for the fulfillment of this strategy.

By 1934, however, many on the French Left were beginning to fear that a continuation of Communist intransigeance might lead to the same debacle as had occurred in Germany. Even within the Communist party, in the wake of the right-wing riots of February 6, 1934, pressure was generating for a united front with the Socialist party. It is testimony to the frozen servility of the PCF to Moscow that virtually everyone became aware of the need for a broad political coalition against fascism before the party's top leadership—and within the PCF leadership, only the antibureaucratic Jacques Doriot, detested by the rest of the leaders for his popularity among the rank and file, advanced the new line before Moscow approved it. Doriot, of course, paid for his prescience with expulsion from the party the very day after a reluctant Thorez finally accepted Comintern orders to approach the Socialists with a United Front program. All this Brower portrays with devastating detail.

What Brower does not see clearly is that the rapid decline of the *Front Populaire,* during and after Léon Blum's year in power, was in good measure the result of the PFC's witless subservience to Moscow. Though supposedly the PCF was the new mass party of the Far Left, whose goal was to overcome the bureaucratization of the Second International by ruthless commitment to revolutionary goals, and though in the thirties it may have been identified with the heroic tradition of French Jacobinism, the link to Moscow served as a functional equivalent of the bureaucratic inertia which had hobbled the European Socialist parties since the turn of the century. In fact, the surrender to Moscow resulted during the Popular Front period in the odd spectacle of the Socialists and their trade union allies consistently opting for more radical domestic policies than the Communists, who frequently outflanked the Socialists on the Right through their closer ties to the Radical party. For—contrary to their Jacobin appearance—the closest French revolutionary analogue to the actual strategy and historical role of the French Stalinists in the Popular Front was the Feuillant attempt of 1792 to submerge revolutionary forces and demands in a patriotic front against the reactionary powers of Central Europe. Even the Girondins had more radical goals than the Stalinists.

Ostensibly having supported the *Front Populaire* as a front against domestic fascism, the PCF showed its real intentions even before the elections of May 1936, when Thorez offered his "outstretched hand" to virtually everyone in France who was not on Hitler's payroll—in Brower's words:

> to the member of the [fascist] leagues, to the veteran misled by authoritarian leaders, to every "son of the people."

This election appeal to the adherents of the Far Right, which must have produced considerable bewilderment in an electorate that had only a year before heard the Communists demand "soviets everywhere," was followed in the summer of 1936 by a formal appeal for a "Front Français," of the Popular Front with the right-wing parties of the Republic. But in early September, the Communists quietly buried the French Front and began to agitate in the factories for political strikes against Blum's nonintervention policy on the Spanish Civil War.

Brower's analysis of this turn from moderation to militancy reveals both the strengths and the weaknesses of his approach. In late August, conversations between Blum and Hjalmar Schacht, the German Minister of Economics, revealed to the Communists that the Socialist Premier

> did not have ideological strictures against negotiating with the Germans. For the sake of the international "front" against fascism, he had to be pushed into the fight to defend the Spanish Republic. . . . Were Germany and France to find themselves at daggers' points in Spain, further Franco-German contacts would be im-

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possible. The French Communist party, by calling for French aid to the Spanish Republic, may thus have been continuing its support of Soviet diplomatic goals. Perhaps both the struggle against fascism and resistance to Germany were factors behind the French Communist campaign. On the Spanish issue, the two were not incompatible.

Using this motivational framework, Brower does an impressive piece of detective work. He notes that the former chief of Soviet Military Intelligence in Western Europe, Krivitsky, had given August 31 as the date for the Russian decision to smuggle arms into Spain and that, on September 2, Krivitsky was ordered to organize this smuggling venture from Western Europe. September 2 was also the day Thorez dropped his pose of moderation and publicly appealed to the Paris metal workers to conduct a political strike against Blum's nonintervention policy. Thus, in Brower's account, began a series of strikes "whose justification was as much political as economic," and which were spurred on by price rises and layoffs. The Communists decided to end the strikes only in late October, when it became apparent that they were turning many Radicals against the working class and the *Front Populaire,* and might lead the Radical Congress in Biarritz to formally pull that party out of the *Front.*

IF ONE IS PREPARED to accept Brower's implicit presupposition that the PCF had become the master of a largely passive working class, his analysis seems conclusive. The facts, however, do not sustain that presupposition, for the strike wave of September began on August 19, when the Stalinists were still talking up the *Front Français.* By September 1, thousands of coal miners and textile workers in northern France, among whom Communists influence was almost nonexistent, were on strike. In the next two weeks tens of thousands more struck, primarily in the north, and largely for economic reasons. The Communist party did not create the fall strike wave; it merely joined it.

The Communists were on an extremely slippery track. Their appeals to the French Right had coincided with a remarkable upsurge of proletarian militancy which, because of the PCF's past record and because of its lesser degree of contamination with the suspect parliamentary system of the Republic, had swelled the party's membership lists and, more important, the unions controlled by the party. The problem, then, was (1) how to hold on to its enlarged and somewhat shaky working-class base while (2) maintaining the alliance with Socialists and Radicals and (3) assuring conservative government bureaucrats and army officers that a military alliance with the Soviet Union against Germany was in the interests of French patriotism. The events of 1936–38 showed that, while the first and second of these policies may have been compatible, the three together were not and that, by attempting to combine all three goals, the Communists were compelled to follow a policy of faint-hearted reforms which insured the failure of their first two aims as well. For, in retrospect, it would appear that the maintenance both of proletarian élan and of the coalition of working class and lower middle class was contingent on drastic controls over large banks and major industries which were bound to be opposed furiously by the hitherto dominant figures of French economic life and hence of the conservative Right.

It is not merely Monday-morning quarterbacking to say that there existed in the mid-thirties both the opportunity and the body of ideas necessary to carry out successfully such a truly Jacobin reform program (and hence to save the Popular Front and perhaps the Republic), and that one of the principal reasons for its miscarriage was the PCF's subservience to Stalin's foreign policy. The intellectuals of the Socialist party and the Socialist-oriented labor unions (CGT) had developed, as early as 1934, a plan for reorganization and modernization of the French economy which took full account of the needs of the "little men" of the lower middle class—that mass of shopkeepers, small producers, craftsmen, and clerks which had given Hitler his political base in Germany and which in France was represented primarily by the centrist Radical-Socialist party. The "Plan" proposed nationalization of cartellized "key industries," such as mining, railroads, and electricity, whose high profits, low level of capital reinvestment, and control over raw materials and services blocked the growth of the national economy. An additional, most important target for nationalization was the credit system, and especially the Bank of France. The banks had the power to sabotage

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French governments after World War I because short-term loans held by the banks were an indispensable source of government revenue. Furthermore, the banking system had traditionally served as a source of credit only for the large corporations, leaving the mass of the "petits" without any means, apart from their own savings, for financing modernization or expansion.

The Plan would thus have released left-wing regimes from the threat of fiscal sabotage, strengthened the vast sector of small firms by the provision of generous credit facilities, and laid the basis for a significant improvement in proletarian working conditions by increasing productivity in heavy industry. Its advocates won over the non-Communist trade unions (CGT) in 1934, and made some progress in the Socialist party at that time. But in the early stages of cooperation with the Communists, supporters of the Plan were muzzled because the Communists denounced it as "fascist." Whether this was a carry-over from the Comintern's third period or an anticipation that Radical-party opposition to the Plan would be an obstacle to the broad coalition the PCF was seeking is difficult to ascertain. In any case, Communists and Radicals jointly blocked socialist and trade union efforts to include parts of the Plan in the Popular Front program. At the time, because of the apparent magnitude of the fascist threat, the Socialists did not put up major resistance.

But by 1936, fear of the Far Right had galvanized middle-class moderates and workers alike. In May 1936 the Popular Front received a solid majority at the polls, and in June, 2 million workers occupied their employers' property in what amounted to a spontaneous semi-insurrectionary general strike. Suddenly the initiative lay with the Left, and Blum, if he had been bold enough, might have forced the CGT Plan through in a fortnight. The "petits," their firms largely untouched by the strike wave, were by no means unhappy to see the financial and industrial magnates humbled. The big employers, confronted by union leaders with evidence of their workers' poverty, were themselves appalled and prepared to make major concessions.

This was the situation in the early days of June 1936, when Blum took office as the first Socialist Premier of France.

On the left wing of the SP, Marceau Pivert declared that everything was possible. Yet Maurice Thorez, frightened by a revolutionary situation that was undermining his effort to win over the economic and political establishment to a collective security agreement with the Soviet Union, begged the workers to return to work. Blum himself, never very friendly to the "Planistes" and concerned about Communist sabotage *from the Right,* agreed to ask no more of the magnates than higher wages, a 40-hour week, and paid vacations. He thus passed over a historic opportunity, which would recur in France—and then would be seized—in the early postwar years: the opportunity to impose on the antiquated French economy a program of modernization through government control and structural reorganization, a program fully outlined in the CGT Plan.

In the absence of structural reforms to curb the power of French capitalism and increase productivity, the wage increases Blum and the union chiefs negotiated in June were largely wiped out by rising prices in the summer and fall, and many firms, especially the textile manufacturers of northern France, began to harass the new unionists by expulsions of their leaders and by lockouts. As a result, the second, more bitter strike wave broke out in September amid growing disaffection from the middle-class entrepreneurs of the Radical-Socialist party, whose firms could not afford even the initial wage increases. Blum's fiscal policy, predicated on gaining the confidence of his worst enemies, jolted along from defeat to disaster: devaluation during the September strike wave further eroded middle-class Radical support, in February, Léon Blum was compelled by the recalcitrance of French finance to announce a "pause" in all social reforms; in March, he put in charge of his financial program three of the most conservative men in France; in May, he resigned. The inadequate nature of the reforms secured by Blum in those initial, explosive days of his regime, then, was probably a sufficient cause for the demise of his cabinet a year later and for the ultimate dissolution of the Popular Front.

Brower ignores completely this aspect of his subject. The lens through which he scrutinizes the behavior of the PCF and the misfortunes of the Popular Front is exclusively that of Stalin's foreign policy. No doubt, this was im-

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portant. Concern over Blum's meeting with Schacht in the late August of 1936 and the Comintern's decision to use the Spanish conflict to maneuver France into a proxy war with Germany certainly account for much of the CPF's militancy on the Spanish issue. But if it had been only a question of persuading the French nation to confront fascism in Spain, there would have been no need to abandon the "French Front" idea. For at several mass meetings in August, Communist speakers had no difficulty in presenting the Spanish issue in strictly patriotic terms: ancient fears of Charles V and the Hapsburg encirclement were evoked to show the menace of a Spanish-German coalition, Franco's supporters were compared to the aristocratic intriguers against the French Revolution, and Joan of Arc and the composer of the Marseillaise eclipsed Marx and Lenin in Stalinist iconography.

The PCF's sudden encouragement, in September '36, of political strikes against Blum's nonintervention policy cannot, therefore, be explained purely on the basis of Soviet foreign policy, as Brower attempts to do. The latter was better served by the "French Front" tactic. The renewal of proletarian militancy and a desperate desire to channel it away from the much more explosive and divisive trend toward class warfare were probably the principal factors in the PCF's decision to switch its position on the Spanish issue so drastically. In a sense, the party had become the captive of its newly acquired working-class base and was forced to accommodate its Spanish policy to proletarian rage. Blum, having established the impossible goal of being the caretaker of French capitalism and having failed in June to impose reforms that would have solidified his popular base and curbed his conservative enemies, was whiplashed for the duration of his year in office between blackmail from high finance, demands from the working class which he could not meet, and the wholesale disaffection of the Radical "petits," who were frightened by wage increases which they were largely allowed to evade.

There was more at stake in the fate of the *Front Populaire* than the success or failure of Communist moderation, of the Blum regime, or even of collective security. Given the French revolutionary tradition in general and the CGT Plan in particular, resolution of middle-class fears through a coherent Left social program—a precondition both for the preservation of the Republic and for a strong stand against Nazism—was a real possibility in 1936, and the responsibility for its miscarriage must rest in large measure on the behavior of Brower's "New Jacobins." Understanding of the blind and ruinous role played by these Stalinist agents in Jacobin disguise—an understanding only partially found in Brower's book—is thus crucial if we are to grasp fully the internal collapse of the French Left in the last years of the Third Republic.

Memory Hole

NEW MASSES: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE REBEL THIRTIES, edited by Joseph North. Introduction by Maxwell Geismar. New York: International Publishers. 318 *pp.* $7.50.

THIS CAREFULLY LAUNDERED SELECTION from the cultural journal of American Stalinism during the 1930s has been put together by one of its early editors, one of the few who never kicked the totalitarian habit. North has excerpted material (some of it readable) that gives the impression *New Masses* was just a pure-spirited champion of the oppressed during the hard depression years; and everything that gave the magazine a distinctive political character he has omitted (such as its praise of Stalin's constitution as "a document which for charm, frankness and simplicity can have few counterparts among the state papers in history").

Down memory hole, again!

More interesting than North's editing is Geismar's introduction. Preening himself as a nonparty man, Geismar reaches a high lyricism of praise for the *New Masses*. His closest brush with, let us say, the unpleasant is this sentence: "A series of outward historical events—like the Stalin purge trials of the 1930s and the suppression of the anarcho-syndicalists in the closing traumas of the Spanish Civil War—had disheartened some contributors to the magazine."

That's like saying: "Certain unfortunate ex-

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cesses of the Nazi regime—such as a lack of legal niceties in disposing of the Jews and a roughness in handling Poles in the closing traumas of the Second World War—had disheartened Knut Hamsun and Ernst Juenger."

Other than the sentence I have quoted, Geismar has nothing to say about the fact that the *New Masses* was a violent defender of international Stalinism; that it proudly upheld the Moscow trials and ran a bitter campaign against those American intellectuals who criticized the trials; that it denied there was forced labor in the Soviet Union, etc. And far from being merely "disheartened," numerous contributors to the *New Masses* broke away, sick and shamed to have been connected with the terrorism and totalitarianism of the Stalinist movement.

Khrushchev, neck-deep in blood, was more candid in 1956 than Geismar in 1969. But then, running the mammoth purges in the Ukraine may give a man a better memory than writing introductions in Westchester County.

—I. H.

CREEPING REPRESSION IN WASHINGTON (*continued from page* 198)

• *The city's three dailies* report in depth on Washington events and gossip. Columnists pontificate and muckrake. But the real movers and shakers are such unlikely types as Herb Block, the *Washington Post's* cartoonist, Art Buchwald, whose satire is more devastating than any editorial, and Ralph Nader, who has attracted some of the brightest young people to poke into the musty closets of Washington bureaucracy. An interesting alliance of one of Nader's "Raiders" and Phil Burton of California obtained a mine safety bill, which proved to have more backbone than any hardboiled nose counters thought possible. Gary Sellers, a young refugee from the Bureau of the Budget attracted to Nader's free-wheeling operation provided the technical input for the mine safety bill, and California's Phil Burton and an old-style liberal, John Dent of Pennsylvania, provided the drive for passage and muscle on the House Labor and Education Committee.

Sometimes the only thing that keeps Attorney General John Mitchell's penchant for repression at bay is a Herblock cartoon; the only thing that really offends Vice-President Agnew is a Buchwald spoof. But does Middle America listen or care? Here the picture depends on fiscal policy. Heads of state come and go, but government bureaucrats go on forever. Those who monitor the fiscal health of the nation fear a recession with 6 million unemployed by the time of the congressional elections this fall. Can President Nixon's party really capture the 7 seats it needs in the Senate or the 29 required to organize the House of Representatives? Even with good times (which only the most far-out optimist envisions), the GOP is bucking American history: the party in power seldom gains seats in Congress during an off year.

• *All the Agnew speeches, Mitchell indictments,* and other high-level gaffs will not win the middle ground in U.S. politics if there is economic distress and grave uncertainty across the land. Most sophisticated money managers in the Nixon administration think the only way to damp down inflationary combustion is by risking "marginal" unemployment. But the traditional and accepted employment measuring sticks do not tell what it means for a heavy manufacturing worker to work only straight hours, and have no income at all from his wife or another member of the family. We are more a two-income–family than a two-car–family nation, and the fiscal belt-tightening that the Nixon Administration is permitting, even encouraging, is not the way to political victory next fall.

• *The Democratic National Committee* is no picture of organizational or fiscal health, either. But congressional campaigns are rarely won by money from Washington. Many a marginal congressman elected in the 1958 upset was helped by the same tight money policies, plus

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a few outlays of union money strategically apportioned. And this is shaping up as the political picture for 1970.

The Nixon administration muffed a great opportunity at the outset in 1969 to begin a very shrewd policy—to get Americans to lower their voices and "bring them together." Trite as this notion seems, there was enormous fatigue in Washington from the heady Kennedy years, the shock of the assassinations, and the mixture of Johnson's grand plans to remake American life and also bomb a corner of Asia into compliance. Nixon inherited a nation ready for some calm and deliberate leadership. But in 1969 he couldn't be bothered on Martin Luther King's birthday. And he watched television on November 15 when Washington was filled with a half million antiwar marchers. He did, however, fly to New York to save face for President Pompidou; that is the only political gesture where he put his reputation on the line, aside from his televised veto message on the $20 billion health and education money bill.

• *Meanwhile, the Nader approach* is catching on: it contains the kind of visual drama made to order for the media. Some of Nader's protégés are trying to turn around General Motors, which they describe as a $24 billion government-within-a-government responsible for 35 percent of the air pollution in the nation.

At a college editors' conference in Washington conferees spent four days sharpening their rhetoric and tactics on the question of ecology. The students came from both boondocks and the big cities. An articulate radical fringe berated the members of the conservative establishment, accusing them of failure these past 30 years. It is now fashionable for the present college generation to berate the ills of large government bureaucracy: at the college editors' gathering, an articulate extreme leftist tore into Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel, with a denunciation of every conceivable kind of government program. Such language was once common talk among conventional Republicans; thus does a Karl Hess, right-wing speech-writer for Barry Goldwater in 1964, make an easy transition to the left incredulity of the Institute for Policy Studies. People who never heard of "dialectics" now are witnessing in Washington what may become the unity of opposites.

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LETTERS

Oppenheimer & Chomsky

Editor:

I was taken aback by the penultimate sentence in Dennis Wrong's review article on Noam Chomsky's *American Power and the New Mandarins* (DISSENT January–February 1970). Mr. Wrong writes that "his [Chomsky's] career as a scientist and his political sensibility remind one of the late J. Robert Oppenheimer." Whether well-meant or patronizing, Mr. Wrong's comparison can only mislead your younger readers who know all about Chomsky but for whom Oppenheimer must be a dim figure at best. According to Robert Jungk in his valuable book *Brighter Than A Thousand Suns*, J. Robert Oppenheimer from the time of his appointment as director of the Los Alamos project (in 1942, Oppenheimer was just 40) did very little original work in physics. He was an excellent organizer and director; he was a public figure on a first-name basis with politicians and generals. I would doubt that he was among those young scientists who yelled "whoopee!" after the first atomic bomb was dropped but his moral qualms seemed to have awakened slowly. Oppenheimer said as late as 1949 with reference to the Bomb: "It is my judgment in these things that when you see something that is technically sweet you go ahead and do it and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success" (Jungk, p. 296).

Noam Chomsky has alerted us rightly to a dangerous elite, intellectuals and scientists who cooperate with the government for questionable ends. How ironic and unjust then, that he should be compared to the object of his own criticism, to a physicist who "applied" science in order to become a bureaucrat and to walk in the corridors of power.

GEORGE SIEGEL

DENNIS WRONG *replies:*

In writing that Chomsky reminded me of Oppenheimer, I deliberately left it to the reader to decide for himself whether the comparison constituted a tribute or a put-down. (To me, it partakes of both.) However, in comparing their scientific careers I obviously had in mind Oppenheimer's achievements in physics rather than in administration, which, of course, antedated his Los Alamos appointment. What physicists have done important original work after the age of 40? Not Einstein, not Newton.

Mr. Siegel is mistaken in doubting that Oppenheimer said "whoopee" after the first atomic explosion, since it is a matter of record that he quoted the Hindu god, Vishnu: "I am become Death, Destroyer of Worlds." As for Oppenheimer's moral qualms about the bomb, Dean Acheson recently reported that when he introduced Oppenheimer to President Truman the President was exasperated by Oppenheimer's reiterated insistence that he had "blood on his hands." Surely it is well-known that the physicists who worked on nuclear weapons, including Oppenheimer, agonized from the very beginning about the moral implications of even showing that such weapons could be made, of actually making them, of the decision to use them against Japan, of the American postwar monopoly, and of developing new and more potent weapons in the arms race with the Soviet Union. Has Mr. Siegel read nothing on the subject but Jungk's decade-and-a-half old book?

Chomsky, incidentally, scarcely refers to the bomb in his book and makes no mention at all of the physicists who worked on it. His "New Mandarins" are mostly social scientists and it is their role as advisers to the government on Cold War policies in general and on Vietnam in particular that he assails. He expresses considerable doubts about American policies toward Japan in the 1930s, but says nothing at all about the war with Germany, nor whether he considers that Oppenheimer and the other physicists who worked on the Manhattan Project, in Mr. Siegel's words, "cooperated with the government for questionable ends," although he approvingly quotes Einstein who played a leading role in encouraging his fellow scientists to work for the Manhattan Project. Setting aside the much-debated question of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, *was* it such a "questionable end" to work on the bomb during World War II when it was widely believed that the Nazis too were on the verge of creating such a bomb? This was the consideration that moved Oppenheimer, Fermi, and the others, not a desire to build the bomb as a technical exercise, let alone to see it dropped on Japanese cities under the circumstances in which it was first used.

In comparing Chomsky's "political sensibility" with Oppenheimer's, I had in mind the conditions under which they first became politically engaged on the Left. Oppenheimer has told how until in his thirties he was totally absorbed in scientific and scholarly pursuits and completely indifferent to politics, but that the Spanish Civil War and the fate of the Loyalists abruptly aroused his intense moral indignation and he promptly plunged into the world of left-wing politics. There is a parallel here to Chomsky's sudden involvement in 1966 with the campaign against the Vietnam War after having devoted himself previously to extremely complex and technical researches in linguistics. I should have thought this basis for my comparison was obvious enough.

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Michael Harrington

Why We Need Socialism in America

Raised letters, such as [a], *refer to textual* NOTES, *which begin on page 288. Raised numbers, such as* [1], *refer to bibliographical* REFERENCES, *which begin on page 301.*

AMERICA NEEDS SOCIALISM. Our technology has produced unprecedented wealth, rotted great cities, threatened the very air and water, and embittered races, generations, and social classes.

Our vision of society, even when most liberal, is too conservative to resolve these contradictions, for they are aspects of a system that has a deep, even principled commitment to the wrong priorities. And while significant reforms—often socialist in inspiration—have modified some of the extreme forms of capitalist injustice, the post-Keynesian welfare state still allows huge corporations to make decisions of fundamental social importance without consulting either those who are affected or those who work for them.

But isn't it an act of leftist nostalgia to indict American society in this way? * Today, one is told, the United States is the richest country in the history of mankind, and its remaining problems can be taken care of by pragmatic technicians acting within the framework of the welfare state.

It is precisely this conventional assumption about our present and future that I propose to challenge. I will show that our affluence is so misshapen that it does not even meet the needs of the majority of the people. The most humane of technocrats cannot cope with the basic causes of these antisocial policies, if only because they are located in an entrenched and possessive sys-

* This essay is confined to developing the case for socialism in the United States. That does not for a moment mean that the rest of the world doesn't matter, or that America's problems can be solved in isolation from the fate of the globe. These international dimensions of socialism are of the utmost importance and will be treated at length in my forthcoming book, *Socialism: Past, Present and Future,* which will also contain much of the material presented here.

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tem of power. Only a democratic mass movement could challenge this vested interest in our current crises. And it is just possible that the "success" of American capitalism will accomplish what its sweatshops failed to do: make socialism politically relevant.

I say these things with a full knowledge of the ways in which the socialist idea has been confused, betrayed, and eviscerated during the past 150 years.[a] Indeed, one of the aims of this essay is to try to face up to these difficulties with candor and to make the idea of socialism more precise. If that attempt is successful, what will emerge at the end of this study will not be the promise of a magical cure-all to bring complete and eternal happiness to all men but a more modest yet still audacious program for making America a good society.

IS Reform of the Welfare State Enough?

THERE ARE THREE BASIC REASONS why the reform of the welfare state will not solve our most urgent problems:

- the class structure of capitalist society vitiates, or subverts, almost every such effort toward social justice;
- private, corporate power cannot tolerate the comprehensive and democratic planning we desperately need;
- and even if these first two obstacles to providing every citizen with a decent house, income, and job were overcome, the system still has an inherent tendency to make affluence self-destructive.

In thus documenting the limits of the welfare state it may seem that I am contemptuous of past reforms or of those liberals who do not share my conviction that there must be fundamental, structural change. Nothing could be further from the truth. The welfare state was an enormous advance over the cruelty and indifference to human suffering that characterized early capitalism. It was achieved through struggle and great sacrifice—sometimes of life itself—on the part of "ordinary" people who, even though they had usually been denied an adequate education, tutored the wealthy in some of the fundamentals of social decency. And to the extent that there is a mass "left wing" in the United States, it is composed largely of precisely those groups—trade unionists, minorities, middle-class idealists—which fought these great battles and are determined to preserve the gains they brought.

Far from being simply a matter of keeping the record straight, this point has profound political implications for the future. It is important that socialists demonstrate the inherent inability of the welfare state, based as it is upon a capitalist economy and social structure, to deal with problems that demand anticapitalist allocations of resources. But that does not mean, as some young leftists in recent times have thought, that the welfare state is to be dismissed as a "fraud" that prevents the people from coming to truly radical conclusions. For if millions of Americans are to become socialists they will do so because, in the struggle to make that welfare state respond to their immediate needs they will have discovered that they must go beyond it. If social-

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ists were arrogantly to dismiss these battles as irrelevant, they would play no role when masses of their fellow citizens turned left.

Socialists, then, must be in the forefront of every fight to defend and extend the welfare state, even as they criticize its inability to solve fundamental problems and even as they propose alternatives to it. In this context, the following analysis of the severe limits capitalism imposes upon the welfare state is designed not to prove that liberals are foolish and deluded, but that their liberal values can only be completely realized on the basis of a socialist program.

The welfare state, for all its value, tends to provide benefits in inverse relationship to human need. And not—the point is crucial—because there is a conspiracy of the affluent, but as a "natural consequence of the division of society into unequal social classes.

Through vigorous and radical reforms it is possible to offset—though not to remove—this inherent tendency within capitalist society to distribute public benefits according to the inequalities of private wealth. Any movement that attempts to carry out such reforms will be going against the grain of the system itself. This has not kept socialists from participating in every one of these struggles, nor will it in the future. But if the gains are to be permanent, if they are not to be reversed when a period of social innovation is followed by a swing back to capitalist normality, then there must be basic, structural changes. Instead of episodic victories within an antisocial environment, there must be a concerted effort to create a new human environment.

How Inequality Is Built into the System

THE CLASS DIVISIONS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM which are the root cause of this problem are not, it must be stressed, simply unfair in some abstract sense. Were that the case, a sophisticated conservative argument might be persuasive: since to some extent the growth of the economy benefits everyone, even those who are worst off, there is no point in endangering these gains on behalf of a vision of egalitarianism. What really concerns the poor, this argument continues, is not the rise or fall of their *relative* share of affluence but the steady increase in their absolute standard of living. In fact, however, inequality means not merely that there are sharply unequal proportions of goods distributed among the various social sectors of the population. It also signifies a socioeconomic process, at once dynamic and destructive, which determines that public and private resources shall be spent in an increasingly antisocial way, thereby threatening the well-being of the entire society.

Housing is a crucial case in point. Even under liberal administrations, the government has been much more solicitous about the comfort of the rich than the shelter of the poor. Not only is this policy morally outrageous; it has had disastrous social consequences. Yet it must be emphasized that in thus investing billions in the creation of public problems, Washington did not act maliciously but only followed—unconsciously, automatically, "naturally"—the priorities structured into our society's class divisions. Thus:

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• in 1962 the value of a single tax deduction to the 20 percent of Americans with the highest incomes was worth twice as much as all the monies spent on public housing for the one-fifth who were poorest,[1] and this figure does not even take into account the government support for below-market rates of interest to build suburbia;

• in 1969, the *Wall Street Journal* reported, the $2.5 billion for urban freeways was a far greater subsidy to car owners who daily fled the central city than was the $175 million subsidy to mass transit,[2] and Richard Nixon's 1970 Budget continued this perverse allocation of resources by providing public transportation with only 6 percent of the funds assigned to highways;

• as the National Commission on Civil Disorders (the "Riot Commission" of 1968) computed the figures, during roughly the same 30-year period the government helped to construct over 10 million housing units for home builders, i.e. for the middle class and the rich, but provided only 650,000 units of low-cost housing for the poor.[3]

Skewed Priorities and Social Consequences

IT WOULD BE a mistake to think Washington discriminated only against the poor. For, as a White House Conference told President Johnson in 1966, *the entire lower half of the American population is excluded from the market for new housing*, a market that could not exist without massive federal support.[4] This point needs special emphasis if only because many people, with the best of intentions, concluded from the rediscovery of poverty in America in the sixties that the bulk of the nation was affluent while only a minority was poor. The statistics, far from describing a simple division between the rich and the poverty-stricken, show that we have in this country a *majority*—composed of the poor, the near-poor, more than half the workers and lower-middle class—which does not even have a "moderate standard of living" as defined by the government.[5]

When Washington used its powers to improve conditions for a wealthy elite, the poor suffered most because they had the most urgent claim on the funds thus squandered on the upper class; but a majority of the people, including tens of millions who were not poor, were also deprived of benefits that should have rightfully been theirs. Worse, in carrying out these discriminatory policies, the federal programs did positive harm to those most in need. As an American Presidential commission recently reported, ". . . over the last decades, government action through urban renewal, highway programs, demolitions on public housing sites, code enforcement, and other programs has destroyed more housing for the poor than government at all levels has built for them." [6] But then this is a familiar injustice: "Fifty years ago," wrote Alvin Schorr in 1968, "a British Royal Commission for Inquiry into the Housing of the Working Classes observed, with dismay, that poor people rarely benefited when land was cleared and model housing erected." [7]

In the America of the seventies these fantastically skewed priorities will have momentous social consequences. For Washington has, in effect, been aggravating the very social problems to which it points with alarm. By financ-

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ing the flight of the middle class from the metropolis and helping industry locate in the suburbs, the central city has been allowed to rot—with federal encouragement. As a result such related evils as violence, bitter old age, intensified racism, the decay of the traditional centers of culture, all grew worse. A study commissioned by the government and chaired by Milton Eisenhower gave the darkest view of these trends. The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence said that, "lacking effective public action," the centers of the great American cities would be safe only in the daytime when crowds gave the individual a sense of security, and that they would be dangerous and empty at night. The big downtown apartment buildings would become "fortified cells for upper-middle and high-income populations living at prime locations in the city." The ghettos would become "places of terror with widespread crime, perhaps entirely out of police control during nighttime hours." And the surburbs would be ringed by freeways patrolled by lightly armored cars.[7a]

So the government's discriminatory social policies have done much more than to exacerbate inequality; they have helped to promote a fantastic anti-design for living. How then can we explain why sincere and dedicated men—as those who presided over these disastrous programs often were—would lavish public funds to aggravate social problems? The answer is to be found in the class character of American society and in the commercial logic which both derives from it and pervades governmental decisions.

The 1969 Report of the Council of Economic Advisers provides candid documentation of this pattern. "Investing in new housing for low-income families—particularly in big cities—is usually a losing proposition," the Council said. "Indeed the *most profitable investment* is often one that demolishes homes of low-income families to make room for business and higher-income families." [8] (Emphasis added.) It is obvious that the criterion of profitability to which the Council refers is private since, as the gloomy projections of the Violence Commission demonstrate, the social cost of the present system is bankrupting the society. Yet precisely this private calculus is the one the government follows. As the Urban Problems Commission put it, ". . . renewal was and is too often looked upon as a federally financed gimmick to provide relatively cheap land for a miscellany of profitable or prestigious enterprises." [9]

In a society based on class inequality and suffused with commercial values, it just doesn't "make sense" to waste resources on social uses or beauty —or anything that cannot be quantified in dollars and cents. Our legislators, drawn almost exclusively from the middle and upper classes, cannot bring themselves to forget those principles that are sacred to a private economy. To them it seems logical to invest the federal dollar in undertakings that run the lowest risk and will show the highest and most immediate return.

Housing is only one example of how the welfare state observes the priorities of maldistributed wealth even when it attempts to serve the common good. Other cases in point can be found in literally every department of government. The American welfare system in the sixties reached only a third of the poor and provided them, on a national average, with only half of what

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they needed.[10] Meanwhile, in 1969, the richest one-sixth among the farmers (individuals and corporations) received two-thirds of the agricultural subsidies, or about $2.5 billion.[11] Given the relation of social classes in this field, America's commitment to promote "agriculture" is also a commitment to help the rich at the expense of the poor. And if one considers the various deductions in the tax codes as an indirect form of government expense—by not collecting money from an individual, Washington increases his income as surely as if it had sent him a check—one will note that they total up to $50 billion, with the bulk of that sum going to oil men, home builders, stock-market speculators, and others from the top of the economic pyramid.

Education and Social Inequality

IT IS IN EDUCATION that the effect of systematic inequality is most damaging. America is becoming a "knowledge economy" in which higher and higher educational credentials are required, sometimes unnecessarily, in order to get a good job. This is one of the most important areas of socialized effort since, either through public schools or aid to private education, the state supplies the modern economy with "its decisive factor of production, which is trained manpower." Although public spending on education in the sixties increased at a rate faster than that of the Gross National Product,[12] those Americans in the most desperate straits were not reached.

So it is that in the sixties a rather optimistic study of social mobility in the United States found that there is an "oversupply" of youth at the bottom of the economic structure: [13] the *Manpower Report of the President, 1969,* reported that the unprecedented recent boom had clearly revealed "economic expansion alone was insufficient to employ many people who had been bypassed in the general advance because of inexperience, lack of skills, and cultural deprivation." [14] Now it is bad enough that such a group should exist at all. What is truly intolerable is the extent to which the social class structure denies it effective access to tax-supported education and works and thereby makes it both self-perpetuating and hereditary.

For if, as Christopher Jencks and David Riesman document in *The Academic Revolution,* society is divided into blue- and white-collar groups, the high school seniors from the white-collar background are four times as likely to score in the top rather than in the bottom 10 percent, while the blue-collar students are twice as likely to be at the bottom rather than at the top.[15] One way of coping with such depressing statistics is to argue that they reflect the "middle-class bias" of the tests used to evaluate students. There have been demands to do away with IQ tests and standard grading, to assign each racial and ethnic group a quota of admissions in state-supported colleges (the top 10 percent of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans, and others would have places reserved for them, so there would be competition only within these communities but not among them or with the non-ethnics).

To those who charge that the tests are "unfair to the poor," Riesman and Jencks cogently reply, "Life is unfair to the poor. Tests are merely the results. Urban middle-class life in general and professional work in particular seem to nourish potential academic skills and interests in parents, while

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lower-class life does the opposite." [16] The conclusion they come to is much more radical than that offered by people who simply denounce "educational racism"—or even propose separate but inferior college faculties for the children of the poor and the minorities. Riesman and Jencks write:

> So long as the distribution of power and privilege remains radically unequal, so long as some children are raised by adults at the bottom while others are raised by adults at the top, the children will more often than not turn out unequal. . . . We suspect that these differences account for more of the class variation in college changes than all other differences combined.[17]

Jencks and Riesman then raise a basic psychological point. Suppose by an act of political will the schools could be transformed so as to favor the minorities while the fundamental social inequalities were left intact. That, they hold, "could be a formula for misery. A mobile, fluid society in which men move up and down is simultaneously a competitive, insecure, and invidious society." [18] "What America needs," they conclude, "is not more mobility but more equality. So long as American life is premised on dramatic inequalities of wealth and power, *no* system for allocating social roles will be very satisfactory." [19] Exactly!

In education, housing, and agriculture, in welfare and every other area of social life, it is therefore necessary to attack the systematic concentration of economic power in order to achieve serious reform. The fulfillment of liberal values, in short, requires structural changes in our class relationships, changes transcending the capitalist limits of today's welfare state.

II Planning under Capitalism—for Whom?

THE SECOND MAJOR REASON *why American society cannot deal with its crises is that we need national economic and social planning on a scale that our present institutional arrangements tend to make impossible.*

Now there is no question that the seventies will see planning in the United States. The really crucial question is: what kind of planning? Planning for whom? The problems of welfare capitalist society are becoming so obvious and overwhelming that conservatives and even reactionaries have understood the need for state intervention—if only to maintain as much of the old order as possible.

In 1969, Spiro Agnew wrote an enthusiastic introduction to the report of the National Committee on Urban Growth Policy which concluded that the nation should spend public funds in building 10 new cities for 2 million people each and 10 new towns each for 100,000 citizens.[20] If it was suprising to find a conservative Republican endorsing such an idea, it was even more remarkable that Richard Nixon proceeded to criticize it from "the left." In his Population Message of July 1969, Mr. Nixon noted that by the year 2000 the number of Americans was going to increase to 300 million and that this growth would be predominantly urban. "Are our cities prepared for such an influx? The chaotic history of urban growth suggests they are not and that many problems will be severely aggravated by a dramatic increase in numbers."

The "radical" proposal for new towns and cities that Agnew had approved was criticized by Nixon because

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> the total number of people who would be accommodated if even this bold plan were implemented is *only* 20 million—a *mere* one-fifth of the expected 30-year increase. If we were to accommodate the full 100 million persons in new communities we would have to build a new city of 250,000 persons each month from now to the end of the century. [Emphasis added.]

And then, in rephrasing what would once have been regarded as a classic Marxian critique of capitalism, the Republican President defined the fundamental problem: "Perhaps the most dangerous element in the present situation is that so few people are examining the questions from the viewpoint of the whole society."

Mr. Nixon is the representative of precisely those special interests, concentrated in the Republican party, which were able to enlist a good part of the welfare state in behalf of their private purposes. And though he uses a patch or two of Marxist-sounding rhetoric, he could hardly afford to acknowledge the basis of Marx's insight: that an economy dominated by self-seeking units is, precisely because of that fact, incapable of seeking the common good of the "whole society." So when Mr. Nixon talks in this manner, there is no real question of innovations that could threaten the power and privilege of his most important supporters. He and other conservatives are sophisticated enough to understand that the "chaotic" growth of modern society is no longer tolerable and that, in order to contain the future, a modicum of planning and discipline must be imposed on the corporations.[b] This realization has penetrated to all advanced societies in the West, so much that the British economist Andrew Shonfeld can write that planning is "the most characteristic expression of the new capitalism." [21]

Marx and Engels, as also some of their more perceptive followers, had understood that capitalism might try to regulate the "anarchy of production," but they felt that this attempt could only constitute a brief moment of transition before the advent of Socialism.[c] What we must now confront, however, is an entire historical period in which planning is of the capitalist essence. In the absence of a vigorous mass movement capable of democratizing this trend toward collectivism—in the absence, that is, of a socialist alternative—planning will be conservative, manipulative, and at the service of social and economic privilege. That is why it is so important to define the limits of neocapitalist planning and to contrast them sharply with the socialist proposals in the same area.

Two Systems and Their Values

THE FIRST DISTINCTION BETWEEN CAPITALIST AND SOCIALIST PLANNING has to do with money. For meeting the social problems that have just been described will require an investment of billions of public dollars. In 1967 Senator Ribicoff noted that the various existing programs don't even reach people with incomes of $8,000 a year.[22] And in December 1969, three years of inflation later, *Fortune* magazine reported that "the shortage of acceptable shelter that has been afflicting the poor and the black is reaching to the white middle class and even to quite affluent families." [23] To deal with a crisis of this magnitude will clearly require a shift of massive resources from the private to the public sector, since the market is not even reaching a majority

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of the people. But while Mr. Nixon criticizes the proposals for new towns and cities as inadequate, it is obvious that he and his conservative colleagues are not about to propose such a basic revision in the uses of the national wealth. They are, after all, principled pinch-pennies with regard to federal spending, i.e. they sincerely believe that the common good is maximized by keeping the allocation of resources as private as possible. Given this basic and capitalist limit to their thinking, any planning measures they urge are going to be inadequately funded. It is significant that in all the Nixon administration's talk about new cities and towns one of the key conclusions of the Urban Growth Policy report is ignored: "*the development of new communities by solely private means will occur in those rare circumstances where the dynamics of growth in particular areas will afford a timely and reasonable return on private investment* [emphasis added]." [24] The infrastructure for a metropolis of one million is, of course, extremely costly and, even though such undertakings have paid for themselves in Europe, the time period before there is any return is quite long. Yet in February 1970, when Nixon's Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans made the most authoritative and detailed administration statement on the new city proposal, all he advocated was some tax and other government subsidies to the private sector. If, as Stans and Nixon himself have insisted, we will need a new city of 250,000 every month between 1970 and 2000, just to house the increase in population, their timid program is doomed to failure even before it begins.

A SECOND BASIC DISTINCTION between capitalist and socialist planning concerns comprehensiveness.

When Dwight Eisenhower proposed in May 1968 that there be new, integrated communities with jobs, schools, parks, and high-speed transportation links to the old cities, he was unwittingly committing himself to radical innovation. Assembling an integrated population and providing its members with decent work, education, and transportation is not something to be accomplished by the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith. It requires long-range projections and a conscious coordination of government policies. It cannot be done, to take but one crucial example, if land is left to private speculation. For in order to assemble the huge areas needed for such extensive projects at a remotely reasonable cost, the public authority would have to use its power of eminent domain and bank land.

Conservatives may be forced to recognize the magnitude of the urban crisis, but they cannot solve it within their own economic calculus. In their advocacy of new cities Eisenhower, Nixon, and Stans really were talking about a version of the old schemes providing federal subsidies for private interests, which are then supposed to fulfill a social purpose. Supposing even that such a tactic could provide the billions of dollars needed (it cannot), the housing industry hardly has the resources, the overview, or the legal right to engage in national, regional, and metropolitan planning.

But if it is easy enough to demonstrate that planning within a capitalist context is, at best, utterly and necessarily inadequate, that does not mean socialist planning is without problems. These problems have to be faced candidly.

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Problems of Planning under Socialism

THE PRINCIPLE of socialist planning is clear: the people, rather than corporations with government subsidies, should decide priorities. In practice it is not that simple. Is it true, however, as John Kenneth Galbraith optimistically assumed in *The Affluent Society,* that the masses have basically decent values, which are perverted by the manipulators who dominate the communications systems? Galbraith contends the fundamental reason so many people regarded the public sector as a place of compulsion and the private market as an area of free choice is that they have been programmed to do so by the media. If that is so, then a radical reform of the advertising industry may allow the electorate to get the truth and the vote for that social spending which is in its objective and long-term interest.[d]

A more ominous possibility has been suggested by two Labour members of Parliament on the basis of the experience of the Wilson government. After 1965, writes David Marquand, social expenditures under Labour went up—but the voters did not like it. "In a democracy," he argues, "Socialist governments can only succeed if the absolute total of private consumption continues to rise while its share of the national income is falling." [25]

David Fletcher is even more pessimistic:

> Gone, in fact, is the delusion that we Socialists represent the "real" interests of the People, and that the People would see it if only they were not blinkered by the "capitalist press" . . . . Aspirations that once had to be expressed in social terms (that is, in the organized demand for more schools, more welfare and more public control of other people's lucrative activities) are now personal or family ambitions (that is, an individual's desire for a good job, an enhanced status, a good education for Johnny as a passport to a good job and a bigger car to carry the family further).[26]

These gloomy conclusions are based on the bitter experience of men who wish they were not true. Yet I suspect that they overstate the case. For, as the next section will demonstrate, it should become more and more obvious in the rest of this century that the greatest threat to living standards in the advanced countries is social in character: i.e. it comes from the congestion, pollution, and ecological mayhem resulting from an unplanned technological revolution. Nevertheless, Marquand's point introduces an important caveat for any movement attempting democratic planning, and his rule of thumb—that the absolute total of private consumption should rise while its share of the national income falls because more resources are allocated to social purposes—is a good one.

Socialist planning, in short, is not a total panacea; neither, for that matter, is democracy. The people are quite capable of making a wrong decision after having been given all of the facts. Nevertheless, there will only be a possibility of making a humane choice if the institutions of democratic planning relentlessly encroach on the private sector in such decisive areas as housing, transportation, and education. Neocapitalist planning with its commercial priorities is inherently limited and unable to solve the crises it has been forced to acknowledge. With socialist planning—at once massive, comprehensive, and democratic—there is at least the possibility that man can master the environment he has created.

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III The Nightmares of Affluence

THE THIRD MAJOR REASON for the basic transformation of capitalist society is this:

Let us assume that the system proves to be much more ingenious than the preceding analysis suggests. Suppose it constructs a welfare state that really does respond to the needs of the poor and that it manages, without fundamental changes in structure, to accommodate itself to democratic planning. Even then—and I admit this possibility for the purpose of argument only—it would be necessary to go beyond capitalism and toward socialism. For if this society somehow found a way to deal with poverty, racism, inequality, and unmet social needs, it would still be incapable of dealing with its own prosperity.

This problem is not a consequence of wrong-headed choices on the part of muddled executives; it is a trend within the system itself and cannot be corrected without sweeping change. The economic theory of "external economies" and "external diseconomies" helps to explain why.

An external economy occurs when an act of consumption creates a collective good, e.g. when the decision of a high school student to remain in school raises his skill level and makes him a more productive worker rather than a candidate for welfare. External economies usually derive from public investments in schools, hospitals, and the like.[27] External diseconomies are a result of an opposite phenomenon: acts of consumption that create a collective evil, e.g. the air pollution visited upon society by a private automobile. These are particularly associated with giant industries and, as one moderate economist put it, "seem to be far more prevalent than external economies. . . ." [28]

So the fundamental tendencies of late-capitalist economies toward bigness and concentration will produce goods whose social costs often exceed their social benefits. This, it must be emphasized, is an inherent pattern in a society where huge investments are made privately. To offset this trend, such decisions have to be made with major consideration of the social costs —a kind of calculus (as will be seen shortly) that is at odds with the very character of the capitalist economy. There follows an extraordinary paradox: the richer capitalism becomes, the more self-destructive it is. (This is a sort of economic analogue to Freud's psychological insight that the more sophisticated society becomes, the more repressive it is, since instinctual energy must be disciplined in order to make large-scale organization possible.)

In traditional Marxist theory, economic crisis was the result of the accumulation of a glut of unsold goods due to a sustained decline in effective demand. Many contemporary economists now argue that the cyclical breakdown of capitalism, which turned relative abundance into immediate want, has been mastered; we would suggest that, so far, all the evidence is by no means available. Nevertheless, even if we do assume that the cyclical crisis of capitalism has been mastered, it has been succeeded by an even more bizarre problem: affluence itself becomes increasingly counterproductive.

SO AS THE SEVENTIES BEGAN—to cite one striking example—the President of the United States told the nation: "Based on present trends it is quite possible

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that by 1980 the increase in the sheer number of cars in densely populated areas will begin outrunning the technological limits of our capacity to reduce pollution from the internal combustion engine." [29] One would think that such an apocalyptic presentiment in Mr. Nixon's Message on the Environment would have been the prelude to decisive action. Yet only one week before he thus warned that the society was destroying the very air it breathes, Nixon proposed a budget in which mass transportation (which would cut down "the sheer number of cars" as well as serve a number of other social purposes) received 6 percent of the money assigned to building highways, i.e. making sure that the sheer number of cars would increase.

The automobile is only one case in point. As Jerome C. Pickard of the Urban Land Institute has commented,

> the concentrated character of future urban regional development will place a great strain on regional resources: with water supply, air, and the land itself. The pollutants generated in such large-scale urban and industrial concentration may threaten a large segment of the environment inhabited by a majority of the United States population.[30]

By the seventies, the menacing consequences of uncontrolled and maldistributed affluence had become so obvious that even the thoughtful business press had begun to doubt whether the market on its own could maximize welfare. Thus one of Marx's fundamental theories was vindicated in a way he himself would never have imagined. The forces of production, Marx held, come into contradiction with the mode of capitalist production, i.e. the revolutionary technology cannot be contained within the social and economic system. In Marx's view, evidence of this clash was to be found in the recurrence of depressions. Today, however, precisely because capitalism has moderated the tendency toward periodic crises, it throws up a new form of the Marxian contradiction—for private decision-making is no longer capable of regulating a technology whose social consequences become more and more destructive.

Lyndon Johnson stated the problem well enough in his 1967 message on "Protecting Our National Heritage" but, like his successor, he could not bring himself to urge the radical measures necessary to deal with it. "We must realize," Johnson said, "that in dealing with fuels for motor vehicles we are dealing with matters of enormous importance to every section of the nation and to many economic units. America's technology and natural resources development are intimately involved in any program that effects fuels and their uses." And then Mr. Johnson proceeded to express the wish that corporate polluters would realize that "out of personal interest, as out of public duty, industry has a stake in making the air fit to breathe." [31]

The day Mr. Johnson made that statement, the president of the Ford Motor Company attacked the dangers of government overregulation, and the *Wall Street Journal* observed that business was mobilizing to fight Johnson's modest reforms. When he signed the Air Quality Act of 1967, President Johnson pretended that he had been given "new power to stop pollution before it chokes our children and strangles our elderly—before it drives us indoors or into the hospital." The *Wall Street Journal* was more realistic: "This was a major victory for such industrial groups as the coal producers, who vigorously opposed toughening federal standards." [32]

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In his 1970 message on the environment, Richard Nixon confirmed that the *Wall Street Journal* had been right and Johnson wrong. There were, he said, "insufficient federal enforcement powers" to fight air pollution. But Nixon could not, of course, hint at why this was so: that the corporations, which had become conscience-stricken about pollution at the precise moment there was a public outcry and the possibility of punitive legislation, had themselves subverted previous efforts to clean up the atmosphere. And even though Mr. Nixon's antipollution proposals were much less bold than his generalities, the *Wall Street Journal* editorially cautioned him about too sweeping an attack on the internal combustion engine. That, it said, might lead to "severe disruption of many of the nation's largest industries." [33]

There, in the example of the automobile, is the essence of the problem: it is foolish to think that giant industries will voluntarily desist from the profitable spoliation of the environment; and it is impossible for a government committed to maximizing the autonomy of those corporations to take the drastic action we require.

Corporate Interests and the Social Good

IN THE NOT SO DISTANT PAST, such a conflict between corporate interest and common good was thought of as exceptional. As Gardner Ackley, a leading new economist of the sixties, put it concisely a few years ago, "If one were to examine all of the thousands of decisions made daily by the managers of the modern corporation, I think he would be struck by the relatively small number in which significant questions of conflict between public and private interests arise." [34] A year later Carl Kaysen, another distinguished liberal economist, challenged Ackley's faith in devastating fashion:

> The interrelated set of questions involving urban renewal, urban planning and transportation planning raises questions that go right to the heart of the usual value assumptions of the economist. The whole field is dominated by the existence of externalities, i.e. it is clear that there is no simple meaningful sense in which the range of decisions can be left to market forces. It is further clear that our past methods for dealing with the major externalities are increasingly inadequate, if they ever were adequate. Zoning by a fragmented set of competing jurisdictions, highway planning uncoordinated with land-use planning or without comprehensive urban-suburban transportation planning simply fails to meet the issues. What alternate decision-mechanisms are available?
>
> The natural bias of economists is toward believing that consumers "ought" to get what they want in some ethical sense of the word. Economists accordingly tend to resist, as a matter of fundamental principle, changes in decision-making processes that substitute planners' choices for consumers' choices. Yet in the face of what consumers' choices are leading to, some such substitution appears inevitable. At the very least, planners will determine, much more narrowly than present processes do, the range of alternatives from which consumers may choose. The key question becomes, "By what political mechanism are planners' choices reviewed and controlled?" [35]

This is a remarkable admission. Yet, much as I agree with Kaysen's perspective on the future, I think he is too easy on the capitalist past. He

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contrasts the market choices, which supposedly pampered the consumer, with planner's choices, which are said to be more restrictive. Yet a good deal of the consumers' desires are in fact engineered, and even when that is not the case, his freedom is circumscribed by the possibilities open to him. Many people in the middle class "freely chose" single-unit surburban homes because decent, reasonably-priced housing in the city was not available. The citizen faced with shoddy public transportation or the private automobile was hardly exercising an exhilarating discretion when he chose the latter. In other words, planning could and should broaden the range of choice for the majority.

Nor was this consciousness of the inadequacy of the classic capitalist model confined to economists. In September 1969 the Yankelovich polling organization surveyed a representative sample of the chief executives of the 500 largest corporations and 50 largest banks. It concluded that there was a "coming conflict in business discipline" because of the contradiction between social need and private investment. "We predict," the article in *Fortune* reporting on the survey said, "that nothing that has happened since the 1930s will inject more confusion, sow more dissension and conflict and threaten more chaos than the effect of these pressures [for meeting social needs] as they mount in the early years of the 1970s." [36]

Not only, then, is contemporary capitalism heir to many of the traditional evils of the system, even if sometimes in ameliorated ways; it also cannot deal adequately, no matter how sophisticated it has become, with either poverty or affluence. Left to itself, the system creates a welfare state that provides some benefits for all yet favors the rich and discriminates against the deprived; it generates problems, like those of the urban environment, which demand comprehensive planning; and even when it functions to produce the highest living standard in the world, the social consequences of that achievement are so appalling as to vitiate much of it.

We socialists support every struggle for the partial and liberal reform of this inadequate structure. Yet we insist—and I believe that the previous analysis has documented the point—that the fundamental solution of these problems requires measures that go beyond the limits of the capitalist economy. There must be a radically new economic calculus, a radically new political and social structure.

The Face of Socialism

IV

CLASSICAL MARXISM OFFERED a powerful argument of the objective need for a new society; it recognized the role of the working class as the conscious agency that was to lead humanity in the desired social transition; but about the content of the desired future, the substance of what socialism would be, it had little to say. That was unfortunate.

There were, to be sure, good reasons why Marx adopted this attitude. The Germany of the 1840s had more than its share of lofty and irrelevant blueprints for utopia; Marx saw no need to add still another. His profoundly democratic realism led him to argue that the good society would be fashioned, not by the dictates of some intellectual's plan, but according to the needs and

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creativity of the people themselves. In the bitter struggles that have occurred since Marx first formulated his position, the working-class movement, upon which he rested his main hopes, has indeed made significant modifications in the structure of such capitalist institutions as the factory and the state. But if there was good reason for Marx to refrain from speaking precisely about the face of socialism, there is no such reason today. We have seen too many tyrannical distortions of the socialist ideal; we have come to realize that socialism is not the "inevitable" successor to capitalism and that, indeed, there can be successors at least as inhumane and reactionary as the worst capitalist society. Hence anyone who says he believes in socialism must make plain what he means by it.

In Marx's view history was not predetermined; there was no "inevitable" upward curve of progress. The class struggle within capitalist society, he said, could lead to socialism—or to barbarism. The latter Marx saw as a stalemate, "the common ruin of the contending classes," which would keep the contradictions of society from being resolved on a new and higher plane.[37] In his comments on the "Asiatic mode of production" he even described a system in which state control of a decisive means of production (water in an economy based on irrigation) could provide the basis for a kind of bureaucratic class rule.[38] Yet Marx did not anticipate that a sort of antisocialist "socialism" could be the successor to capitalism in one third of the world, or that capitalism itself could become planned and rationalized for an entire historical period.

Collectivism—But What Kind?

BUT MARX DID CLEARLY ASSERT a basic value judgment that makes it possible to distinguish socialism from other forms of collectivism. Nationalization of industry, planning, cooperative production—all these, he insisted, were only means to an end. The crucial question about such techniques and institutions are: who employs them and according to what priorities? If the state owns the means of production, we must then ask, who owns the state? And there is only one way for the people to "own" the state which owns the means of production: through the exercise of their democratic right to determine its policies and personnel.

For capitalism it is "natural" to assign resources where there will be the greatest commercial return, and without regard for social consequence. For socialism, by contrast, it is "natural" to allocate them on the basis of human need as democratically determined. As a group of independent French leftists have put it, "By socialism . . . one means a global conception of man and the world which seeks to substitute the principle of conscious solidarity for the traditional resort to domination and private interest in the organization and functioning of society."[39] If this solidarity does not suffuse the new institutions, then it is possible to nationalize all the means of production, to plan the economy meticulously and yet to end up, not with democratic socialism, but with a new and oppressive form of class society.[e]

The Port Authority in New York City is a useful example of such an antisocial collectivism. Originally it was given considerable autonomy in order to take it out of "politics." Even though it was designed to be high-

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minded and serve the public, and even though there are no private owners, it acts at least as irresponsibly as any private corporation. As Theodore Kheel has described the Port Authority:

> It has preferred to grow huge—and hugely profitable—by catering to motorists. Without even the flimsy justification of acting in the interests of stockholders—it has none—the Port Authority pursues money, not service, with the arrogance, indifference and contempt for the public welfare characteristic of nineteenth-century robber barons.[40]

And then, in a perceptive statement of the kind of economic calculation that should rule in a publicly-owned enterprise, Kheel writes:

> Austin J. Tobin, executive director [of the Port Authority] for 27 years, once said, "Above all else, the people expect their officials to give them prudent and conservative management of public funds." That is disingenuous. Public servants are expected to manage public funds as conservatively as their essential purpose permits. A seemingly unprofitable venture, such as helping mass transportation, might be more genuinely productive than any seemingly self-supporting service the Port Authority has yet turned its hand to—and ultimately would cost us far less.

The Port Authority in New York, like many of the nationalized industries in Europe, shows that public ownership in and of itself, especially within the framework of an economy still basically capitalist, is no guarantee that a corporation will follow social priorities. It behaves exactly like the capitalist enterprises that surround it. This would not be the case under socialism —even though such a society would still have to take costs and alternate uses of resources into account. Karl Kautsky, who prided himself on his Marxian orthodoxy, argued that accounting, and even interest, would exist in socialist undertakings, and he opposed the notion that the omnipotent state would simply command the economy to produce this or that good.[41] There is now a voluminous literature on this subject.[f] Socialist planning would seek to get as precise a measure of costs as possible; yet an investment would not be made simply because it could bring a high return and in spite of its social cost, as is the case under capitalism; nor would totalitarian bureaucrats ruthlessly sacrifice the present needs of the masses in order to build up heavy industry and a war machine, as under Communism.

In the following attempt to make a rough outline of socialist institutions, the point will be to describe how the contradictions of capitalist society can be resolved so that the needs of the people, as they themselves democratically determine them, are met. But in imagining this future it is obviously not enough to invent "ideal" solutions. We begin with the specific problems that have just been identified, and within a context established by capitalism where resources are limited and choices have to be made. Then, after having described the social classes and strata which need such innovations and can become politically conscious of this fact, we come to an ultimate vision of socialism. This ultimate vision assumes that the basic material desires of the people have been satisfied and productivity has grown to such an extent that man can free himself from the psychology and economics of scarcity. That more distant future will be the subject of the last section of this essay.

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IN MAKING THIS DISTINCTION between the immediate transition to socialism and the final goal, I am using a necessary if somewhat dangerous idea. Marx had insisted that the new society would be conceived within the womb of the old and therefore would be born with the heritage of the past as well as with the hopes of the future. He contended that only when men had learned to live cooperatively through a long experience and abundance was an economic fact, the old bourgeois limits could be transcended and society inscribe on its banner, "From each according to his talents, to each according to his needs." [42] But precisely this theory of the two stages of socialism was used by Joseph Stalin to justify murder and totalitarianism.[43] Whenever the injustices and oppressions of Soviet society were attacked, Stalin could reply that this was, after all, only the first and "imperfect" phase of the transition to the millennium. Yet long after Stalin died, and more than half a century after the Bolshevik Revolution, the "temporary" institutions of anti-freedom are still basic to Russian society.

If it is indeed impossible to take a single, giant stride into utopia, one surely cannot arrive at a society of brotherhood by way of gradual terror and coercion. So, if the changes in capitalist structure that are proposed in the following pages are only transitional, they must also move in the direction of the ultimate vision of socialism. They cannot, as under Communism, be the very antithesis of it.

For Socialization of Investment

FIRST OF ALL—and this is urgent, practical politics within the present confines of capitalism as well as a step toward socialism—investment must be socialized.

There are, as has just been seen, huge and decisive areas of economic life in which private capital will not invest because there is no prospect of sufficient profitability (or, what amounts to the same thing, where antisocial allocations are more profitable than social ones). This is true of the fundamental determinants of the urban environment, such as housing and transportation. Therefore, the society must shift resources from the privately profitable sector of the economy to the socially necessary. This decision can be made only by government and must be taken only as a result of a democratic process. It can be accomplished only on a national scale and within the framework of planning.

I do not mean to say that the housing design or the exact mix of public and private transport will be settled by a ukase from Washington. A qualitative increase in the rate of social spending can be channeled through the most diverse kinds of organizations: through departments of national, regional, and local government, public corporations, cooperatives, private nonprofit institutions, neighboorhood associations, and so on. A progressive income tax, nationally administered, is the only source of funds for such a gigantic appropriation, and the various regional and local choices—where to build a new city, for instance—have to be integrated into a national plan.

John Strachey, the late British socialist theorist, thought that such a process of transforming "the social form taken by accumulation into a consciously set-aside fund" was the "essence of the transition to socialism." [44]

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That is, as will be seen, an overly optimistic assessment of this development, since more than investment must be socialized. Yet it does emphasize the fact that federal planning and Congressional appropriation could be one way of directing production for use rather than profit.

In areas such as housing and transportation, this program obviously requires much more than simply the spending of money. For even conservatives have come to realize that government programs have to be coordinated: the Nixon administration talks of a national urban policy and uses five-year projections in its 1970 Budget. The National Commission on Urban Problems (chaired by the liberal economist Paul Douglas) recommended that

> the President and his Economic Advisers, the Federal Reserve Board, the Treasury Department, and other major agencies of government be required to state what effect any major change in economic policy [e.g. interest-rate changes, tax reductions or increases, balance of payments proposals] would have on the successful building of the number of housing units set by the President in his annual housing construction goal message.[45]

All these suggestions, the liberal as well as the conservative, assume the continuation of the present structure of the housing "industry"—if so modern a word can be used to describe so backward a sector. Yet the government will fail in its commitments unless it creates a new industry. New cities cannot be built by a myriad of private developers, each making his own decisions about a small parcel of real estate. The present procedure of clearing areas that are already urban and then turning them over to profit-seekers has indeed had the disastrous effect of subtracting from the housing supply, increasing the rent on existing, inadequate dwellings, and in general making life more miserable for the poor and minorities. There must consequently be a social land bank, a new technology, an industry created to modern scale, and to national and regional plans. And that will take more ingenuity than just writing a federal check.

It All Must Be Done Democratically

THIS ONE CASE COULD BE DUPLICATED in every other area of social need, and it points up the second socialist proposal for changing our institutional structure: that decisive investments must be democratically planned as well as financially socialized.

There should be an Office of the Future in the White House. Each year the President should make a Report on the Future—with projections ranging 5, 10, or even 20 years ahead—which would be submitted to a Joint Congressional Committee where it would be debated, amended and then presented to the entire Congress for decision. This process should establish the broad priorities of the society and annually monitor the result of past efforts. It would be, for instance, the proper forum where the broad concept of regional planning would be established; but it would not engage in the actual planning of individual projects.

At this point, let me say, a candid admission is in order. The changes outlined in the previous paragraph could be welcomed by social engineers determined to impose their values on the people. They might even be used by sophisticated corporate leaders to make the status quo more rational and

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stable. And they might create an entrenched bureaucracy with a self-interest of its own. The critics of socialism who cite such dangers ignore, or conceal, the fact that these are the consequence of the complexity of *all forms* of modern, technological society and that socialism is the only movement which seeks to offer a structural and democratic challenge to that trend. Even more important, it must be understood that there is no institutional reform which, in and of itself, can "guarantee" genuine popular participation. Only a vibrant movement of the people can do that. That is why socialists do not foresee an ultimate stage of human existence in which all conflicts are resolved. In the very best of societies both the democratic majority and the critical minority must be on the alert.

There is, however, one important area where planning is made more simple because of tendencies within the economy itself. The dominant trend of this century is to move economic activity away from primary pursuits, such as agriculture, and even away from industry, into areas like service and education. This is one of the reasons why college expenditures have increased faster than has GNP since 1950, and that school teaching has been one of the fastest-growing professions.[46]

A great many of the areas thereby expanded have been traditionally public or private nonprofit: schools, hospitals, social services, and the like. A 1970 analysis in *Fortune* has even suggested that it is impossible for the nation to achieve its health goals unless there is an even greater increase in the employment of paraprofessionals.[47] When there was a renewal of social consciousness in the sixties, the corporations began to move into these new markets and designed various human care programs according to the logic of profit. Yet education, health, and personal problems are obviously antagonistic to commercialism, for these are spheres in which one should not stint in order to cut costs and increase the return. The only humane criterion is that of need, and these growth "industries" are therefore natural candidates for social investment.

V A Case for Social Ownership

BUT EVEN IF society would thus socialize more and more investment, consciously planning the allocation of resources for cities, transportation, and human care, that in itself would not change the prevailing order. For the control of the means of production and of wealth is not simply economic power; it is political power as well. If over a long period of time private ownership of huge corporations were to coexist with planned social investments, the corporate rich, be they managers or owners, would come to dominate the new, supposedly democratic institutions. Socialists cannot abandon their insistence on social ownership.

It may seem quixotic to raise such a point just as the Socialist parties of Europe have abandoned it. For the continental social democrats have almost all adopted the idea of a "social market economy" in which the state controls but does not own the decisive means of production. Given this decision on the part of the mass democratic socialist movements, is it not mere nostalgia or, worse, dogmatism, to bring up this traditional view of the Left?

Paradoxically, I will base the case for social ownership on the same

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economic trend—the separation of ownership and control under contemporary capitalism—which was cited by many socialists in the sixties as a reason for giving up the traditional position on the nationalizaton of industry. Moreover, I think there is a strategy for achieving social ownership that does not involve a sudden, apocalyptic leap (impossible under democratic conditions) but rather employs structural reforms. This is a response to present, so far limited problems that nevertheless point toward fundamental changes in the relations of wealth and power.

Functionless Stockholders—Who Needs Them?

THERE IS A TREND toward the separation of ownership and control and its bearing on social ownership.

For the continental socialists who revised their basic programs in the late fifties and early sixties, this development made the classic case for nationalization seem irrelevant. Now that rational, plan-oriented managers have taken over from individualistic capitalists, they argued, it is no longer necessary to change the title to property. For the socialists in control of the government will follow full-employment policies that will yield a growing fund for social spending and, in any case, the corporate executives will see that it is to their interest to observe the broad priorities established by the state. I would argue that this very trend of separating ownership and control increasingly demonstrates the functionless character of the legal title to property and suggests a very practical, unapocalyptic method of doing away with it.

Marx, as I noted earlier, had understood that the joint stock company—the first institutional expression of the separation of ownership from control—contained an anticapitalist premise insofar as it made economic functions independent of capital itself. That, he felt, was one more sign of the transition to socialism. The Fabians, with their penchant for basing the socialist case on neoclassical economics, emphasized this development. A third of the English corporatoins, Sidney Webb wrote in the original *Fabian Essays,* are joint stock companies "whose stockholders could be expropriated by the community with no more dislocation of the industries carried on by them than is caused by the daily purchase of shares on the Stock Exchange." [48]

In the 1920s John Maynard Keynes, a principled antisocialist, described the self-socializing tendencies of capitalism as the "euthanasia of the rentiers." [49] More recently, John Kenneth Galbraith has suggested that the "functionless stockholder" is becoming an anachronism and A. A. Berle, a pioneer in the empirical studies of the ownership-control pattern, echoed Sidney Webb: "Transition from private collectivism to state collectivism is the easiest thing in the world where [as is the case under the corporate system] collectivism is already well organized for production." [50] And Robin Marris, an outstanding theoretician of the contemporary corporation, has pointed out that "once the classic idealization of capitalism is thus destroyed [when, that is, it is seen that the managers are not working "for" the stockholders] there is no *economic* case for its superiority over socialism." [51]

It was a distinguished conservative, however, who most clearly drew the socialist conclusions from this economic tendency. Frederick A. Hayek has said,

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> So long as the management is supposed to serve the interests of the stockholders it is reasonable to leave the control of its actions to the stockholders. But if the management is supposed to serve wider public interest, it becomes a logical consequence of this conception that the appointed representatives of the public interests should control the management.[52]

There are two reasons why I believe this straightforward proposal of socialization is to be preferred to the European social democratic notion of the state programming a market economy with social goals. First, the recent experience of the continental social democrats confirms the tendency of the corporations to try to dominate, rather than obey, the government that is supposed to control them. Second, it is now possible to have a relatively painless transition to social ownership if socialists will only learn how to give direction to the underlying trends of the corporate economy.

Harold Wilson's problems in England during the sixties provide an example of the first point. Whenever Wilson, who had received a democratic mandate, sought to raise pensions or to introduce other reforms, bankers in London and throughout the world took reprisals against the pound sterling. Industry was quite ready to maximize the advantages of production for the domestic market rather than to become the efficient exporter that the government urged them to be. And while Labour did manage to put through a qualitative expansion of social spending, the proportion of unearned income in Britain rose.[53] For in Britain, as in America, private economic power seeks to veto democratic majorities and to make the state an instrument of private purposes as far as is possible. That is one reaon why an extension of social ownership is necessary.

"Euthanasia for Rentiers": A Modest Proposal

SOCIAL OWNERSHIP NOW seems easier to achieve if socialists will encourage the "euthanasia of the rentiers." The Swedish socialists bring an ingenious contribution to this area. They propose to socialize the functions of property while leaving the title to it temporarily undisturbed. In this way socialization will be part of a historic process rather than a sudden and drastic leap to new forms of property.[54]

We tend to reify private property into something indivisible, so that one either owns or does not own. But in the case of the means of production (and they, not personal property, are what is of concern to socialists), one can think of private property as conferring series of functional and divisible rights. In the class theory of laissez faire, ownership allowed a man to utilize existing fixed capital resources; to determine investment policy; to deploy the labor force; to set wage levels; to distribute profits; to retain profits; etc. This model has, of course, already been modified: wage levels are fixed through collective bargaining agreements overseen and encouraged by the state; tax policies can provide incentives for internal financing or for distributing profits; etc. Now a much more profound and conscious socialization is required of more of the functions of property. Taking property as, in A. A. Berle's phrase, a "packet of permissions," [55] what is proposed is not a sudden, wholesale take-over by the state but a process that progressively abolishes all these private permissions and that substitutes democratic decisions for them.

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For example, private investment decisions must be socialized. The right to locate or relocate a plan in a given area can no longer be considered a private matter. For in order to engage in regional planning and to aid in the construction of new cities and towns, the geography of employment has to be publicly determined. A strict system of licensing the permission to build a factory could work toward this end. (The Attlee government initiated some measures of this type, and various Italian governments have tried to use such techniques to promote the development of the South.)

Technology also has to be monitored. The decision to build a supersonic transport has so many consequences (noise, air traffic congestion, airport construction) that even if it were not a government-subsidized project, the public interest would have to be asserted. There is a need, as a National Academy of Science panel pointed out, for "technological forecasting." One cannot trust these matters, as the *Wall Street Journal* put it in a telling anti-capitalist phrase, to the "mindless market." [56]

The Brooks panel made another important point about technological forecasting: that it must be carried out by an independent agency and not by an interested bureaucracy. For "the Bureau of Public Roads has hardly been noted for its devotion to the natural beauty of the countryside." More generally, as the example of the New York Port Authority suggests, it is quite possible for a publicly-owned enterprise to behave in the same aggressive, self-interested way as a private corporation. Here again, the crucial issue is not so much the legal form of ownership as the kind of economic calculus it follows.

Putting a Limit on Profit

PROFIT IS ANOTHER FUNCTION OF PROPERTY that must be subjected to social control. In 1967, the Council of Economic Advisers—hardly an anticapitalist agency—noted that government direction of the economy had smoothed out the cycle of boom and bust and therefore removed a great deal of the risk in the marketplace. Under such conditions, the council argued, business should be prepared to take a lower rate of return.[57] But in point of fact, American corporations chafed under the voluntary controls of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations even though their profits rose by 78.7 percent between 1960 and 1970, and their cash flow (profits plus depreciation) was up by 85 percent in the same period.[58] When Richard Nixon came into office, he abandoned all efforts to persuade industry and labor to obey guidelines in price-and-wage policy. Whereupon, the London *Economist* reported, the steel industry increased its prices in 12 months by 7 percent—as contrasted to a 6 percent rise in the previous 10 years.[58a]

Government, we must conclude, cannot leave profit policy to the "conscience" of the corporations. It can use an array of techniques to socialize this important area of economic life: price-and-wage controls in an inflationary period; a requirement that big companies open up their books and justify any increase in prices before an independent board; the use of vigorous tax policy (more on this shortly). However this be done, the fundamental purpose of the reform is clear enough. The society cannot afford to leave to private decision the pricing of basic goods—or how the huge annual increments in wealth are to be distributed.

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There are other structural changes that could socialize some of the functions of property. The voting rights of all speculative, short-term shareholders could be abolished.[59] (This would make it clear that many of the transactions on the stock market are nothing but a socially-approved form of gambling—and an enormous waste of resources and energy.) It has been proposed that the government give itself the right to act as if it were a majority stockholder in all major industries, but without taking legal title.[60] In this scheme, the corporation would be left to its own devices as long as it conformed to the national plan and did not irresponsibly impose social costs upon the country. When its private egotism led to antisocial behavior, the government would intervene in the same way major shareholders confront poor management. The state would not assume permanent control but see to it that the direction of corporate policy was changed so as to observe the proper social priorities.

In France in 1970, the Radical party under the urging of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber adopted a policy "to abolish the hereditary transmission of property in the means of production." In effect, Servan-Schreiber advocated a confiscatory tax on the stock holdings of very wealthy individuals. There have been debates on how effective such measures would be, yet the principle is both clear and excellent.[61] A quite similar idea was proposed by Douglas Jay of the British Labour party, which would make a government investment bank the recipient of the stock paid as death duty.[62]

Taken individually, none of these changes would basically transform the power relations within capitalist society. But if they were part of a comprehensive policy which sought to limit progressively the rights of property in the means of production, they could encourage and direct the "euthanasia of the rentiers." The gradualism of this strategy is not derived from any abstract principle but from the actual experience of socialist governments over half a century—as well as from a sense of what may be acceptable to the American people. In the United States (and in all the advanced capitalist countries, for that matter) there is neither political support nor administrative feasibility for the sudden decisive nationalization of an entire economy. In any case, a socialist movement could take the opportunity provided by such a process to promote as much diversity as possible within the forms of social property.

VI Images of the Future

THE QUESTION OF EXACTLY HOW OWNERSHIP *is to be socialized is another area of difficulty in the socialist tradition.* Vague metaphors—the state will "seize" or "take over" the means of production—provide no guide for political action in a complex, technological economy.

The nineteenth-century socialists were deeply confused about the status of ownership in the society they sought. There was one tradition, with origins in Saint-Simon, that emphasized state action, planning, and socialized investment; there was another, represented by Fourier and Proudhon, that envisioned communes and free associations carrying on production; and Marx, to complicate matters, borrowed from both lines of thought. As time

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went on, it became clear that the very complexity of a modern economy required that social property function within a context controlled by the state.

Yet this does not mean that the government should simply "take over" the giant enterprises. As Otto Bauer put it after World War I,

> If the government controlled as many undertakings as possible, it would be too powerful as against the people and the popular assembly; such an increase in government power would be dangerous to democracy. At the same time, the government would be a bad administrator of socialized industry; nobody manages undertakings worse than the state. For this reason we have never advocated the nationalization of industry but always its socialization.[63]

How prescient Bauer's insight was can be seen from our recent American experience, as well as from our current understanding of the sources of creativity within the corporation. There is a quite successful model in this country of what a public corporation can accomplish: the Tennessee Valley Authority. Like a private corporation, the TVA is able to accumulate capital for future investment out of present income; yet it is under the broad supervision of the federal government in Washington. (It is also under constant attack by private power industry, which cannot tolerate this demonstration of how a government-chartered enterprise can be more efficient, and produce cheaper power, than the private sector.) Moreover, in 1969 the TVA proposed an innovation in an important area of social need by coming forth with plans for an integrated new town and by pointing out that its comprehensive structure would make it much easier for the TVA to plan and finance such a project than could a private developer.[64]

This initiative touches upon one of the most important aspects of corporate organization. As Robin Marris has noted, "the most fundamental difference between business firms and government departments lies in the former's capacity for autonomous growth."[65] Indeed, one can argue, as Marris has, that the essence of the most sophisticated stage of corporate capitalism is not the famous separation of ownership from control but the fact that an organization is financially independent, i.e. that it can use retained profits to fund growth and is therefore not subject to the constraints of the money market.[66]

When considering giant industries, one should think in terms of the TVA model of a public corporation—with considerable autonomy and the right to innovate—rather than of the Post Office, a public enterprise under the direct and political control of the government. But there are obvious risks to this approach. It is precisely the autonomy of the New York Port Authority, its independence from democratic control, that has allowed it to use its resources for creative antisocial purposes. This point is central to John Kenneth Galbraith's critique of socialism in *The New Industrial State*. In the last century, according to Galbraith, firms were run by entrepreneurs, and as a result the state, or the collective of workers, could take over from them without too much trouble. Now, however, there is the corporation with its intricate "technostructure" of scientists and administrators. If the socialist state tries to exercise too close a control over such an organization, it almost guarantees waste and incompetence; but if the socialized industry is granted the right

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to independent action, it will probably follow its own purposes rather than those of the national plan. "The technical complexity and planning and associated scale of operation," Galbraith concludes, "that took power from the capitalist entrepreneur and lodged it with the technostructure, removed it also from the reach of socialist control." [67]

To Whom Is the Corporation Accountable?

GALBRAITH CORRECTLY NOTES that this was one of the problems that caused the socialists in Europe to retreat from the commitment to public property after World War II. But then ironically—for he writes as an American liberal who is critical of socialist dogma—he takes up an ambiguous position somewhere to the Left of many of the revisionist social democrats.

> It is possible that there is, in fact, more to the case for the autonomous public corporation that the modern socialist now sees. The problem of the technostructure . . . is whether it can be accommodated to social goals or whether society will have to be accommodated instead to its needs. *The nature of the legal ownership has an undoubted bearing on the amenability of the technostructure to social goals.*[68] [Emphasis added.]

The ambiguity in Galbraith's position is that he never really follows up this insight except in fairly vague references to the gradual withering away of the "functionless stockholder." I propose to be more specific. Granting that Galbraith has identified a serious problem—the Scylla represented by the Post Office, the Charybdis represented by the Port Authority—it is impossible for society to carry out liberal reform, to plan and allocate social costs properly, unless it asserts a decisive interest over the huge corporations. This means that there will indeed be an ever-present danger of inefficiency, dullness, poor service, and all the rest. But that is a risk infinitely preferable to the one incurred by leaving the corporate structure in its present, irresponsible form. There are, in short, no "perfect" solutions to these enormous problems, and any intelligent person can foresee difficulties in any proposal. Nevertheless, the public corporation with both the right to internal financing and the responsibility to democratically-elected representatives of the people is, with all problems acknowledged, a right step in the best direction.

Nor is it necessary to accept all of these dangers fatalistically; some can be dealt with and eliminated. And here early socialist theory was more advanced than later socialist practice. For when Jaurès, Bauer, Kautsky, and other social democratic leaders in the early part of the century rejected the anarchist and syndicalist proposals to vest title and control of each enterprise in its own workers, they also suggested a very important reform (for details, see Note **g**). The administration of public property, they argued, should take a corporate form in which the board of directors of an industry would be divided between representatives of the workers directly involved, of the consumers at large, and of the state authority.

When, for instance, the Attlee government nationalized industry after World War II in Britain, it did not follow the principle of Clause Four of the Labour party's constitution and did not provide "the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry and service." [69] And when the Wilson government renationalized steel in the sixties, it not only

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paid 450 million pounds in compensation to the owners but left many of the previous managers in control of the public enterprise.[70] The London *Economist* could thus summarize an interesting article about the attitude of the exprivate steel executives in January 1970: "The British Steel Corporation would like Labour to start nationalizing the industry before the elections—and the Tories not to denationalize it afterward." [71] In other words, social property was allowed to be as much like private property as possible.

Without succumbing to decentralist panaceas, one can easily see that a much more imaginative structure, with major elements of workers' and consumers' control, would have led to profound changes in the society. In their 1969 electoral campaign, the German Social Democrats understood at least part of this point and made the extension of "co-determination"—which provides for workers' representation on the boards of certain large and private corporations—a central political demand. However, when Willy Brandt required the support of the Free Democrats in order to form a government, he agreed, as a price of coalition, not to push this reform.

SO FAR, THIS DISCUSSION has dealt primarily with huge units of modern production, but there are also many instances where cooperative, regional, and even neighborhood forms of social ownership are desirable. In the United States, to take but one example, the electrification of the rural areas was largely achieved through a New Deal measure that provided cheap federal credit to local cooperatives.

So the idea of functional socialization is not simply a political necessity; it is also an opportunity for innovation. In the old, apocalyptic proposals for the sudden and complete nationalization of basic industry, there was little room for promoting diversity and a variety of institutional forms. But if we proceed to socialize the specific functions of property over a period of time, there is much more of a chance for originality and imagination. There is also, of course, the possibility that such gradualism will be an excuse for not challenging the basic power of capital itself. That is why this process can only culminate in a fundamental transformation of power structures if there is a conscious socialist movement which aggressively educates and persuades the electorate to see these reforms as steps toward a new society.

Social Change and Human Psychology

YET, ALL THESE PREVIOUS IMAGES of the possible future of social property have a certain unimaginative quality. For they assume that the change of ownership will take place with the capitalist psychology intact, so that the urge to maximize profit and/or power and the pervasive egotism of economic man will still be the rule of life. It is necessary to take this bleak premise into account, if only because socialism is not going to emerge full-blown as the result of a sudden apocalyptic leap. But it is perhaps even more important to understand the degree to which change affects not simply the structure of the economy but the human spirit as well.

Discussion of this practical potential of man's idealism has been confused because it has so often turned on the experience of Communism, and on what happens to human psychology in a regime of totalitarian scarcity and class privileges. Alienation—and greed and invidious striving—can only be

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overcome, as Marx observed, when the means of production are so developed that they provide the material basis for general abundance. When an impoverished economy is socialized, he said, *"want is made general, and with want the need to struggle for necessities must begin again and all of the old crap will be reproduced. . . ."* [72] (Emphasis added.) And "the old crap" is precisely that pervasive venality that is to be found in any form of class society, capitalist or Communist.

Marx's prediction has been corroborated under Communism. The totalitarian accumulation of capital that Stalin ruthlessly carried out under conditions of economic backwardness has made inequality a basic principle of Soviet life. The privileges conferred upon the new Soviet elite have been institutionalized, and they persist to this day, long after the economic rationalization for them has disappeared. The Russians pioneered in the establishment of this new class system, and other East Europeans copied their model; and the Chinese, or at least the Maoist faction, criticized the fat Communists bitterly from the point of view of a nation that was only at the beginning of this process. But the basic source of all this Communist inequality—the persistence of the "old crap"—was that scarcity whose psychological effects Marx analyzed.[h]

Must an analysis then conclude, as Robert Heilbroner has suggested, with an acknowledgment that the socialist aspiration toward equality necessarily and always conflicts with the socialist determination to produce enough for all? [73] I think not. For as soon as one examines the question of motivation within the context of affluent societies there emerges the possibility of a productive egalitarianism—and trends in this direction can be seen despite the outrageous inequality still prevailing in these nations. The evidence is provided by the children of the rich and the mothers of the poor in contemporary America; the optimistic generalizations come from men as counterposed as Keynes and Trotsky.

Heilbroner speculates on how advanced capitalism may be changing economic psychology. It is possible, he writes, that in such a society "affluence will weaken the condition of economic dependency on which the market system is tacitly based, opening up the prospect that normal differentials of income payment will no longer suffice to attract men to less desirable jobs, and thereby requiring that capitalism resort more and more to planning and coercion." [73] Yet if Heilbroner's observations of this trend are accurate, his conclusions are overly pessimistic.

For it has been noted in New York that when welfare benefits to the mothers of dependent children became competitive with or superior to the pay for unskilled jobs in the labor market, these people did not seek work. They were hardly enjoying affluence, yet they certainly exemplified a breakdown of the old market compulsions. There is, as Nathan Glazer commented on the phenomenon, "a massive change in values which makes various kinds of work which used to support families undesirable to a large number of potential workers today." [74] Now one possible conclusion is to force these women to work. That was the response of the Nixon administration in 1969, when it made the benefits of its proposed minimum family income program conditional on the recipient working or training for a job. It was, in effect,

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a vicious public policy forcing mothers into the labor market (by 1969 there were practically no able-bodied men on public assistance).

Advance in Human Aspirations

BUT THERE IS ANOTHER WAY of handling this situation, one that socialists propose here and now, even within the context of welfare capitalism.

The unwillingness of human beings to work at degrading, routine jobs should be welcomed, both as an advance in the level of men's aspirations and as an opportunity for channeling their talents into socially useful areas. Many dead-end jobs can be mechanized out of existence; as long ago as 1966, the President's Automation Commission demonstrated that there were then 5.3 million public-service jobs in education, health services, beautification, and the like, that could provide decent employment for people displaced by such mechanization—and for millions of the underemployed and unemployed—which would vastly improve the quality of the entire society.[75]

Among the most cruelly used people in the affluent society there seems to be arising a new sense of dignity (conservatives mistake it for laziness), which refutes the old motivations now that brutal compulsions are no longer in force. And this change in psychology could be utilized to help America solve its problems—or it could serve as an excuse—which Heilbroner fears as a possibility and Nixon embraces as a policy—to substitute the coercion of law for the weakened discipline of the market and thereby to drive people to do humiliating work.

Another change in psychology is taking place, not in the slums, but in the surburbs of the upper middle class and the rich. A *Fortune* survey taken in October 1968 reports that 8 million youths between 18 and 24 are or have been in college. Forty percent of these young people said that they were no longer primarily interested in preparing for commercial careers in the profit sector.[76] This trend will be dealt with in more detail shortly, for it has enormous political consequences; it is cited here to show that socially-conscious motivations are becoming more and more important.

The *Fortune* data describes liberal arts students for the most part. There is a similar trend in industry, among technicians and engineers. Capitalism went through two successive industrial revolutions—coal, steam, and textiles were the basis of the first, steel and electricity of the second; both of these resulted in a hierarchical structure with a detailed division of labor. But the third revolution—in electronics, data processing, and petrochemicals—is not so prone to bureaucracy and subordination. Cooperation and informal, transitory team relationships become the norm, replacing fixed and formal lines of authority; groups coalesce around problems and reforms when new issues arise.[77] In May 1968, in France, adult militancy in the general strike was concentrated in precisely these advanced areas of the economy, and the key demands concerned the organization of work rather than simple wage increases.

One of the most important American theorists of the corporation, A. A. Berle, has some fascinating speculations on this development. He argues that profit-oriented decision is not particularly innovative, and that the more secure and wealthy a company becomes the fewer are its incentives to change.[78] The greatest feats of invention, Berle continues, have been accomplished by

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defense corporations under conditions of war and with survival and patriotism as central motives. The Manhattan Project, which created the atom bomb, is an obvious example.

Berle considers it at least possible that such attitudes can be given a social rather than a military thrust: "A day may come when national glory and prestige, perhaps even national safety, are best established by a country's being the most beautiful, the best socially organized, or culturally the most advanced in the world." [79] If such a profound psychological mutation does not lie in the immediate future, the attitudes of the educated and affluent young suggest that it is not impossibly distant either. Were this to happen, some of the dreams of the anarchists and Guild socialists would become a realistic byproduct of technical and social change. One could then think of human and communal relationships within the socialized enterprise, and the classic socialist vision—that production will be carried out by the "associated producers"—would become newly relevant.

THE SOCIALIZATION OF PRIVATE WEALTH remains therefore a central goal. It can be achieved through the progressive socialization of the functions of ownership and it is an essential measure to offset, and eventually abolish, the political power of private ownership. But on the far side of such a process—and verging toward that second phase of socialist transition Marx envisioned—it is not at all utopian to expect that the relative disappearance of scarcity will give rise to new social forms of motivation.

As Keynes, who was certainly not a radical dreamer, put it:

> the author of these essays, for all his croakings, still hopes and believes that the day is not far off when the Economic Problem will take the back seat where it belongs and that the arena of the heart and head will be occupied, or reoccupied, by our real problems—the problems of life and human relations, of creation and behavior and religion.

The economic basis of this possibility, Keynes thought, was "an increase in the volume of capital until it ceases to be scarce so that the functionless investor will no longer receive a bonus." Relating this to a change in motivation, Keynes foresaw a time when society would adopt

> a scheme of taxation which allows the intelligence and determination and executive skill of the financiers and the entrepreneurs, *et hoc genus imne* [and all that sort] (who are certainly so fond of their craft that their labor could be obtained much cheaper than at present) to be harnessed to the community on reasonable terms of reward.[80]

Trotsky made much the same point, though in typically soaring Marxist language. Competition, he said, will not disappear under socialism. It will

> to use the language of psychoanalysis . . . be sublimated, that is, will assume a higher and more fertile form. . . . People will divide into "parties" over the question of a new gigantic canal, or the distribution of oases in the Sahara . . . and over the regulation of the weather and climate, over a new theater, over chemical hypotheses, over two competing tendencies in art and over a best system of sports. Such parties will not be poisoned by the greed of class or caste.[81]

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Taxation as Social Policy

VII

BUT BEFORE TURNING TO THESE EXHILARATING if ultimate possibilities, I must try to complete the description of a more immediate socialist program. For in addition to the socialization of investment and the progressive socialization of ownership, there must be a vigorous tax policy directed toward achieving a more egalitarian society. And this is on the agenda today.

In the past, socialists have tended to ignore the enormous potential of tax policy as a way of getting to a decent society. If there is a tendency under capitalism for reforms, and even in structural changes a tendency to benefit the wealthy more than the poor, a rigorously progressive income tax could provide a major corrective. Not only must the wealth generated by the intervention of the state serve society on a democratic basis; the very organization of inequality itself must be undermined.

In the United States there has been no significant change in the distribution of income since 1944. Moreover, the effective rate of taxation on the rich and the upper middle class (the top 15 percent of the society as measured by incomes) declined in the years between 1952 and 1967.[82] Many of the taxes in this country—for social security and unemployment insurance, state and local sales taxes—are regressive. And all of these figures are based on reported rather than actual income: they do not take into account the command over resources in expense accounts, pensions, and other perquisites which are confined to the upper reaches of the economy.

The American tax system—the same is true for most advanced capitalist countries—is a labyrinth favoring the wealthy who can afford lawyers and accounts. "Income," as defined by the Internal Revenue Service, excludes more than $7 billion a year in capital gains; it does not tax the rent middle-class families save by owning their own houses, worth $8 billion a year; it exempts various state and local bonds; etc. The simple act of making "income" on the tax form equal actual income of the tax payer would be a major contribution to social justice.

Even such a modest reform is intolerable on the basis of capitalist ideology. Two items in the *Wall Street Journal*, separated by less than a year's time, illustrate my point. In the summer of 1969 when Congress considered—and promptly forgot—the idea of limiting some of the privileges of stock speculators by changing somewhat the favored status of capital gains, the *Journal* replied in an indignant editorial. The reform would "punish the nation's most productive citizens" and this disincentive to the stockholder would lead to a decrease in economic activity and lower federal revenues. "Obviously enough," the *Journal* said, "the tax reformers' chief aim is not more money for Uncle Sam but more 'justice' as among individual taxpayers." This plea obviously assumes that the stock market performs important and creative economic functions and that it is peopled by "the nation's most productive citizens."

But in February 1970 there was another report in the *Wall Street Journal*. Inflation had made money so tight that giant blue-chip corporations were doing something out of the ordinary: they were actually trying to raise money in Wall Street. The "nation's most productive citizens," the *Journal* reported, were dismayed at this turn of events. Sidney Homer, a partner in Solomon

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Brothers & Hutzler, told the paper, "Every time you add $1 billion to the volume through new stock offerings you *take out $1 billion that could be used to push up stocks already on the market.*" (Emphasis added.) This constitutes a marvelous refutation of the *Journal's* editorial, for it shows that the main form of activity on the market is legalized gambling of a sort that provides no new venture capital whatever. As Joan Robinson summed it up, "the shareholders and rentiers indeed make a great negative contribution to industry, for much of the best talent in every generation is engaged, one way or another, in the lucrative business of swapping securities around amongst them and so is kept from constructive activities." [83]

Attacking Parasites and Gamblers

EFFECTIVE INHERITANCE TAXES would provide another important source of social funds and an opportunity to work toward greater equality. In the United States these taxes are quite low—or quite avoidable, which amounts to the same thing. In classic capitalist theory, a man must be able to leave his fortune to his children if he is to have an incentive to work hard all his life. That motive could easily be protected by providing for relatively low death duties on the *first* transfer of wealth, from father to son. This would encourage the father, while very high rates on the second transfer, from son to grandson, would give both of them a reason to strive hard. This proposal follows the ingenious Saint-Simonian scheme of abolishing inheritance over three generations and counting on the greed of the first generation to make it indifferent to what happens to its grandchildren.

In all these reforms, the point would be not to penalize hard work or actual risk-taking but to limit severely, and eventually to eliminate, the tribute society pays to passive wealth and stock gamblers. For as the process of accumulation becomes much more social, with industry generating its own investment funds or getting them from institutions, it is absurd to pay generations of functionless coupon clippers on the grounds that their distant ancestors made a contribution to the economy. It is property income that should become the target of taxation, a kind of income easy enough to distinguish from the reward for present accomplishment. We should also seek to get at the enormous increase in land value—worth $25 billion a year in the United States between 1956 and 1966—which takes place without any effort on the part of the owner.[84]

Of all the reforms proposed in this essay, the use of taxes to increase justice and equality should be the most politically promising. For it would be a policy attacking the wealth of a parasitic minority, and once all the outmoded rationales for favoring the rich were shattered, a majority of the people might be educated to see the value of a radical system of taxation.

Here, then, are three kinds of programs that move in the direction of a socialist democratization of economic power:

- *the socialization of investment;*
- *the progressive socialization of the functions of corporate property and then of that property itself, with an attendant increase in the social motivation of the people;*
- *the employment of tax policy as an instrument of social justice.*

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Who Will Do the Job? VIII

YOU MAY ASK: granted that basic new departures in economic and political policy are desperately needed, where can we find the political support for these measures? If the European social democrats have not been able to go beyond the welfare state, isn't it preposterous to suggest that they—and an America that doesn't even have a mass social democratic movement—should now prepare to go much farther?

A serious Marxist analysis would reveal that on many issues Marx was wrong. In his classic scenario, the workers were supposed to become a revolutionary majority of the society. The overthrow of the old order would then be relatively simple and, at least in some cases (England, America, Holland), possibly nonviolent. As August Bebel, the leader of early German socialism, put it:

> As the knowledge [of capitalist exploitation and the need for socialism] grips increasingly larger groups it finally wins over the overwhelming majority of society which has a direct interest in this transformation. . . . At the same time the resistance of the ruling class lessens, for its power is based on unscientific ideas and it has no insight into the conditions of the exploited and oppressed classes.[85]

Part of that prediction has come true. It is a fact that the ruling classes during the thirties believed in and acted upon preposterous, unscientific ideas (they cut expenses and tolerated mass unemployment in a depression) while the masses, for all their lack of formal education, had a superior instinct for what should be done. But in some crucial aspects the Marxian prophecy failed. The capitalist structure was not simplified so as to counterpose a gigantic proletariat and a tiny bourgeoisie. Instead, all kinds of intermediate strata persisted long after they were scheduled to disappear; new groups emerged and, in the period after World War II, the industrial working class became a declining percentage of the population in the advanced nations.

At the same time the vision of an utterly transformed society which the European workers had adopted so frightened the capitalists that they yielded to reforms. In turn, these reforms helped to integrate the Left into a welfare economy that was still privately owned. By the beginning of the sixties, this momentous development had affected not merely the revisionist social democrats but all the orthodox Marxists and intransigeant radicals as well. The latter groups were simply more discrete (or disingenuous) about their disenchantment, and more frenetic in their search for new saviors.

Herbert Marcuse and C. Wright Mills, who have had a great influence on the youthful Left, were thought of as the most stern critics of reformism.[i] Yet, essentially they agreed with those German revisionist social democrats who wrote in their 1959 program,

> The defenseless proletarian without rights, who used to drive himself through a sixteen-hour day to get a starvation wage, has won the eight-hour day, job security, protection against unemployment, sickness, chronic illness, and provisions for retirement. . . .[86]

This development, which Marx could hardly have anticipated in detail, can be understood through a Marxist analysis. Social being, Marx had said,

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determines social consciousness. In the nineteenth century, the immediate experience of capitalist society was one of poverty, insecurity, periodic crisis, and the degradation of a mechanized division of labor. As a result there was a revolutionary class consciousness. But as the barbarities of the system were moderated, precisely through the impact of that class consciousness, the consequent new conditions—the new social being, if you will—gave rise to a new consciousness. The worker in the welfare state had a certain stake in the established order as well as powerful grievances against it. If he still considered himself a socialist, that was either in deference to tradition or as an expression of his essential reformism: utopia, at least for a time, had been partially conservatized.

Is the Working Class Obsolete?

ON THE BASIS OF THIS ANALYSIS, a group of intellectuals in the late fifties and early sixties—Daniel Bell and Raymond Aron prominent among them—declared that we were witnessing an "end of ideology." In effect they argued that the old, militant antagonisms of capital and labor were ended, or largely muted, and that social change had become a question of how experts would divide an ever increasing Gross National Product. In *The Accidental Century,* I challenged this thesis and contended that revolutionary changes taking place in technology and economic structure could well radicalize masses of people again.

I believe that the second half of the sixties bore out my analysis more than that of the "end of ideology" people. In every advanced nation there was unprecedented student and youth unrest; in the United States there were explosions of black anger; in France, Italy, Germany, and Spain the working class engaged in the most determined struggle since the thirties. And now, looking toward a conscious movement that could make the objective need for socialism into an effective political force, let me suggest a possibility (not an inevitability): that the traditional protest of the workers, the grandchildren of the prisoners of starvation, and the unprecedented rebellion of the youth, the children of affluence, may converge into a force capable of transforming modern society.

To understand the creative potential of the workers, take the United States of America, the advanced nation where labor seems most integrated into the prevailing order and utterly lacking in any kind of revolutionary consciousness.

Now it is quite true that the *industrial* working class in America is a declining percentage of the population. But, to cite a fact some of the interpreters of this trend forget, the number of the workers is also on the increase; it is their percentage, not their total, that is going down. In 1965 in America, 37 percent of the job holders, or more than 26 million individuals, were craftsmen, foremen, operatives, and laborers.[87] And a majority of those in the service industries—9 million people and 12.6 percent of the whole work force—were blue-collar. As the Department of Labor projected the evolution of these categories, the number of industrial workers would increase by 1975 to 30 million, even though their percentage would drop to 33.3 per-

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cent. Adding in the blue-collar service workers, that would mean over 40 million citizens in working-class occupations in the mid-seventies.

The working class is by no means "disappearing." And even as various academics were explaining how the proletariat had ceased to be a historical actor, there were tens of millions of workers who continued to face many of the old problems of working-class life. For, as the Bureau of Labor Statistics computed the figures, in late 1966 it took about $9,200 to support an urban family of four in the United States at a "moderate standard of living" (the definition allowed, for example, the purchase of a new suit and a two-year-old used car every four years).[88] With our rampant inflation, it is clear that this figure would have to be revised to somewhat more than $11,000 for 1970.

To achieve that 1966 level required a weekly pay check of $177; the average for industrial workers was actually $114. Indeed, a majority of the American people lacked the resources of this "moderate" budget. In addition to the poor there were tens of millions of working Americans who, if not hungry, had to struggle and scrape to make ends meet. And many of these citizens were concentrated in factory jobs that were physically grueling. So the "old" issues of wages and working conditions were still very much a factor in the experience of the majority of the people. And in Europe, where per capita wealth is inferior to that in the United States, this is still more true.

Political Clout of the Workers

EXPRESSIONS OF WORKING-CLASS DISCONTENT did not take the turbulent, near revolutionary forms that it did in France and Italy in 1968 and 1969, but it was still a powerful political force. In the elections of 1968 the supposedly decrepit trade unions were clearly the single most important element in the coalition which, despite the most difficult odds, almost elected Humphrey President in 1968. The labor organizations registered 4.6 million voters, printed more than 100 million leaflets and pamphlets; and supplied 72,225 canvassers and 94,457 volunteers on election day.[89]

For—and this point is extremely important—the political potential of social classes cannot be determined by a simple head count. There are nations in which the overwhelming majority is peasant and yet the society is run in the cities. Peasants are dispersed, parochial and pre-modern. They can flare into a Jacquerie or even provide the troops for a Mao or a Ho Chi Minh. But the decisive technology of the contemporary economy is industrial, and the center of power is therefore urban. Workers, in the cities, are concentrated in very large numbers, subjected to a common discipline in the work process, and forced—in the defense of their most immediate interests—to build collective institutions. They therefore have a cohesion, a social weight, in excess of their numbers.

I stress this aspect of working-class life which is so often ignored by the affluent, college-educated, and issue-oriented people who must form coalitions with the unionists. The new constituency that is emerging as a result of mass higher education is important; but it does not have a solidarity imposed upon it by the very conditions of life and work, as the workers do. Therefore, even if the percentage of blue-collar workers is declining and that of

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"professional, technical, and kindred workers" is on the increase, it is the working people with their own, stable institutions who must be the decisive component in a socialist majority.

PARADOXICALLY, AFFLUENCE MAY YET PROVOKE the workers to political struggle as much as poverty did. As far back as 1849, Marx had recognized the possibility that capitalist success would make labor rebel.

> The rapid growth of productive capital [Marx wrote] brings about an equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social wants, social employments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the worker have risen, the social satisfactions which they give him fall in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalists which are inaccessible to the worker, and in comparison with the state of development of society in general. Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society. . . .[90]

If one updates Marx's insight into the radicalizing effect of good times, another aspect of recent working-class militancy can be brought into focus. For affluence does not simply narcotize and make men passive, as Herbert Marcuse seems to think. It also makes people angry when they compare what they have with the bountiful pretensions of the society. They contrast their standard of living, not with that of their parents or grandparents, but with the enchanted creatures of television. Affluence seems to subvert itself.

Moreover—and here we move toward the line separating the traditional blue-collar working class from the new professionals—there are changes in class structure in the affluent economy which occasion new kinds of discontent. Planned, rationalized capitalism demands higher and higher skills from its labor force, and this opens up the possibility of a very educated opposition among the technicians employed in the most advanced industries. So it was, for example, that in the French general strike of May 1968 the greatest militancy was not found among the coal miners, the classic source of proletarian intransigeance, but among men and women working in electronics, the chemical and auto industries, among teachers and the employees of the state-run radio and television network.[91] And these demands of sophisticated workers in advanced industries did not concern wages as much as the democratization of working conditions.

IX Is There a "New Class"?

THERE IS STILL a politically potent dissatisfaction, based on the old working-class deprivations and also on the new needs of affluence. Moreover, if the proletariat failed to develop as Marx believed it would, there may now be a totally unexpected agency of social change emerging in the West.

This new class—I use the term loosely—has been glimpsed by many observers. Yet there has been a great deal of confusion, partly, I suspect, because this prodigious age is producing not one but two new social groups, related yet distinct. In addition, this change in class structure has been mistakenly identified so that both the mass media and the pop sociologists see it primarily as a matter of age. What is happening, I would suggest, is not the

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mere expression of a transitory mood among young people who will forget their egalitarian fantasies once they have to submit to the rigors of the labor market and "grow up." What may well be happening—youth apart—is a change in economic and social structure that could have large political consequences.

As capitalism developed, it needed more and more people who were not engaged in actual production. Long ago Max Adler, the Austrian socialist theorist, had recognized "a new black-coated proletariat altogether unlike the petit bourgeoisie of Marx's day. . . ." [92] After World War II this tendency became more and more pronounced. With the third technological revolution within capitalism, electronics, chemicals, computers, and the "knowledge" industry were in the vanguard. And all these fields require a great number of highly skilled people.

Moreover, as John Kenneth Galbraith noted in *The New Industrial State,* because the corporation has become huge and makes multi-million dollar investments projected over long periods of time, a whole new stratum of industrial planners is needed. This marks, Galbraith suggests, a major new source of power, since society always pays a particular deference to its most scarce resource. Once it was land, then capital; now it is organized intelligence.[93] Daniel Bell has said that the "new men" in this emergent order are

> the scientists, the mathematicians, the economists and the engineers of the new complex technology. The leadership of the new society will rest, not with the businessmen or corporations as we have known them . . . but with the research corporation, the industrial laboratories, the experimental stations and the universities.

From his thesis about the new men of "post-industrial" society, Bell drew fairly conservative conclusions. Using almost the same theory, the French sociologist Alain Touraine has said that these changes would result in a "utopian communist" movement and that the French revolt of May 1968 was one of the first expressions of this new revolutionary trend.[94] Even some Communist writers acknowledged this development. Indeed, the French Communist party, perhaps the most rigidly Stalinist group in the West, disciplined Roger Garaudy and removed him from the Central Committee for having argued, among other things, that the workers had to make an alliance with the new strata of technicians and intellectuals in industry.

In the Soviet Union itself, the scientist Andrei D. Sakharov not only spoke out for intellectual freedom but based his appeal for Soviet-American cooperation—and his hope that the two societies would converge in democratic socialism—on the thesis that managerial groups were more and more important in both countries and had a common interest in a new socialist order.[95] And in the spring of 1968, when Czechoslovakia searched for the "human face" of socialism, the journalists and intellectuals played an innovating role—and the support they received among the workers turned their critique into effective politics.

In short, responses to this new social stratum come from every point on the political compass. How to interpret the facts about this new group is still a highly controversial matter, but the facts themselves are pretty clear. In 1969 a Department of Labor study predicted that by 1975 this country

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would have a 45 percent increase in the number of professionals as compared to 1965, a 23 percent rise in the number of managers, and a 32.5 percent growth of the clerical work force.[96] If these projections turn out to be accurate, these three groups could account for over 40 percent of the employment in the United States. There are, of course, enormous differences among and within these categories: a typist is by no means part of the same social stratum as a corporation vice-president or a nuclear physicist. Nevertheless, it is urgent to realize that there is occurring a vast expansion of jobs both distant from actual production and often demanding high levels of education and skill.

IS THERE EVIDENCE to indicate that these statistics point to a group with a consciousness of its own, let alone a special receptivity to radical or socialist ideas? Galbraith is optimistic on this count; he writes that the industrial system "brings into existence, to serve its intellectual and scientific needs, the group that, hopefully, will reject its monopoly of social purpose."[97] As early as the turn of the century, the American Marxist Louis Boudin applied Kautsky's theory of "state socialism" which is discussed in note **c** to the United States and identified the very beginning of the phenomenon Galbraith described. The new middle class or group of propertyless managers, Boudin said, was in favor of regulating the conflicts and crises within capitalism and therefore disposed to state intervention, but it would never accept a radical transformation of the society itself.[98]

Boudin may be right and Galbraith wrong. The growing stratum of professionals and technicians may simply want to ameliorate, not really change, the existing order. It would then end up with politics similar to those of the American Medical Association, a group organized to exploit the community it is supposed to serve. But there is at least the possibility that the new professionals will be drawn to support more radical transformations. Involved each day with cooperative endeavors in which they debate and discuss and plan, they are open to an appeal to build a more rational, planned order.

Professionals and Technicians as Workers

ONE COULD IDENTIFY THIS STRATUM in terms of the traditional Marxist analysis, as some on the Left have done. It would then be seen as a new section of the working class, rather than as a new class. For the great mass of these people indeed work for large corporations and universities and often have developed a "trade union" consciousness of the need to band together and fight for their group interests. It seems to me that it is quite legitimate to take this view of the phenomenon so long as one recognizes the unique characteristics of the new group: a high level of formal education and an issue-orientation. On such issues as foreign policy, civil liberties, and civil rights, this emergent stratum is likely to differ considerably from traditional working-class attitudes.

If then the crisis of advanced society will become more pressing in the years ahead, and if it can be resolved only through radical innovation, there is a growing group that could become conscious of this fact and decide to act upon it politically. It has, I believe, already provided part of the mass

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basis for the McCarthy and Robert Kennedy campaigns of 1968 and for the movement to end the war in Vietnam. But if this group decides, out of naivete or arrogance, to "go it alone" and refuses to work with trade unionists because of the latter's dominant concern with bread-and-butter questions, it will not be able to transform the society. Only if it understands that labor is the best-organized and most powerful force for domestic social change and if it works with the unions, can it be part of a new, and perhaps radical, majority.

These professionals and technicians, then, are not an age group or a youth phenomenon, but the expression of changes in the American class structure. And they are to be distinguished from yet another stratum, similar to them in certain respects, but with important characteristics of its own. I refer to the young people who are educated—but not for technological functions.

In the *Fortune* survey which showed 40 percent of the college youth to be fundamentally dissatisfied with the values of the society, the majority of this group—*Fortune* dubbed them the "forerunners"—were students in the arts and humanities. The vocational choice that attracted the largest single group among them (39 percent) was teaching. That would, of course, make them part of the "professional" category as defined by the statisticians in Washington—but it would certainly not qualify them as part of the technostructure (since most of them are oriented toward primary or secondary teaching and wish not to participate in either the research institutions or the corporations).

These nontechnicians are the most visible representatives of the "generation gap" that has been so widely discussed in Europe and America. They incarnate not merely a new definition of the meaning of age, but the consequences of changes in class structure as well.

Adolescence, as Kenneth Keniston points out, was an invention of industrial society.[99] Before the rise of urban industrialism, children entered adult society as soon as they were physically able (and, in the early days of capitalism, even before then). But with the growth of wealth and the middle class, the children of the well-off were granted (to use Erik Erikson's idea) a "moratorium" in their teens during which they were neither quite children nor adults. Now, as society has grown more affluent, it has created still another period of human life, one that "intervenes between adolescence and adulthood." [100]

The Affluent, Radical Young as a New Force

THIS NEW PHASE, Keniston argues, has been the basis of New Left currents in the advanced nations during the sixties. For the radicals, Keniston discovered, are overwhelmingly the children of the middle, and even upper-middle, class; they come from liberal homes; and their bitterness with the existing order is partly the result of having been given the leisure and educational opportunity to take a "distinterested" and critical view. But their antiestablishmentarianism may also reflect a certain self-interest, as Bruno Bettelheim has suggested. For many of these young people understand that, despite or because of their liberal education, they are becoming obsolete in

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a technological economy. Trained as "gentlemen" in an age that needs technicians, they become, in Walter Lippmann's phrase, "derelicts from progress." [101]

If these theories are correct—and I think there is substance to them—they describe one of the unexpected consequences of our technological revolution. Some writers, myself included, responded in the early sixties to the phenomenon of automation with an excessive literal-mindedness. We assumed it would have the obvious effect of producing chronic, and even mass, unemployment; but we did not realize the various disguises this trend could adopt. One of these was the war in Vietnam which "carried out" a policy many of us had proposed—the direct governmental creation of 1.7 million jobs—but did so in a murderous fashion. Another was the protracted postponement of entry into the labor market on the part of the liberally-educated children of the affluent.

For those among the young who were preparing for careers in the "knowledge economy," this delay was functional. But for others, who sought enlightenment or simply the "credential" of a college degree, the experience was bewildering. True, they were saved from unemployment. But they also found themselves in new mass institutions of higher learning which could give them no convincing reason as to why they should be there. So they rebelled in a thousand ways against the irrationality of their life.

In France, after May 1968, the authorities adopted a version of the foregoing analysis and acted upon it. As *Le Monde* reported in 1969,

> The students in the various faculties are also upset for another reason: the uncertainty of the job market. Almost half the liberal arts graduates no longer find posts in teaching and are not prepared for any other activity. The situation is rapidly going to be just as upsetting for graduates in economics, natural science and even physics, for they cannot all find a place in teaching or research.

As another paradoxical result of the May 1968 student rising, the technocrats are opening a new school teaching management techniques and introducing the study of technology in the science faculties so that the students will be prepared to work in industry.[102]

Dropouts from Work-oriented Society

SOME OF THE YOUNG DROP OUT of the work-oriented society altogether. This is, of course, an option taken by a tiny minority, yet there is a remarkable response to the hippie style among those who have not disaffiliated completely but share the dissatisfactions of those who have. Theodore Roszak argues that this phenomenon is so serious, it marks the appearance of a "counter culture," that is, a radical departure from the mainstream assumptions of the West since the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century.[103] It integrates oriental mysticism, psychedelic drugs, and communitarian impulses; and it is profoundly hostile to technological rationality.

The extreme form of this attitude leads to a dangerous utopianism, in the worst sense of that word. Roszak asks,

> . . . how ready are the workers to disband whole sectors of the industrial apparatus where this proves necessary in order to achieve ends other than

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> efficient productivity and high consumption? How willing are they to set aside technocratic priorities in favor of a new simplicity of life?[104]
>
> [And this vision culminates in the proclamation of] . . . a new heaven and a new earth so vast, so marvelous that the inordinate claims of technical expertise must of necessity withdraw in the presence of such splendor to a subordinate and marginal status in the lives of men.[105]

I take this view seriously, even though it expresses the attitude of only a small number of disaffiliated young people. Portions of this ideology—as, for that matter, hippie styles in clothing—are to be found among a very large number of the growing college-educated constituency. And what Roszak is articulating is, in part at least, a self-righteous call for such people to withdraw into their tight little universe and, in the name of ultra-radicalism, reduce the opportunities for basic change.

The "Radicalism" of Copping Out

POLITICALLY, IT IS IMPOSSBLE TO PERSUADE THE MAJORITY of the people of the advanced countries to become voluntary ascetics. Unlike the inhabitants of the counter culture who usually come from affluent homes and live off the wealth of the society, most people still have unsatisfied material needs. Even more important, dealing with the agony of the poor in the advanced countries—with the hundreds of millions in the Third World who are much more desperate—requires that contemporary technology be used for the creation of food, housing, and clothing. It was, for instance, technological rationality—in this case, applied scientific research—that resulted in the "green revolution" of new strains of wheat and rice, making it possible to generate huge increases in the agricultural production of India. To carry out the program of the "counter culture" would literally threaten millions with starvation. The poetic demand to do away with machines, so compelling to young people who have never run them or realized their own dependence upon them, comes to seem extremely reactionary.

I don't mean to say that the hippie view is completely without substance. It is quite right in arguing that production is not an end in itself—as capitalist society and its ideology of eternally increasing consumption insists. It is right in saying that, once the basic needs of all the people of the earth are satisfied, man should turn to other pursuits. Marx rightly held that the "kingdom of freedom" was one in which there was no compulsory work (a point I will develop shortly). And he understood that, if one dispensed with the discipline of the labor market, it would mean a mutation in the psychic character of man—there would be "new" men.

But Roszak and those for whom he speaks want to pass immediately into the kingdom of freedom, even though the vast majority of mankind is still forced to live in the kingdom of necessity. Yet the very conditions that make some of the young susceptible to such an appeal might make them open to a socialist program for the humanization of technology. A bit later they might even respond to a realistic strategy for reaching the kingdom of freedom, not through disaffiliation of a sensitive if irresponsible minority, but through the conscious activity of the majority.

In this and other areas of advanced capitalist society, its injustices and

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perverse values afflict a diverse group of classes and strata, which may possibly join together to transform the society. The workers are confronted by the old, and basic, problem of not having enough; they are also made discontented when they contrast their own material gains with the affluence enjoyed by a relatively small minority. By virtue of their cohesion and organization, it is this working-class component that must be the spine, the decisive element, of any new socialist movement.

But if the workers have not become the overwhelming majority of society, as the Marxists predicted, the very development of the capitalist economy may be creating new allies for them in the struggle to democratize economic power. The growing stratum of professionals and technicians—whether they are called new class, new working class, technostructure, or what have you—have already had a political impact in the antiwar and civil rights movement. The conditions of their working lives make them susceptible to the appeal for democratic planning and a politics of participation. And then there is a group within the new mass constituency of the college-educated which, because it asserts the traditional values of liberal culture in the midst of a technological revolution, is particularly aware of the insanity of production for production's sake and the dehumanization that accompanies it.

There are reasons to fear that these different groups, all with a practical interest in the transformation of society, will war with one another rather than coalesce in a new radical majority and eventually into a socialist movement. They have profound differences among themselves in style, tradition, and even in politics. But they do share common interests, and it is the job of socialists in America to persuade them to act upon these interests.

If the problems outlined at the beginning of this essay are to be recognized; if the solutions described in the middle of it are to be practical politics; then this new majority that I have just suggested must come into being. It might.

X The Vision of Socialism

THOUGH THE CHANGES I have been talking about go far beyond any proposals by major political movements in neocapitalist society, they are still only transitional measures. They would profoundly improve and humanize the old order but would not yet constitute a new and revolutionary order. So it is now necessary to look beyond scarcity to the ultimate vision of socialism itself.

In envisaging the transcendent potential of social change I am not, I hope, indulging in holiday rhetoric to console those who spend their lives in mundane struggles—nor am I implying that history will one day enter paradise. But in the particulars of this or that conflict, each increment of progress can be better structured if it is related to the vision of a qualitative change in the human condition. If, as I will argue in a moment, the abolition of money and work are basic socialist values, that has some bearing on tomorrow's urgent trade union negotiations and on the next welfare measure in the legislature. It was, for example, a prophetic notion of more dignity

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for human beings which led the British socialists in 1945 to reject a means test for the new social services they were providing.

There is also a certain danger in carrying out the socialist idea to its ultimate conclusions. It was first pointed out by that great antisocialist, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and it has since gained in relevance. Dostoevsky argued that messianic socialism, the pretence of a total earthly salvation analogous to Christian redemption, would lead to totalitarianism. Man, he said, cannot be so completely refashioned, and those who claim to do so will, in the name of nonviolence and brotherhood, be driven to force and dictatorship. Dostoevsky did not understand his own prejudices when he made this analysis, but the alarm he sounded was quite real.

Now it is not true, as some conservatives think, that the Communist countries are the proof of Dostoevsky's prophecy. For, as I noted earlier, Marx himself had understood as early as in the 1840s that the attempt to base socialism on an economy of scarcity would lead to new forms of exploitation and repression, not to socialism. Even so, Dostoevsky did brilliantly intuit the logic and psychology of totalitarianism, the way in which the promise of total cooperation and consensus can become the excuse for total coercion and terror. With the means of scientific manipulation developed since Dostoevsky's time, advanced societies could, in the name of absolute justice, act out the injustices which he perceived but in a far more efficient technological way than he could have foreseen.

It is therefore important to insist upon the limitations of socialism as a prelude to describing how it seeks to break through some of our present limits. It proposes a solution, not to all human ills, but to those based upon the economic, social, and political conditions of life. In contrast to what Marx thought, it may well be that once man stops dying from famines and depressions and starts to die only from death, there will be a resurgence of the religious spirit, not an end to it. "Under Communism," Sidney Hook once wrote, "man ceases to suffer as an animal and suffers as a human. He therefore moves from the plane of the pitiful to the plane of the tragic." [106]

To grant that socialism is not a final redemption should not, however, paralyze the imagination, for even within these limits there are enormous possibilities. For instance, I think that Stanley Moore overreacted in his legitimate hostility to the demands of some of the youthful New Leftists for "Gemeinschaft Now!" "Is it not enough," Moore wrote, "for the proletarian revolution to abolish the division of labor between wage workers and capitalists? Why does Marx suggest in the *German Ideology* that communism will eliminate *all* division of labor?" [107] For there are present tendencies, and there is a certain future socialist potential, toward redefining work along the lines Marx suggested.

In what follows there will be a "dialectical" tension. On the one hand, I want to avoid that absolutist view of socialism which is so transcendental that it drives its true believers to totalitarianism and an antisocialist society; on the other hand, I want to suggest the truly radical potential for human change that exists today. And with these caveats, I would stress two elements as crucial in my definition of the socialist future. Society should move toward, even if it never reaches, the abolition of work and money.

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Can Work Be Abolished? Should It?

MARX'S VISION OF SOCIALISM was as radical as Stanley Moore complains it was. I quote extensively, not because it comes from Marx, but because I think it remains an accurate perception of the most desirable possibility of social change.

> The realm of freedom [Marx held] begins first with the fact that work ceases to be determined by need and external expediency; so in the nature of things it will be located beyond the sphere of material production in the proper sense of the word. As the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy his needs and to maintain and reproduce his life, so must civilized man do the same thing under all social forms and possible modes of production. With his development, man expands the realm of material necessity and his own needs; but at the same time, he expands the productive forces which satisfy them. In this sphere, freedom can only emerge if socialized man [*vergesellschafteter Mensch*], the associated producers [*assozierte Produzenten*] regulate their relation to nature rationally and bring it under communal [*gemeinschaftliche*] control, rather than being ruled by it as by a blind power; and if this is accomplished with the least expenditure of effort and under conditions worthy and adequate to human nature. But this remains always as the realm of necessity. Beyond that there begins the true realm of freedom where the development of man's powers becomes an end in itself, a realm which can only bloom on the basis of the realm of necessity. The shortening of the working day is its fundamental premise.[108]

Essentially Marx is saying that, in the fullness of socialism, all men will work like artists, out of an inner need and satisfaction, and not because they are forced to earn their daily bread. In arguing that even in the planned, socially-controlled society, work is still unfree as long as it is compulsory, Marx was anticipating that passionate antisocialist, Friedrich Nietzsche, who wrote, "Phew! To speak as if an increase in the impersonality inside a mechanized plant will make a new society and turn the scandal of slavery into a virtue!" [109]

By now we have become so accustomed to the regime of compulsory (in an economic sense) labor that we have lost even the memory of the precapitalist period when leisure was more common. For, as Marx documented in his brilliant history of the bourgeois struggle to lengthen the working day and week, the limit that Massachusetts law set upon the labor of children in the nineteenth century defined the normal working day for an adult in the seventeenth century.[110] In the Middle Ages the working year was only 150–200 days.[111] Nietzsche's insight reflected, if from a reactionary point of view, an instinctive understanding of working people whose lives had been subjected to the calculation of clocks and the division of labor. A hundred or so years later we have "progressed" to the point where we have forgotten how natural it is not to work.

WHAT MARX UNDERSTOOD, however, and Nietzsche did not was that the application of science and technology make it possible—even necessary—to change the very nature of work. Marx had glimpsed the coming of automation as early as the late 1850s. Just before the passage I have quoted on the realm of freedom, he wrote, "The actual wealth of society and the possibility

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of a continued expansion of its process of reproduction do not depend upon the duration of surplus labor, but upon its productivity and the more or less fertile conditions of production under which it is performed." [112]

In other words, the evolution of technology would progressively reduce the need for human labor, and this economic trend would make possible the socialist realm of freedom. In his notes for *Das Kapital,* Marx was even more specific about the tendency he summarized in Volume Three of that work. He not only argued that the increasing productivity of machine production would make it possible for society progressively to reduce labor time; he held that it would become a necessity.[113] The output of an automated economy, Marx said, would increase so fast that, if title to consumption were still determined by labor time, society could not possibly use up its own production. Therefore, as a matter of survival, such an economy would have to shorten the working day and increase the consumption of the masses. In order to release these surging forces of production, a new mode of production becomes a practical necessity.

Is it poetic license to say that Marx was talking about automation? Now it is obvious that he did not have advance knowledge of the computers and cybernated equipment that were not invented until long after his death. But it is extraordinary that his analysis of the capitalist dynamic did lead him to anticipate in broad outline what automation would mean. Marx had rightly seen (and Joseph Schumpeter thought it his great accomplishment) that one of the basic laws of motion in capitalist society was for competition to beget monopoly and a consequent tendency to increase investment in machines (in the Marxist vocabulary, for constant capital to grow in relationship to variable capital, thus changing the "organic composition" of capital itself). "In this transformation," Marx said, "it is neither the immediate labor which man himself performs, nor the time during which he works, but the appropriation of his common productivity . . . in a word, the development of the socialized individual, which is the basic source of richness and production." [114]

This reference to the "socialized individual" has a very specific economic meaning. The increasing investment per worker who tends more and more sophisticated machines enables the individual to produce out of all proportion to his own physical powers. Through science and its application to industry, one man can do as much as a hundred, or a thousand men used to do. Moreover—and if this is not an anticipation of automation, what is it?—"men relate more and more to the productive process as watchers and regulators." [115]

The Promise, or Threat, of Automation

WITHIN CAPITALISM THIS DEVELOMENT THREATENS the very existence of the system: success is suicidal. On the one hand, capitalism "uses all the power of science and nature, of social cooperation and social exchange, to make the creation of wealth (relatively) independent of the amount of labor time expended." [116] On the other hand, capitalism proposes to measure, and consume, this output in terms of labor time which sets a limit upon what can be sold; the worker, who through technology produces as if he were a thou-

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sand men, is paid as an individual. So the increase in productivity within a class society—where its benefits are necessarily maldistributed—has a tendency to decrease effective demand. An unprecedented accomplishment, Marx concluded, would contain the seeds of crisis.[117]

The basic technological trend Marx predicted has indeed come to pass. Yet the crisis it was supposed to occasion has not. Why?

Marx, it turned out, was wrong to think that capitalism was necessarily helpless to deal with its own abundance. There has been widespread state intervention to correct the "natural" tendency of the system to catastrophe (though, more often than not, these measures were introduced at the behest of the labor and socialist movements and against the determined opposition of a significant section of business). But this does not mean that the neo-Keynesian complacency of the National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress is justified. Federal fiscal policy, the Commission said in summarizing the prevailing reform attitude, could supply the deficiencies in aggregate demand for any rate of technological innovation.[118] If productivity increase eliminated particular jobs, then government action would create an economic environment in which new work would be forthcoming. In other words, Marx's insight was partially validated and partially annulled. The society would indeed have to spend socially in order to buy back its own incredible output; and by doing so it could contain even a revolutionary technology within the established framework.

But this optimism ignores the evidence presented in this essay: that government spending, precisely because it follows a commercial calculus, has "solved" one crisis by worsening other crises. For if capitalism was more flexible than Marx thought, it still had to design, or stumble into, ameliorative programs that would preserve the structural injustices of the society. It created 1.7 million "jobs" to prosecute the tragedy in Vietnam without hesitation, but it would only fund a handfull of social employments; it provided billions in disguised welfare for the housing of the rich and a pittance for the poor; etc. And these perverse appropriations were not miscalculations or the result of ill will, but expressions of the most basic values of the system itself.

This is the key to that paradox presented by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence under Dr. Milton Eisenhower: that after the most prosperous decade in the nation's history, it is in imminent danger of building a hate-ridden, strife-torn anti-utopia.

Can All Men Be Creative?

SOCIALISM WOULD BE FREE OF PRECISELY THOSE CONSTRAINTS which make it structurally impossible for capitalism to make a truly social use of its productivity. In the immediate future, a democratically socialized society could use this enormous economic power to meet the needs of America and to aid in the industrialization of the world. There is so much work that needs to be done within this country and internationally that the next several generations, at least, must put the "socialized individual" to work meeting basic needs. Yet in the more distant future it is not only possible, but perhaps necessary, for society to enter that Kingdom of Freedom which Marx described. Once

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the basic needs of all of mankind are provided for, and productivity still grows, men may be forced to live without compulsory work. The sentence decreed in the Garden of Eden will have been served.

I would not suggest that a psychic transition of this character will be easy. It is a familar phenomenon that some people are crushed by retirement, bewildered when the compulsion of work is removed from their lives. At a conference sponsored by DISSENT in 1969, Meyer Schapiro, a brilliant art critic and socialist, placed this kind of crisis in a thoughtful context. The ideal of the artist, of freely chosen and loving work, Schapiro said, is problematic even for the the artists themselves and would be infinitely more difficult to apply in the lives of the masses of people. For every successful painter or sculptor there are many others whose hopes are disappointed. And even those who do succeed often require tremendous sacrifice from their family and friends in order to develop their genius.

I suspect that Schapiro has touched upon one of the fundamental social-psychological issues of the twenty-first century: whether, in an economy of abundance, men can find within themselves and their relations with one another, rather than in external necessity, a reason for living. The problem with this aspect of the ultimate socialist projection arises because Marx's cultural vision was so thoroughly aristocratic. He hoped for nothing less than that every citizen become a Renaissance man. "In a Communist society," he and Engels wrote, "there will be no painters, but only highly developed men who, among other things, paint." [119]

But it was Trotsky, among the Marxists, whose optimism was the most audacious:

> Man will become immeasurably stronger, wiser and subtler; his movements more rhythmic, his voice more musical. The forms of life will become dynamically dramatic. The average human type will rise to the heights of an Aristotle, a Goethe, a Marx. And above this ridge, new peaks will arise.[120]

In part at least, this soaring vision is an expression of that dangerous messianism I described earlier. Yet, if one understands it as the statement of a limit toward which mankind strives but perhaps will never reach, it serves to free the mind from the narrowness of the present. The human body has been changing under capitalism: in the United States, Selective Service exams show that height is on the increase in the twentieth century; and, of course, athletic records, and presumably biological prowess, have been dramatically extended. A higher living standard, with good diet and medical care, certainly can make people more beautiful, as the rich discovered a long time ago. In the realm of intelligence there are no comparative statistics but the qualitative growth in the number of scientists, and educated people generally, must mean that some of man's genetic potential has been saved from the savage fate scarcity and starvation used to visit upon it.

We may well be on the eve of psychic mutations. Our unprecedented, man-made environments produce new kinds of people. The question is not whether this will happen but how it will take place: under commercial priorities (Marcuse's pessimistic vision); under totalitarian control (Orwell's fear); or consciously chosen and shaped by a free political and social movement.

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Men Freed of the Curse of Money

THE END OF COMPULSORY LABOR is one socialist ultimate; the abolition of money is another.

As many economists have recognized, money is the basis of a system of "rationing by the purse." In a society of maldistributed incomes it is obviously unjust that an elite should enjoy luxuries while a mass are denied necessities. Long before the socialist movement will even be in sight of its final aims, it can ameliorate this outrage by the redistribution of income, for then the rations will at least be more justly shared. But this reform might even be assimilated to an Adam Smithian model of the economy. As Paul Samuelson remarks, Smith would now agree that dollar wealth has to be distributed "in an 'ethically optimal' manner—and kept so by non-distorting, nonmarket intervention" in order to get the most efficient production and "to give people what they really deem is best for them." [121]

Socialists should propose to go well beyond such a change and eventually to challenge the principle of money itself. In a discussion of property which produces unearned income John Strachey argued that, given such a phenomenon, "a moral poison is bound to permeate the society." [122] And as long as access to goods and pleasures is rationed according to the possession of money, there is a pervasive venality, an invitation to miserliness and hostility to one's neighbor. Particularly in the area of necessities no one should be required to choose between needs or to sacrifice them in order to get luxuries—and that is what money makes inevitable.

Socialism should therefore work toward making more and more goods and services free: medicine, housing, transportation, a healthy diet, etc. The standard response of many economists to such a proposition is that cliché of Economics One: nothing is really free. All commodities cost something to produce and if the individual does not pay for them directly, then some one does indirectly. But this is to miss the enormous social gain that would occur if society were to make all the fundamentals of life free. There would, surely, be a collective payment for these goods but the change in moral atmosphere created by such a new mode of distribution would be profound.

The other standard criticism of free goods is the charge that they invite waste. People, one is told, will lavishly misuse their new rights, and a socialist society will therefore be the least efficient in human history. That prediction is partly based on the parochial assumption that man will act in a radically new environment exactly as he did in the old, that the greed and acquisitiveness of several hundred years of capitalism are of the human essence. It is not even necessary to become particularly visionary in responding to this, for the theory and practice of recent years has provided a basis for the socialist hope.

In his famous essay on the economics of socialism, Oskar Lange argued that those goods and services for which demand is relatively inelastic can be made free without running the risk of wastefulness. Salt is a classic example. The amount of it consumed in good times or in bad is relatively invariant. If it were made free it is doubtful that individuals would suddenly and vastly increase their use of it. Similarly with transportation within a city. If that were made free, there would unquestionably be a large increase in the use

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of transit facilities, since people would be much more likely to visit one another, to go on outings, etc. Yet who can say that such an increase in sociability and recreation is "wasteful"? And who would want to ride a subway simply because it is free?

There is some experience to go on. In California there is a private medical plan run by the Kaiser company. It has succeeded in sharply reducing the cost of care while improving the service. According to the thesis about the inherent greediness of men, the people who subscribe should use their rights more than the citizen who pays a higher cost. In fact, the Kaiser patients go to the doctor less than do the patients of expensive fee-for-service systems. As an article in *Fortune* put it, "Kaiser's experience refutes the widely held belief that if medical services are 'free,' or virtually free, the public will stampede to them." [123]

SOCIALISM, THEN, IS NOT SIMPLY A PROGRAM for socializing investments and ownership and redistributing wealth, important as all those goals are. It retains the notion of a truly new order of things and it asserts this through the vision of seeking, in the distant but conceivable future, to abolish compulsory work and the rationing system of money as far as is humanly possible. Perhaps I can sum up this vision by retelling a famous socialist parable.

In desert societies—including the American Southwest—water is so precious that it is money. People fight and die and connive over it; governments covet it; marriages are made and broken because of it. If one had talked to a person who had only known that desert and told him that in the city there are public water fountains and that children are even sometimes allowed to turn on the fire hydrants in the summer and to frolic in the water, he would be sure that you were crazy. For he knows, with an existential certitude, that it is human nature to fight over water.

Mankind has lived now for several millennia in the desert. Our minds and emotions are conditioned by that bitter experience; we do not dare to think that things could be otherwise. Yet there are signs that we are, without really having planned it that way, marching out of the desert. There are some who loathe to leave behind the consolation of familiar brutalities; there are others who, in one way or another, would like to impose the law of the desert upon the Promised Land. It may even be possible that mankind cannot bear too much happiness.

It is also possible that we will seize this opportunity and make of the earth a homeland rather than an exile. That is the socialist project. It does not promise or even seek to abolish the human condition. That is impossible. It does propose to end that invidious competition and venality which, because scarcity allowed no other alternatives, we have come to think are inseparable from our humanity.

Under socialism there will be no end to history—but there may be a new history.

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Notes

a SOCIALISM is one of the most abused words of the modern age. Yet the various definitions of the term are not simply the result of intellectual "mistakes" but reflect attempts to adapt the emotional and rhetorical resonance of the word to specific historical conditions and, often enough, to an antisocialist purpose.

Punning confusion into the very name of his ideal commonwealth, Thomas More had Utopia mean both "no place" and "good place." This prophetic joke is referred to in an introductory poem. (See *Utopia,* Penguin Classics edition [Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965], p. 29.) In 1845, Friedrich Engels complained that the socialism of many Germans on the Left was "vague, undefined, and undefinable." (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Werke* [Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1960–], 2:519. All quotations from Marx and Engels, unless otherwise noted, are taken from this East German edition of their works and cited from here on as *MEW.*) Throughout the nineteenth century, some of those calling themselves socialists wanted to destroy the state and transfer all political functions to work groups, while others used the same word defining proposals to make the state the main agency of social transformation. In the twentieth century, socialism has been used to define politics that would emancipate man—but also politics that would enslave him. Trotsky said that in the new society the average citizen would be an Aristotle, a Goethe, a Marx—but the English Fabian Sidney Webb was content to foresee a "discretely regulated freedom." (Margaret Cole, *The Story of Fabian Socialism* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961], p. 148.) Stalin wiped out an entire generation of Marxist revolutionaries, erected a totalitarian state, and called it "socialist"; Clement Attlee and the British Labour party enacted sweeping social reforms within the framework of a parliamentary monarchy.

It is important to understand why so many politicians, some conservative and others even fascist, co-opted the socialist vocabulary and aspects of the socialist program. In *The Communist Manifesto* Marx and Engels anticipated this development. Already, they noted, feudalists, shopkeepers, preachers, and the bourgeoisie itself used socialist rhetoric to conceal antisocialist purposes. This concept of an antisocialist "socialism" is, I would suggest, a key to an understanding of some of the most important events in recent history, particularly of sophisticated conservatism in the capitalist West and Communist totalitarianism in the East. For both of these very important trends are part of the history of antisocialist "socialism" which the *Manifesto* began to chronicle in 1848.

In 1878 Bismarck outlawed any organization that even advocated socialism. By 1882 he could tell the Reichstag, "Many of the measures that we have adopted for the welfare of the land are socialistic, and the state must introduce even more socialism into our Reich. . . ." (Hans Müller, *Ursprung und Geschichte des Wortes "Sozialismus"* [Hanover, Germany: Dietz Verlag, 1967], p. 137.) Indeed, Bismarck's various social insurance programs led Karl Kautsky to describe a new phenomenon: "state socialism." (*Die Neue Zeit,* 10, no. 49 [1891–92]: 705 ff.) It was actually a form of antisocialism in which the capitalist state intervened in economic affairs in order to shore up the existing order. Engels, though at first dubious about Kautsky's term, later applied it to France in criticism of Jean Jaurès for supporting the nationalization of grain imports. (*MEW,* 36:88.) Later, Rudolf Hilferding, the distinguished Austrian Marxist economist, was to use this concept in his analysis of finance capital and its tendencies toward conservative planning.

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Perhaps the most monstrous perversion of the word "socialism" was perpetrated by the Nazis, whose name was an acronym for the National Socialist German Workers' party. As Gregor Strasser the "left-wing" Nazi said in 1932, Hitler was responding to the "anticapitalist yearning" of the overwhelming majority of the people.

Confusion as to the meaning of socialism is to be found on the Left as well as the Right. In the late fifties and early sixties most of the European social democrats redefined their aims. This was done not out of temerity or laziness but because they felt that the experience of socialists in government failed to corroborate the classic Marxist texts. In 1960 the Swedes saw socialism as compatible with a pledge "to stimulate private investments in fields where it shows that it can combine efficiency and progressive thinking with responsibility toward the consumers, the employees and the community." (Douglas Jay, *Socialism and the New Society* [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963], p. 148.) In 1965, in formulations that must have grated on traditional socialist sensibilities, a group of French Left intellectuals argued that socialists had to abolish "the myth of the public appropriation of the means of production" and to "rehabilitate" the market economy. But it was a group of radical priests in France who were most candid. At a 1969 conference they decided that they must take "the road of an ever more authentic socialism." Then, as the *New York Times* reported the incident, "Asked to define terms, a spokesman replied that [the word] socialism in French is rather vague."

Why, then, bother with definition at all? That was the feeling of some young radicals in the sixties. They were tired of the Talmudic distinctions and the glosses on Marxist scripture; they wanted, as the title of one collection put it, to go "Beyond Left and Right." Yet the leading themes advanced by such young radicals—the conflict between revolutionary technology and conservative society, the need for comprehensive planning—were the very ones that socialists had identified more than a century ago. Nor is there much doubt that the central contradiction of capitalist society as it has been described by socialists—the clash between forces of production more and more social in character and modes of investment and appropriation that remain private—is basic to the contemporary crisis. I do not mean to suggest that there is a Platonic essence of socialism that can serve as a panacea for all problems. For one thing, all of those "mistaken" interpretations of socialism, the vicious as well as the benevolent, make some *historical* sense. Each was not so much an error in thought as a response to two of the most basic trends of the age: (1) the way in which large-scale technology was accomplishing a de facto collectivization of the economy; (2) the fact that hundreds of millions dreamed that this revolutionary process could be made the servant, rather than the master, of man. Left, Right, and Center, there were politicians who sought to put these tendencies to their own uses and employed a "socialist" rhetoric to do it.

Part of the confusion about what socialism means derives not from cynical manipulations of the term, but from the richness of its tradition. In *The Future of Socialism* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), Anthony Crosland describes the extraordinary range of socialist doctrines:

The natural-law argument; the Owenite stress on cooperation as against competition; the theory that the workers as the source of economic value have the right to its rewards; Christian socialism; the thesis put forward by John Stuart Mill and Henry George that rent represents unearned income and therefore should belong to the society as a whole; aesthetic socialism as in the anti-commercialism of William Morris; Fabianism with its overly-optimistic assumption that all acts

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of collectivism are a step toward the good society; the Independent Labour party heritage of an emotional identification with the "bottom dog"; welfare statism as a variety of socialism; the proposal that unions or guilds, rather than the state, control production (syndicalism and Guild socialism); the advocacy of national planning as an equivalent to socialism. (*Ibid.* pp. 81–88.)

Socialism, Crosland concludes, "is not an exact descriptive term, connoting a particular social structure, past, present, or even imminent in some sage's mind, which can be empirically observed or analyzed. It simply describes a set of values, or aspirations, which socialists wish to see embodied in the organization of society." (*Ibid,* p. 216.)

But if Crosland is right and socialism is whatever socialists happen to say it is, a fundamental problem remains. How does one then separate authentic democratic socialism from the antisocialist "socialisms"? For if each use of the word, even the most monstrous, has had a historical function, then the term may be so relative as to be meaningless. Karl Marx's resolution of this difficulty is one of the main reasons he is the greatest of all socialist thinkers. He provided not a final answer but a realistic method of analysis in which the word takes its meaning from the living texture of history. The dream of the New Jerusalem, Marx argued, must be subjected to empirical tests. First of all, the good society can be reached only when technology is so developed and all-sided that it can abolish poverty (otherwise we would only socialize hunger and need, which in turn would produce hunger and need, not justice). Second, this potential can be realized only if there is a political movement of conscious and aroused men and women capable of controlling that technology.

Socialism is thus defined not simply as a dream or an ideal but as that social order which can fulfill the needs of people struggling to master their environment at a specific point in history. It is the mark of the antisocialist "socialisms" that, despite their promises, they serve the purposes of various elites; it is the sign of socialism that it is a democratic mass movement deciding, and working to fulfill, its own aims.

b HAROLD MACMILLAN WAS ONE of the first conservatives to come out in favor of planning—and was called a "socialist in disguise." (See his book *Winds of Change, 1914–1918* [New York: Harper & Row, 1966], p. 232.) Labour MP David Marquand believes it is "arguable" that in England in the thirties conservatives like Macmillan did more than the socialists to popularize the idea of economic planning. (David Marquand, "The Politics of Deprivation," *Encounter,* April 1969.)

Perhaps the most surprising recent addition to this tradition is the late President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

In the May 1968 issue of *Reader's Digest,* in an article entitled "To Insure Domestic Tranquility," Mr. Eisenhower came out for relocating masses of people

> in new, more wholesome communities. These new towns would have their own schools, shops, clinics and hospitals, their own light industry and recreational facilities. For those who did not find employment locally, swift mass transportation should be created to take them to jobs in the cities. Needless to say, these new areas must not become just added enclaves of segregation. They must be open and made inviting to people of all races.

The title of this article—"To Insure Domestic Tranquility"—is revealing. For Eisenhower, as for the conservative advocates of planning and state intervention before him, was fearful that the unsolved problems of the society would become so explosive as to threaten the public order—and private property—with violence.

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c IN MARX'S "PURE MODEL" of the trends of capitalism, the system is fundamentally unplanned. "The essence of bourgeois society," he wrote to Ludwig Kugelman in 1868, "is exactly that there is no *a priori* conscious, social regulation of production. The rational and natural necessity thus appears as a blind average." (*MEW*, 32:553.) Yet when Marx, in the third volume of *Das Kapital*, related his abstract analysis to the eccentricities and contradictions of the actual world, he was quite conscious that there was planning under capitalism. He regarded it, however, as a brief transition period that heralded the coming of socialism. For Marx, the joint stock company which separated management from ownership was a kind of collectivization within capitalism and introduced new elements of rationality into the capitalist process. It was, he wrote, "the highest development of capitalism . . . a necessary transition stage for the transformation of capitalist property into the property of the producers. . . ." (*MEW*, 25:453.)

When Engels published the third volume of *Das Kapital* after Marx's death, he added a lengthy comment to the discussion on the joint stock company. The tendency Marx had described he said, had been "raised to the second or third power" and now involved nothing less than the "regulation of production." (*MEW*, 25:453–54.) Eventually, he thought, this rationalizing trend would lead to single-firm industries. And, in notes added to a later edition of *Anti-Dühring*, Engels interpreted this evolution in a polemical way:

> In the trusts, free competition is transformed into monopoly and the unplanned production of capitalist society capitulates before the planned production of the emergent socialist society. But at this point the process takes place only for the profit and enjoyment of the capitalists. Yet such exploitation is so obvious that it must collapse. No people will allow the trusts to be the property of a little band of coupon clippers who direct production and engage in the naked exploitation of everything. [*MEW*, 30:617.]

Meanwhile, as indicated in Note a Karl Kautsky was responding to the political aspect of this process and to Bismarck's social insurance programs in particular. That led to the theory of "state socialism," which Kautsky worked out in the 1880s and 1890s, i.e. the tendency of capitalist governments to intervene in the economy and even to nationalize certain industries on behalf of preserving the status quo. This concept of "state socialism" was popularized in the American socialist movement by Louis Boudin (*The Theoretical System of Karl Marx* [Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1915], pp. 209 ff.), and by William English Walling (*Socialism as It Is* [New York: Macmillan, 1912], a book-length analysis). After the government had played such an important directing role in the economy during World War I, this concept became even more widespread.

Perhaps the most sophisticated exposition of this theme is Rudolf Hilferding's analysis of finance capital in 1909 (*Das Finanz Kapital* [Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1947]). "The characteristic of 'modern capitalism,'" he wrote, "is based on the tendency toward the concentration of industry which, on the one hand, expresses itself in the 'abolition of free competition' through the formation of trusts and cartels and, on the other, by the ever closer relationship between bank and industrial capital." (*Ibid.*, p. xiii.) Hilferding was quite explicit about the ability of a modified capitalist society to plan: "The question arises as to the limits of cartelization. There are none. The whole of capitalist production could be consciously regulated by a center that determines the size of production in all of its spheres. . . . There is a consciously regulated society in antagonistic form." (*Ibid.*, pp. 318 ff.) That last phrase is a brilliant and prescient summary of what Nixon, Macmillan, and the other "conservative collectivists" want: a "consciously regulated society" (*planning*) "in antagonistc form" (*the continuing domination of private interests even in the public intervention*).

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The emergence of a rationalized capitalism was subjected to different interpretations by the left and right wings of the socialist movement. Eduard Bernstein, in *Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1923; originally published in 1899), argued that this development made a peaceful evolution possible. But Lenin and Bukharin held that the trustification of the various national capitalisms would only make the international competition among them all the more bitter. In this perspective, "rationality" would lead to sharpened imperialist hostility and to war. Bukharin, incidentally, used Kautsky's theory of "state socialism" to define a form of capitalist exploitation in the course of his analysis. (Nikolai Bukharin, *Imperialism and the World Economy* [London: Martin Lawrence, n. d.], p. 165.)

If the notion of planned capitalism was not a shock to the Marxists, the idea that it would be more than a passing phase was. They assumed that if planning were to be stable, it must be Marxist. "The anticipation of regularity," the Bolshevik economist E. Preobrazhenski wrote shortly after the Soviet state was formed, "constitutes the first characteristic of the new socialist production, distinguishing it from the old. . . ." (*The New Economics* [Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1965], p. 54.)

After World War II it became clear that capitalist planning was not just a presocialist episode, which gave rise to an ingenious if paradoxical theory developed by the Belgian Trotskyist Ernest Mandel. (*Traité d'Économie Marxiste* [Paris: Julliard, 1962], 2:178–98). Capitalist planning, Mandel holds, is a sign of the *decline* of the system. For even though corporations engage in long-term programming and accept government policies which put a floor under effective demand, the capitalists cannot accept subsidies to mass consumption on a large scale. Those would reduce the rate of profit. Moreover, the various reforms acceptable to business tend to educate the workers to become concerned with the economy as a whole and to struggle for a better division between profits and wages. This analysis underestimates the resourcefulness and adaptability of sophisticated corporations. Yet I think it does identify one crucial problem of the system: that even though capitalism has learned (and usually rebellious workers have been its teachers) that its self-interest lies in maintaining minimal levels of consumption, it is by no means prepared to spend the billions required to deal with the profound crises that are a by-product of affluence.

I have sketched out the history of the socialist theory of capitalist planning because it is relevant to the definition of socialism itself. In his analysis of "state socialism" Engels remarked that the Marxists had undoubtedly overemphasized the *laissez faire* aspects of capitalism and thereby caused some socialists to think that any act of state intervention, or nationalization, was socialistic. (*MEW*, 35: 323–24.) The confusion persists to this day. On the one hand, the apologists for Communist totalitarianism have made much of the argument that Russia and the other Communist states must be truly socialist since the means of production are nationalized. On the other hand, alarmed conservatives and complacent liberals in the countries of advanced capitalism have assumed that government action is necessarily a step toward a new society.

But the evidence of more than half a century corroborates Kautsky's basic insight of an antisocialist potential in state intervention and even in the nationalization of industry. Under Communism, the publicly owned means of production are in the service of a bureaucratic elite with class privileges; under capitalism the welfare state has a built-in tendency to take much better care of the rich than of the poor.

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d R. H. S. CROSSMAN HAS IDENTIFIED this Galbraithian contrast between private affluence and public squalor as the "inherent contradiction" of modern capitalism. As the "individual grows rapidly more comfortable, the community becomes ever more rapidly weaker and weaker. . . . The price which the modern, managed capitalism pays for avoiding the old crisis of mass unemployment is the continuous sacrifice of public service, community welfare and national security to private profit." (R. H. S. Crossman, *The Politics of Socialism* [New York: Atheneum, 1965], p. 110.)

I think that this is one of the contradictions of capitalism, not the only one, and Crossman's thesis has to be amended to note that sophisticated corporate policy does increase the amount of social spending—but not in proportion to the public crises it engenders. In any case, this is a very important aspect of the capitalist reality.

e ONE OF THE MOST profound passages in all of Marx's writings is the discussion of how systems of "rights," even those based on equality, are fundamentally anti-egalitarian. In his comments on the Gotha Program he imagined a society in which there is no exploiting class and all workers are paid according to their labor.

> Despite such an advance [Marx wrote] right is still marked with bourgeois limitations. The right of the producer is *proportional* to what he produces . . . . But supposing one worker is physically or intellectually superior to another and accomplishes more in the same period of time or can work more hours. For labor to serve as a measure of wages it must take the intensity, or duration, of work into account. Equal right is then unequal right for unequal work. There is no class difference since both men are workers, but the unequal individual gifts and accomplishments are tacitly recognized as natural privileges. It is therefore a right of inequality like all other rights. Right can, by its nature, only develop through the application of uniform norms; but unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) are only measurable by a single standard which subsumes them under the same point of view and considers them from one *specific* aspect, e.g. in a given instance considers them *only as workers,* abstracting from all else. Further, one worker is married, another is not; one has more children than the other. With equal work and equal participation in the social consumption funds, the one actually receives more than the other. To avoid these abuses, rights must be unequal, not equal.
>
> "But these abuses are unavoidable in the first phase of communist society as it comes out of capitalism after long labor pains. Right can never be higher than the economic level (*Gestaltung*) and the cultural development of society which determine it.
>
> Later, in a higher phase of communist society, after the slavish subordination of the individual and the contradiction between spiritual and manual work has disappeared; after work has ceased to be the means of life and has become the first need of life; after the all-sided development of the individual and his productivity has been roused and when the springs of social wealth flow, only then can society really go beyond the narrow bourgeois vision and inscribe on its banner: from each according to his talents, to each according to his needs. [*MEW,* 19:21.]

f THE NOTION THAT there is a social "profit" which is distinguished from private profit can be found in Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations.* Smith saw three areas in which the state should intervene: to guard against invasion; to keep domestic peace;

> and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; *because the profit could never repay the expense of any individual or small number of individuals, though it may fre-*

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quently do much more than repay it to a great society. [Emphasis added.—Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (New York: Modern Library, 1937), p 681.]

Smith and his followers regarded such governmental action as an exceptional case in an economy that would primarily operate on *laissez faire* principles. Even in recent economic literature, the conscious maximizing of welfare is still considered an exception to the rule. But socialists would now argue that the Smithian proportions have to be reversed since the private economy no longer finds it profitable to meet some of the most basic needs of the society. In advocating a vast extension of the social principle in economics, we should pay tribute to Adam Smith for having recognized the principle of social profitability in a great society.

A socialist formulation of this principle would be along the lines of Jean Jaurès' 1896 analysis in the *Revue Socialiste.* (*Oeuvres*, 3:373 ff.) "In the socialist order," he wrote, "profit having disappeared, it will hardly be necessary, in order to undertake an enterprise, that it be able to run at a profit. It will be enough that it is useful and adds, no matter how little, to social wealth." (*Ibid.*, p. 398.) But does this mean that socialists have no way of determining how to allocate scarce resources, and that all decisions are to be made by fiat?

Under contemporary capitalism, it is assumed that private corporations, by responding to the demands of individual consumers, will channel investments into those projects that actually satisfy popular taste. But this supposedly free choice is, as I demonstrated in the discussion of external diseconomies, quite often engineered by advertising and in some of the most important areas of life—such as the care, maintenance, and creation of cities—and so does not provide tolerable options for the majority of the people. One of the reasons for this state of affairs is that profitability is defined in private, nonsocial terms so that, for instance, the housing of the rich is rebuilt in every generation while slums fester. In a socialist society, the yield on an investment would be calculated so that actual cost would be known but there would be no automatic assumption that the use guaranteeing the highest return would receive priority. For social reasons, as Jaurès suggested, the people could decide in favor of a project with a low return, or even subsidize a loss. It was with these considerations in mind that Leon Trotsky made a sharp attack on the centralized, fiat planning in the Soviet Union of the early thirties, and insisted that there must be

> a sound ruble if socialism is to be built. . . . If there were a universal brain described by the intellectual fantasy of Laplace, a brain could simultaneously register all the processes of nature and society . . . such a brain could obviously construct *a priori* an economic plan which would be definitive and faultless, starting with the calculation of how many hectares of fodder should be planted for livestock, and ending with the buttons on a vest. In truth the bureaucracy often thinks it is such a brain. [Leon Trotsky, *Écrits* (Paris: Librairie Marcel Rivière, 1955), 1:125–26.]

Trotsky and Kautsky understood this point in a general way, but it was Oskar Lange and A. P. Lerner who, in the thirties, and in response to an attack by the conservative economist Ludwig von Mises, defined the notion of using market criteria and interest rates *within* the context of a socialist plan. In Lange's model, a Central Planning Board would require all managers to follow certain rules: that the costs of production be minimized; that output be fixed so that marginal cost equals the price of the product; that all prices be treated as if they were independent of a planning decision. If resources were misallocated under such procedure, that fact would become obvious when there were either surpluses or shortages and it could then be empirically corrected. (Oskar Lange and Fred M. Taylor, *On the Economic Theory of Socialism*, Benjamin Lippincott, ed. [New York: McGraw Hill, 1964], pp. 59 ff.) Lange, and all the other theorists who

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discussed this point in the thirties, acknowledged that the Italian economist Enrico Barone had worked out the basic theoretical problem as early as 1908. (Barone's "Il Ministro della Produzione nello Stato Collectivista" is translated and included in *Collectivist Economic Planning*, F. A. von Hayek, ed. [London: Routledge, 1935].) The history of the debate is summarized by Joseph Schumpeter (in *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* [New York: Harper 1950], pp. 172 ff).

How, then, does such an approach differ from the rules that capitalism, in theory at least, is supposed to follow? Lange emphasized two important contrasts. The maldistribution of income in capitalist society is such that, by letting every citizen cast a dollar ballot in a "consumer democracy," the economy responds to the desires of the rich—who have more dollar "votes" than anyone else—rather than to those of the poor. In such a system, prices do "not reflect the relative urgency of the demands of different people." (*Ibid.* p. 100.) And under socialism, prices would be comprehensive, i.e. take social as well as private costs into account.

A. P. Lerner's analysis converged with Lange's but added a crucial point. These economic theories, Lerner said, would only apply where there was political democracy. "State control or ownership of the means of production where the state is not thoroughly democratic is not socialism and is much further removed from socialism than . . . capitalism." (A. P. Lerner, *The Economics of Control* [New York: Macmillan, 1946], p. vii.)

After World War II, this issue became a very practical question in the bureaucratic collectivist societies of the Communist world. And even though these societies are antisocialist, their experience does have some bearing on the future. The intellectual realization in Russia and the Soviet Union that fiat planning is wasteful—that Trotsky's 1931 criticism was quite right—applies even more to a democratic socialist society than to totalitarianism. Where there is political democracy, economic dictatorship will be even more intolerable than it is under a one-party Communist regime. Conversely, where the demand for loosening up dictatorial economic control arises—as it did in Czechoslovakia in 1968—it is almost inevitably accompanied by an insistence upon political freedom. It was this last fact, and not a quarrel over price theory or the role of the market, that led the Soviets to make their imperialist invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Finally, there is an irony that should be recorded in this intellectual history of the market under socialism. Shortly before his death Oskar Lange modified, and almost repudiated, his thesis arguing in effect that computers had provided the universal brain Trotsky had derided. (Oskar Lange, "The Computer and the Market," in *Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth*, C. H. Feinstein, ed. [Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1967], pp. 158 ff.) The new information technology, he held, made it possible for the planners to solve hundreds of thousands of equations and to relate them to each other, and therefore the indirection of using market prices was no longer required. Lange's retrospect was, I think, unfair to his earlier analysis. For as he recalled his own theory it had but one element—that trial and error would lead to the fixing of prices by correcting surpluses and deficits over a period of time. There was, however, another important component to his point of view: the role of prices in determining the alternate uses of limited resources, and this remains a complicated question of politics and value judgment which cannot be left to machines.

g AMBIGUITIES ABOUT THE MEANING of socialism go back to the very origins of the movement. In one interpretation of socialist history, centralizers with an emphasis on state planning are counterposed to decentralists with a vision of

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cooperative production and workers' control. Saint-Simon, Marx, Lassalle, and Lenin are put on the statist side; Fourier, Proudhon, Bakunin, and the Guild socialists on the other. But even this dichotomy is much too simple. For there were ambiguities within ambiguities when it came to imagining the just society of the future.

Saint-Simon and his followers have been justly charged with trying to organize a "church of the engineers." (The phrase comes from C. Bouglie and E. Halévy, editors of a 1924 edition of the *Doctrine de Saint-Simon; Exposition, Première Année, 1829* [Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1924]). The Saint-Simonians emphasized rational and centralized planning of investment through a central bank and objected to capitalism because it allowed parasitic coupon-clippers to share in the wealth of the producers. (*Ibid.*, pp. 239, 271–72.) Therefore, they ingeniously proposed to cut off inheritance after the third generation, arguing that the present heirs would be so greedy that they would not object to the expropriation of their grandchildren's wealth. (*Ibid.*, p. 53.) Given this technocratic emphasis, it comes as no surprise that the Saint-Simonians were not particularly concerned with democracy. Saint-Simon himself tried to convince both Napoleon and Louis XVIII of his ideas and, after his death in 1825, his followers sought to influence Louis Philippe when he came to power as a result of the Revolution of 1830.

Yet, even with this background, the Saint-Simonians were not simply the progenitors of planned and centralized socialism. For Saint-Simon's followers managed to reach a sympathetic working-class audience during the period of Louis Philippe, and it was in one of their publications that the word "socialism" was used for one of the first times in France. (George Lichtheim, *The Origins of Socialism* [New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969], p. 43.) Moreover, a key Saint-Simonian term was "association," a word that conjured up a vision of producers in a decentralized workshop taking charge of their own destiny. (For a discussion of the term, see Bouglie's and Halévy's comments in *Doctrine de Saint-Simon*, p. 203, n. 91.) Whatever Saint-Simon himself intended to say, his message was interpreted in history by men and women who often redefined it according to their own needs.

Proudhon is often thought of as the very antithesis of Saint-Simon. For Proudhon common ownership would simply "substitute collective man for the individual in social functions, in production, exchange, and the family," and he advocated "a system of free credit that would make a decentralized economy possible." ("Misère de la Philosophie," in Proudhon, *Marx: Misère de la Philosophie; Philosophie de la Misère* [Paris: Collections 1018, 1964], pp. 259–60. For an analysis of Proudhon's positive proposal, see Lichtheim, *Origins of Socialism*, p. 97.) Yet the Proudhonesque notion of financial state support for cooperatives was also urged by Louis Blanc—author of the formula, "From each according to his talents, to each according to his needs"—who is usually placed in the statist tradition. Lassalle, who was even more distant from Proudhon's intentions, was prepared to use the Prussian state in order to get assistance for workers' cooperatives. (See G. D. H. Cole, *History of Socialist Thought*, 5 vols. [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953–65], 2:72 ff., "Marxism and Anarchism.")

In the debates within the International Workingmen's Association—the First International of the 1860s—Marx was engaged in a struggle with Bakunin and the followers of Proudhon, and once again the counterposition seems clear: centralism versus decentralism. The debate over nationalization of industry began at the Lausanne Congress in 1867, which voted for public ownership of transportation and the banks, but not of the land. At the Brussels Congress in 1868, the Proudhonists were defeated and the assembly voted for the collectiviza-

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tion of the land, the mines, the railroads, and the communications system, and they held that the working class should "possess" the machines in producers' cooperatives which would receive "gratuitous credit." In short, the Proudhonists lost, but their most distinctive single idea was adopted by the entire Congress. (See Cole, *History of Social Thought*, 2:126.)

It is important to understand how decentralist the emotions of the centralizers were in the International. As Cole put it, "It was not state ownership or control of industry for which the Congress declared, but cooperative ownership on a basis of decentralization, or rather localization." (*Ibid.*, 2:126.) And this ambiguity can be found in the work of the greatest of the centralists, Karl Marx. For though Marx clearly opposed the utopias based on small groups of producers and a backward technology, though he quite rightly understood that the hope for socialism lay in the working class winning control over the highly centralized means of capitalist production, in his ultimate image of socialism he had much in common with his factional opponents. He believed, after all, that the state would become unnecessary and "wither away." And, in one of his most mature and specific statements about the socialist future, in the third volume of *Das Kapital*, he spoke of how the "associated producers" would assert their "community control" (*gemeinschaftliche Kontrolle*) over the economy, i.e. he spoke in the language of Fourier and Proudhon. (*MEW*, 25:828. This remarkable text will be discussed at length later on.)

The decisive resolution of this ambiguity waited upon the development of the German Social Democratic party before World War I. Originally, when the Marxist and Lassallian wings united at Gotha, the party advocated "producers' cooperatives built with state aid and under the democratic control of the working people." In Marx's famous critique of the Gotha Program he called the idea "worthy of Lassalle's fancy that one can build a new society with a government loan, just like a new railroad." (*MEW*, 19:26.) The establishment of the conditions for cooperative production, Marx thundered, had to do with a revolution in the present mode of production and not with the founding of cooperatives through government aid. (*Ibid.*, p. 27.) In time, the Marxists became dominant in the SPD and the Lassallian formulation was dropped.

So by the 1890s the German socialists had essentially rejected the formulations made by the First International at the end of the 1860s. In his popular discussion of the Erfurt Program, Karl Kautsky argued that cooperatives would be subject to failure, crisis, and bankruptcy, and would end by pitting the successful collectives against the unsuccessful ones. When the means of production were still relatively on a small scale at the beginning of the nineteenth century, he said, the notions of phalansteries and socialist colonies made a certain sense, at least as a product of their time. But now that the economy had become so interrelated and huge, "There is only one social organization that has the necessary scale so that it can be used as a framework within which socialist cooperation can develop, and that is the modern state." (Karl Kautsky, *Das Erfurter Programm* [Stuttgart, Germany: Dietz Verlag, 1892], p. 119.)

Strangely enough, it was the right wing of German socialism—the revisionists under the leadership of Eduard Bernstein—who insisted on the continued relevance of cooperatives. In a shrewd assessment of the fact that the class polarization predicted by Marx had not taken place, Bernstein argued that there was no imminent proletarian majority. Given this situation, he continued, it was wrong to advocate that the state take over the big factories, if only because the socialists are not, in any case, going to be able to take over the state. In this context, the cooperatives would provide a possibility for the growth of new forms

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of social property within the old society and might hasten, even signal, the coming of the new order. (Eduard Bernstein, *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus,* 3rd ed. [Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1923], pp. 141 ff.) But if Bernstein often had a sharper eye for the actual evolution of society than his "orthodox" opponents, he was hopelessly optimistic in his assessment of the cooperatives' potential. (He had lived for a time as an exile in England where they played a relatively important role, though even there they never fulfilled the promise he assigned to them.)

In France, Jean Jaurès, one of the most appealing and unsectarian leaders in the history of French socialism, reached conclusions similar to those of Kautsky and anticipating those of Otto Bauer. "If socialism consists in extending the regime of state industry and administration to private industry," Jaurès wrote, "I would be the adversary of socialism . . . the socialist regime is the exact contrary of the present state industries. For the current state is nothing but a boss like other bosses." (Quoted by Georges Lefranc Aubier, in *Jaurès et le Socialisme des Intellectuels* [Paris: Augier-Montaigne, 1968], p. 30.)

Jaurès, as Otto Bauer after him, proposed to have elected representatives of the workers in an industry as well as representatives of the state and the consumers on the council that would direct such enterprises for the nation. (*Ibid.,* 3:353.) One would expect such a response from a socialist leader in a nation that has as strong a syndicalist tradition as France. If he could not (rightly, I think) accept the syndicalist cry of "the mines to the miners," he could at least try to guard against the obvious bureaucratic evils of state administration.

Strangely enough, it was in England—where the labor movement, to the disgust of some of the continental Marxists, had always been untheoretical and reformist—that the old decentralist image of socialism flourished right before and just after the First World War. In the period before 1914 there was a surge of syndicalist militancy among the workers. The Guild socialists received an intellectual impetus from this development and, after the War, put forward plans for industrial self-government and a national legislature of the producers. (Cole, *History of Socialist Thought,* 3:222 ff., "The Second International.") But when the Attlee government nationalized industry in 1945, there were no provisions for workers' control.

Do all these ambiguities and complexities of definition mean that there is no usable tradition with regard to how socialism will work? I think not. For every one of these contrasting, even contradictory versions of socialism bespeak an aspect of a many-sided reality. There are two fundamental socialist aims: to solve the basic economic problems of humanity and to liberate man. By and large the first goal is possible only on the basis of a highly developed, concentrated technology and with national planning. The second goal cannot be achieved unless the spirit of the "associationist," cooperative wing of the socialist movement finds new embodiment. If Marx, the greatest of the socialist thinkers, did not resolve this ambiguity, it was because it can only be transcended in practice—through painstaking, undogmatic innovation.

h THE COMMUNIST DEBATE OVER MOTIVATION, though conducted in a Marxist vocabulary, has taken place within a context Marx would have seen as making the emergence of a socialist psychology impossible. We must keep this clearly in mind when Che Guevara, one of the most determined opponents of material incentives within the Communist camp, says: "We do not deny the objective need for material incentives but we are certainly unwilling to use them as a fundamental driving force. We believe that, in economics, this kind of a force quickly

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becomes an end in itself and then exercises its power over relationships among men. (*Vinceremos! The Speeches and Writings of Che Guevara,* John Gerassi, ed. [New York: Macmillan, 1968], p. 341.)

The argument over this issue has supplied the Sino-Soviet dispute with many charges and countercharges. The Chinese argued that the Russians had actually retreated from socialism to capitalism.

But even in the Czechoslovakian spring of 1968, when portions of a Communist party began to move away from totalitarianism and on to search for "the human face" of socialism, the problem of motivation was important. The Action Program of the Dubcek leadership held that overegalitarianism

> has become one of the chief obstacles of intensive economic development and the improvement of living standards. The harmfulness of egalitarianism lies in the fact that it works to the advantage of idlers, loafers and irresponsible workers, and against sacrificing and hard-working individuals; that it works to the advantage of the unskilled against the skilled; that it works to the advantage of the technically and professionally obsolete as against the talented and those who take initiative. [*Action Program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, April 5, 1968.* I am indebted to Erazim Kohák for the translation.]

But is that not precisely what an old-fashioned free enterpriser would think? Here again the economic context is central. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the most economically developed nation in which the Communists ever seized power, economic troubles are due not so much to scarcity per se as to the tremendous shortages and inefficiency the Stalinist model of central, fiat planning had visited upon the society. Just as in more impoverished countries, the problem was to get the most out of resources that were not sufficient to satisfy the needs of all the people. And this means, as Marx understood way back in 1845, invidious incentives.

i C. WRIGHT MILLS FELT, at the end of his life, that the educated public, which had been the hope of liberalism, and the organized workers, to whom the socialists looked, "had either collapsed or become most ambiguous" as historical actors. (C. Wright Mills, in *Power, Politics and People,* Irving Horowitz, ed. [New York: Ballantine Books, 1965], p. 101.) Herbert Marcuse is even more pessimistic. Summarizing Marx's view of socialism he notes that free time, which is always on the increase, is supposed to give man the leisure for higher activity and turn him into a "different subject," that is, a new kind of person. In contrast to that hope, Marcuse writes, "Today advanced industrial society is creating free time but the possessor of free time is not a 'different subject'; in the capitalist and communist systems, the subject of free time is subordinated to the same norms and powers that rule the realm of necessity. The mature Marxian concept . . . appears idealistic and optimistic." (Herbert Marcuse, in *Socialist Humanism,* Erich Fromm, ed. [New York: Doubleday, 1965], p. 101.) My text will make clear shortly how profoundly pessimistic this analysis is, for Marx regarded leisure as the distinctive mark of that kingdom of freedom which socialism was to gain. Writing in the same volume as Marcuse, Lucien Goldmann, a French Marxist, argues that modern capitalism as we know it is more likely to lead to an integration of the workers into the established order than to a release of socialist consciousness. (*Socialist Humanism,* p. 42.)

In short, some radicals like Mills, and some Marxists like Marcuse and Goldmann have all come to believe in one variant or another of the theory of "mass society" in which the militant social classes are submerged and lose their distinctive identity. Others, like the various Maoist groups or the followers of

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Fanon and Guevara, look to the peasants of the Third World to take over the mission of proletarian revolution but without showing how such a premodern class could, even under the changed conditions of the twentieth century, become the architect of a new society.

There are even sociologists who compare the workers of late capitalist society to the peasants of the nineteenth century. As Alain Touraine summarizes this notion, the workers are "a category in relative decline with particular interests to defend but . . . no longer the rising group that constitutes the privileged adversary of the dominant class." (Alain Touraine, *Le Mouvement de Mai ou le Communisme Utopique* [Paris: Seuil, 1968], p. 177.) In this case, however, Touraine is not driven to the pessimism of Mills and Marcuse because he believes, from the vantage point of the explosion in May 1968 in France, that there is a "new class" that will take over the leadership the labor movement is now surrendering.

j THE CONCEPT THAT SCARCITY MIGHT BE ENDED through the development of technology was postulated at the very beginning of the modern socialist movement. In 1818 Robert Owen was already speculating that "New scientific power will soon render human labour of little avail in the creation of wealth." (Cole, *History of Socialist Thought,* 1:94.) Marx saw increasing productivity and automation as the material precondition for socialism.

But Karl Kautsky, though he tried with all his might to be an orthodox Marxist, had some doubts about his master's more apocalyptic visions. "As the measure of value and means of circulation of products," he wrote in 1924, "money will continue to exist in socialist society until the dawn of that blessed second phase of communism of which we do not yet know whether it will be more than a pious wish similar to that for the Millennial Kingdom." (Karl Kautsky, *The Labour Revolution,* H. J. Stenning, transl. [London: Allen & Unwin, n. d.], p. 262.) Anthony Crosland was even more skeptical than Kautsky. Marx, notes Crosland, had assumed that the transition to the new society would take place "only after capitalism had actually fulfilled its 'historic function' of developing the production system to a saturation point where further growth would be superfluous." But this assumption, he cautions, is "never likely to be fulfilled." (Crosland, *The Future of Socialism,* p. 417.)

John Maynard Keynes, though a principled antisocialist, was more visionary on this count than either Kautsky or Crosland:

> For the Western world [Keynes said in 1931] already has the resources and the techniques, if we would create an organization to use them, capable of reducing the Economic Problem, which now absorbs our moral and material energies, to a position of secondary importance. Thus the author of these essays, for all his croakings, still hopes and believes that the day is not far off when the Economic Problem will take the back seat where it belongs and that the arena of the heart and head will be occupied, or reoccupied, by our real problems—the problems of life and human relations, of creation and behaviour and religion. [*Essays in Persuasion,* (London: Macmillan, 1931; New York: Norton, 1963), p. vii.]

The economic basis of this hope, as I noted earlier, was that capital would cease to be scarce.

Kenneth Boulding, a distinguished economist, believes that these visions of an end of scarcity are wrong. The basic transition taking place, he holds, is not from poverty to abundance, but from the "open society" with an 'input' of material from mines and ores and fossil fuels and with pollutable reservoirs as recipients of 'outputs'—to a closed society in which there are no longer any

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mines or pollutable reservoirs and in which, therefore, all materials have to be recycled. This is what I call the 'space ship earth.'" (Kenneth Boulding, "Is Scarcity Dead?" *The Public Interest,* Fall 1966.) President Nixon echoed this thesis in his message on the environment in 1970 predicting that in "the long-range future—to 1980, 2000, and beyond—recycling of materials will become increasingly necessary not only for waste disposal but also to conserve resources."

Ironically the political deductions that follow from such a hypothesis about new forms of scarcity are as socialist as those based upon unprecedented abundance. For it is clear that only conscious planning could achieve such a careful hoarding of resources. However, I think both Boulding and Nixon omit some crucial variables—the potential of population policy, unforeseen technological innovation, even the impact of space exploration—and that the main problem in the immediate future is not a deficiency in resources but in creative political intelligence.

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

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